The purpose of this COI Focus is to assess the security situation in the five states of Darfur, the Two Areas (the two southern provinces of South Kordofan and Blue Nile) and West Kordofan in Sudan. The report is particularly focused on the period from January 2022 to December 2022.
From 30 October to 10 November 2022, the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo) and Cedoca conducted a joint fact-finding mission in Sudan. Information collected during meetings with sources in Khartoum is also included in this report.
On April 11 2019, the army put an end to the regime of president al-Bashir after months of civilian protests. In October 2020, the Sudanese transitional authorities and a number of rebel groups signed the Juba Peace Agreement, but one year later the Sudanese military staged a new coup. As the political struggle in Khartoum deepened, the violence in the peripheral states resumed, fueled by a power vacuum and the divided loyalties of the security forces. Episodes of mass violence in West Darfur left hundreds dead, thousands displaced, and hundreds of homes destroyed. Violence also spread to areas that had remained relatively stable in recent years, including Kulbus (West Darfur), Ed Damazin and Rusayris (Blue Nile). Ceasefires between the two rebel groups, SLM/A-AW and SPLM/A-N al-Hilu, and the Sudanese authorities were largely respected.
In the last decade, irregular ethnic militias and paramilitary groups have played a growing role in the violence in Darfur and the Two Areas compared to the long-established rebel groups. Various armed communal militias - organized along tribal lines and difficult to control - were active in Darfur and the Two Areas in 2022. While conflict triggers varied from place to place, outbreaks of violence usually follow a certain pattern. They are often triggered by individual disputes and criminal incidents. There was a trend of Arab militias attacking non-Arab communal militias and civilians alike in the aftermath of such incidents. State security forces hold back, intervening belatedly or even retreating because they are no match for the attackers. In other cases, members of state security forces have joined the attacks in a private capacity, bringing their weapons and choosing sides according to their ethnicity. Meanwhile, tribal self-defense units, formed by non-Arab communities, were increasingly organizing themselves. Fighters from the signatory rebel groups, who have returned from Libya, also posed a security threat to the population. Impunity for violations by any of these armed actors persisted.
For the period 1 January 2022-31 December 2022, ACLED registered 659 events in Sudan, of which 391 events occurred in Darfur and 153 events in the Two Areas and West Kordofan. There was an increase in violent incidents in Darfur in 2022, and to a lesser extent in the Two Areas and West-Kordofan, compared with the previous year. In Two Areas and West-Kordofan, the fatalities linked to violence doubled compared with 2021. Attacks made up the bulk of the violent incidents. They mostly targeted IDPs and farmers, resulting in killings, looting, destruction and burning of villages. Most of the armed clashes took place between different communal militias.
For the period 1 January 2022-31 December 2022, ACLED registered 1,930 fatalities in Sudan. More than 85 % of these fatalities were recorded in Darfur, the Two Areas and West Kordofan. Most of these fatalities are linked to confrontations between communal militias. During fighting, civilians were often attacked due to their imputed affiliation or because they were “in the wrong place at the wrong time”.
In Darfur, most of the violence occurred in the southern part of the districts Tawila, El Fasher, Melit, Kutum, and Dar As Salam (North Darfur), the districts El Geneina, Kreinik, Kulbus and Jebel Moon (West Darfur) and the different districts of South Darfur. Regional capital cities in Darfur, with the exclusion of El Geneina (West Darfur), were less affected by the insecurity than other parts of the region. Violence in Blue Nile was mainly centered in the east of the region, in the districts Wad al-Mahi, Rusayris, Geissan, and, to a lesser extent, in and around the capital city of Ed Damazin. In West Kordofan, most violent incidents happened in the districts Lagawa and Al Nuhud, and violence in South Kordofan was concentrated around Kadugli and the eastern part of the region.
Most IDPs in Sudan have been displaced multiple times, with periods of return followed by new displacement due to regular violence. Sudan housed 3,714,377 IDPs in July 2022. Darfur had an IDP population of 2,795,246 people out of a total population of 7.5 to 11 million. For the Two Areas and West Kordofan, the ratio was 536,722 IDPs out of a total estimated population of about five million people.
Politique de traitement
La politique définie par le commissaire général se fonde sur une analyse approfondie d’informations récentes et détaillées sur la situation générale dans le pays. Ces informations ont été recueillies de manière professionnelle auprès de diverses sources objectives, dont l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile (EUAA), le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés des Nations unies (HCR), des organisations internationales de défense des droits de l’homme, des organisations non gouvernementales, ainsi que la littérature spécialisée et les médias. Pour définir sa politique, le commissaire général ne se fonde donc pas exclusivement sur les COI Focus publiés sur le site du CGRA, qui ne traitent que de certains aspects particuliers de la situation du pays. Le fait qu’un COI Focus date d’un certain temps déjà ne signifie donc pas que la politique menée par le commissaire général ne soit plus d’actualité.
Pour examiner une demande d’asile, le commissaire général tient non seulement compte de la situation objective dans le pays d’origine à la date de la décision mais également de la situation individuelle et des circonstances personnelles du demandeur. Chaque demande d’asile est examinée au cas par cas. Le demandeur d’asile doit montrer de manière suffisamment concrète qu’il éprouve une crainte fondée de persécution ou court un risque réel d’atteintes graves. Il ne peut donc se contenter de renvoyer à la situation générale dans son pays mais doit également présenter des faits concrets et crédibles le concernant personnellement.
Pour ce pays, il n’y a pas une note de politique de traitement disponible sur le site Internet du CGRA.