Pakistan

Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report

October 2019
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doi: 10.2847/478022

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Cover photo: © Shankar, S., India-Pakistan border at Wagah, near Amritsar, India, November 2017, url
Acknowledgements

EASO would like to acknowledge the Belgian Centre for Documentation and Research (Cedoca) in the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, as the drafter of this report. Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed by reviewing the report:

- Austria, Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, Country of Origin Information Department
- The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis
- Poland, Country of Origin Information Unit, Department for Refugee Procedures, Office for Foreigners
- Swedish Migration Agency, Section for Information Analysis

The following external organisation reviewed this report:

ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.
Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. 3
Contents ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................. 6
Glossary and Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 12
Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 12
Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 12
Structure and use of this report ............................................................................................... 14
Map ........................................................................................................................................... 16
1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan ................................................... 17
   1.1. Overview of recent conflicts in Pakistan ........................................................................ 17
      1.1.1. History of militant violence ...................................................................................... 17
      1.1.2. Ethnic and sectarian violence ................................................................................... 18
      1.1.3. Political landscape .................................................................................................. 19
      1.1.4. International context ............................................................................................... 20
   1.2. Actors in the conflict ...................................................................................................... 22
      1.2.1. State forces ............................................................................................................... 22
      1.2.2. Armed Groups ........................................................................................................ 24
   1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations ......................................................... 36
      1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes .................................................................... 38
      1.3.2. Attacks by militant groups ..................................................................................... 39
      1.3.3. Sectarian-related violence ....................................................................................... 41
      1.3.4. Political violence .................................................................................................... 41
      1.3.5. Border attacks ........................................................................................................ 41
      1.3.6. Drone strikes .......................................................................................................... 42
   1.4. Impact of the violence on the civilian population ......................................................... 43
      1.4.1. Figures on casualties in 2018 .................................................................................. 43
      1.4.2. Civilian casualties during 1 January - 31 July 2019 .............................................. 45
      1.4.3. Children .................................................................................................................. 47
      1.4.3. Internally Displaced Persons and refugees .............................................................. 48
   1.5. State ability to secure law and order ............................................................................... 49
      1.5.1. Security forces ........................................................................................................ 49
      1.5.2. Judiciary and legal system ....................................................................................... 52
      1.5.3. Anti-Terrorism Acts and military courts ................................................................. 53
1.5.4. Detention and death penalty .................................................................................. 54
2. Security situation per region .......................................................................................... 56
    2.1.1. Trends in regional violence .............................................................................. 56
    2.1.2. Regional comparison of violence-related casualties ...................................... 58
  2.2. Security trends per geographic subdivision ......................................................... 60
    2.2.1. Punjab .............................................................................................................. 60
    2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including former FATA) ........................................... 63
    2.2.3. Balochistan ..................................................................................................... 72
    2.2.4. Sindh ................................................................................................................ 76
    2.2.5. Islamabad Capital Territory ............................................................................ 78
    2.2.6. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan ................................................................. 79
Annex I: Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 83
Annex II: Terms of Reference .......................................................................................... 114
Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (June 2019). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To the extent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making authorities.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 9 August 2019. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the introduction.

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1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: [url]
## Glossary and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Afghan Citizen Card - between August 2017 and February 2018, the Government of Pakistan, in collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan and with the support of IOM and UNHCR, carried out a country-wide exercise to identify undocumented Afghans.(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>Azad Kashmir</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda on the Indian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASWJ</td>
<td><em>Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat</em>, political Sunni Deobandi organisation, that emerged out of Sipah-e-Sahaba.(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLA</td>
<td>Balochistan Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLF</td>
<td>Baloch Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Baloch Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRAS</td>
<td>Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIED</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPF</td>
<td>Central Reserve Police Force (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSS</td>
<td>Centre for Research and Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTD</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daesh</td>
<td>See Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>A conservative Sunni religious movement.(^4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Frontier Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRC</td>
<td>FATA Research Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Gilgit-Baltistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haqqani network</td>
<td>Armed insurgent movement led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. This movement is affiliated with the Taliban. Their headquarters are based in North Waziristan tribal district and in south-east Afghanistan, in areas of the Pashtun tribe of the Zadran.(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>Ethnic (primarily) Shia Muslim minority group living predominantly in central Afghanistan, western and northern Pakistan and parts of Iran.(^6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^5\) Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations. “Haqqani Network.”, last updated: July 2018, [url](#)

\(^6\) BBC News, Pakistan Hazara minority protests after bombing in Quetta, 13 April 2019, [url](#)
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, militant group operating in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, led by Syed Salahuddin.\(^7\)

Hizbul Ahrar, a breakaway faction of the JuA.\(^8\)

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Human Rights Watch

Intelligence-Based Operation

International Commission of Jurists

Islamabad Capital Territory

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

Internally Displaced Person: person or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.\(^9\)

Islamic Jihad Union

Improvised Explosive Device

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: an armed insurgent movement operating in Afghanistan and other countries with fighters originally from Uzbekistan.\(^10\)

International Organization for Migration

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Islamic State Khorasan Province, also called ISIS, ISIL, IS or Daesh

Islamic State Pakistan Province

Inter-Services Intelligence, one of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, generally considered to be one of the most powerful Pakistani state institutions.

Inter-Services Public Relations, media wing of the Pakistani Army.

An umbrella organisation of Islamist armed insurgent organisations uniting with the aim of reintroducing a platform to reintroduce al-Qaeda.\(^11\)

Jamaat-ul Ahrar (Assembly of the Free), splinter faction of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan formed in August 2014 and based in Mohmand tribal district (former FATA).\(^12\)

Jaish-e Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army), Islamist armed insurgent group active in Kashmir.\(^13\)

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\(^7\) Al Jazeera, Explainer: Who are Kashmir’s armed groups?, 3 March 2019, [url]

\(^8\) Dawn, Taliban splinter group splits further, 13 November 2017, [url]

\(^9\) UNOCHA, Guiding principles on Internal Displacement, September 2004, [url]

\(^10\) Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.”, last updated: August 2018, [url]


\(^12\) Jeffery, F., Documenting: Jihadist groups operating in Afghanistan, 2 June 2019, Aurora Intel, [url]

\(^13\) Zahid, F., Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar, April 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, [url], pp. 1-5
Jundullah
Soldiers of Allah, a group linked to the TTP and IS.\textsuperscript{14}

Khassadar
Tribal militia, institutionalised by the British. In recent times, they have been made responsible for security in Pashtun areas, and receive a salary by the Pakistani authorities.\textsuperscript{15}

KP\textsuperscript{16}
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including former FATA.

Lashkars
Pashtun tribal armies or militias that can be mobilised via traditional tribal decision mechanisms.\textsuperscript{17}

LB
Lashkar-e-Balochistan

LeI
Lashkar-e Islam, a militant Sunni group with a sectarian agenda formed in 2004 under Mufti Shakir.\textsuperscript{18} In 2015, Lashkar-e Islam announced that it was joining Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.\textsuperscript{19}

LeJ
Lashkar-e Jhangvi, an armed Sunni militant group with a sectarian agenda in Pakistan formed in 1996. The group has carried out a number of attacks on minority groups in Pakistan and aims at establishing a Sunni caliphate.\textsuperscript{20}

LeT
Lashkar-e Taiba, a Sunni militant group, formed in 1990 and initially trained in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan. LeT fights for the unification of the Kashmir region and its integration into Pakistani territory and also attacks civilian targets in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{21}

LoC
Line of Control, disputed borderline between India and Pakistan in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir.

LJA
Lashkar-e Jhangvi Al-Alami, a faction of Lashkar-e Jhangvi.\textsuperscript{22}

Khyber-IV
Operation launched by the Pakistani army on 16 July 2017 aimed at clearing Rajgal Valley in Khyber Agency of militants.\textsuperscript{23}

Madrasa
Islamic school

MQM-P
Muttahadi Qaumi Movement- Pakistan

NACTA
National Counter Terrorism Authority

NADRA
National Database & Registration Authority

NAP
National Action Plan, Pakistan government plan to eliminate terrorism.\textsuperscript{24}

NWFP
North West Frontier Province, the former name for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

\textsuperscript{14} Reuters, Pakistan Taliban splinter group vows allegiance to Islamic State, 18 November 2014, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{15} Express Tribune (The), Khasadar force personnel deprived of salaries, 28 May 2016, \url{url}; TNN, Pro-merger people should now raise their voice for Khassadars’, 14 August 2018, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{16} In this report KP refers to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with the exception in the abbreviation ISKP where KP means Khorasan Province
\textsuperscript{17} Dawn, Death by lashkar: The forgotten protectors of Adezai village, 9 May 2016, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{18} Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009, \url{url}; Express Tribune (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{19} LWJ, 3 jihadist groups merge with Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 6 May 2015, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{20} USDoS, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 - Chapter 5 - Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ), 19 September 2018, \url{url}, p. 317
\textsuperscript{21} Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations. “Lashkar-e-Taiba.”, last updated: June 2018, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{22} Jamestown Foundation (The), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State, 27 January 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{23} Dawn, Army launches Operation Khyber-4 in Rajgal Valley, 16 July 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{24} Express Tribune (The), Fight against terrorism: Defining moment, 25 December 2014, \url{url}
Peace Committee

Often called Aman Jirgas. Members are appointed by the military or police in order to deal with security issues and to bring peace in an area, with the government giving them authority for out-of-court arbitration.25

PICSS

Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies

PIPS

Pak Institute for Peace Studies

PoR

Proof of Registration card: administrative document issued to registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan.26

PPP

Pakistan People’s Party

PTI

Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf

PTM

Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, or Pashtun Protection Movement, a grassroots Pashtun civil rights movement.27

Radd-ul-Fasaad

Code name for a military operation launched by the Pakistani army on 22 February 2017.28

Razakar

Pro-government tribal militia.29

RFE/RL

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

RSIS

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

SATP

South Asia Terrorism Portal

SDLA

Sindhudesh Liberation Army

SMP

Sipah-e Mohammed Pakistan, a Shia militant group.30

SSP

Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Prophet Followers), a former political party following the Deobandi school in Islam.31

TBIJ

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism

Tehsil

An administrative division in some parts of Pakistan

TDP

Temporary displaced persons

TTP

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, (Pakistan Movement of Taliban), the largest militant group in Pakistan. The organisation was founded in 2007 and is an umbrella of mostly, but not all, Pakistani Taliban groups. TTP had pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar, in 2007 the leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The main goal behind TTP’s establishment was to unite the various factions of the Pakistan Taliban in order to organise synchronised attacks on NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The group also carries out ‘defensive jihad’ against Pakistani military forces conducting operations in former FATA.32

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (drone)

UBA

United Baloch Army

25 Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, The role of local institutions in conflict affected Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan, September 2017, url, p. 12
26 UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Pakistan cabinet’s decision to extend stay of Afghan refugees, 28 June 2019, url
27 BBC News, Manzoor Pashteen: The young tribesman rattling Pakistan’s army, 23 April 2018, url
28 Dawn, Pakistan Army launches ‘Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad’ across the country, 22 February 2017, url
32 Elahi, N., Terrorism in Pakistan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Challenge to Security, March 2019, pp. 75-90
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Committee Against Torture</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDoS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>Religious alms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarb-e-Azb</td>
<td>Code name for a military operation launched by the Pakistani army on 15 June 2014.³³</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Introduction

This report was drafted by a Country of Origin Information (COI) specialist from Cedoca, the Belgian COI unit, as referred to in the Acknowledgements section.

The report aims to provide information on the security situation in Pakistan, which is relevant for international protection status determination (refugee status and subsidiary protection). The terms of reference can be found in Annex 2.

Methodology

This report is an update of the EASO COI report on Pakistan, Security Situation (last update: October 2018). The reference period for describing events was from 15 August 2018 until 31 July 2019. In order to ensure that the drafter respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. This quality process led to the inclusion of some additional information, in response to feedback received during the respective reviews, until 13 September 2019. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.

Sources

The information in this report results from desk research of public specialised paper-based and electronic sources, which were consulted within the time frame and the scope of the research. In addition, the Cedoca researcher, a specialist on Pakistan, conducted interviews with the following experts:

- Asad Hashim, Skype interview, 28 May 2019. Asad Hashim is a Pakistani journalist covering Pakistan.
- Malik Siraj Akbar, Skype interview, 23 May 2019. Malik Siraj Akbar is a Washington based political analyst and a Baloch journalist.
- Mohammad Amir Rana, Skype interview, 17 July 2019. Mohammad Amir Rana is a security and political analyst and director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) (https://www.pakpips.com/).
- Sarah Belal, Skype interview, 28 May 2019. Sarah Belal is the executive Director of Justice Project Pakistan (https://www.jpp.org.pk/).

This report relies on data about security incidents and casualties provided by different institutions such as the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) and the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) in their reports or on their websites. All four institutions consulted a broad range of sources. The following descriptions of their respective methodologies are based on each institution’s own reports or websites.

The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), established in Islamabad, was founded in 2006 by its director, Muhammad Amir Rana, an expert on Pakistani security issues. PIPS monitors on a daily basis

34 EASO COI reports are available via EASO’s website: url
35 PIPS, PIPS Team, n.d., url
relevant incidents in Pakistan from sources such as correspondents in the different regions, newspapers, magazines, journals and television news channels. The information is gathered in the PIPS conflict/security database and archives which form the base for their annual and monthly reports. PIPS divides ‘attacks’ into five categories:

(i) terrorist attacks, including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks and sectarian-related attacks. These attacks can be carried out through different methods (suicide attacks, beheadings and destruction of educational institutions, CD/video shops, etc.); 37

(ii) incidents of ethno-political violence;
(iii) cross-border attacks;
(iv) drone attacks; and
(v) operational attacks by security forces against militants. 38

PIPS defines ‘casualties’ as follows: ‘casualties include both the number of people killed and injured’. 39

The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) is a Pakistani research institute that analyses politics and security in the country. Executive Director, Imtiaz Gul, founded CRSS in December 2007. 40 CRSS publishes annually a report on security in Pakistan and quarterly reports. 41 In March 2019, CRSS published a ‘special edition security report’ about the violence in Pakistan from 2013 until 2018. 42

Violence as defined by CRSS includes terrorism, militant attacks, sectarian violence, crime, lynching, political rivalry, robbery, targeted killings, security operations and drone strikes. 43 CRSS uses open sources such as national printed and electronic media. 44

The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is a website run by the Institute for Conflict Management, a non-profit organisation set up in 1997 in New Delhi, India. SATP is headed by its founder K.P.S. Gill. 45 According to an explanation on their website, SATP is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. 46 SATP has established ‘a comprehensive, searchable and continuously updated database on all available information relating to terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South Asia’. 47

The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) is an independent research think-tank based in Islamabad. 48 This institution collects statistical data regarding Pakistan-specific anti-state violence. 49 The Conflict Monitoring Centre has become a part of PICSS and is now working as its statistical division. 50 PICSS publishes annual security reports and divides incidents of violence mainly in two categories: ‘violent militant activities and security forces actions’. Sectarian violence, general crimes, ethnic or language-based violence are not recorded in the annual report. 51 The data collected by PICSS is based on open sources such as newspapers, government sources and own correspondents. 52 PICSS defines militant attacks as follows: ‘a. Militant Attacks against government,
public, or private targets. These targets can be against life or property e.g. government installations such as gas pipelines, electricity transmission lines etc. and b. Militant clashes among different militant groups''.

Because of the use of a different methodology and terminology by each institution, the data on security incidents and casualties can differ between the four institutions. For example, while PIPS records ‘terrorist attacks’, PICSS records militant attacks. Therefore, chapter 1.4.1 Figures on civilian fatalities presents data from the different sources separately to allow comparison and clearer understanding of the situation.

This report contains information about security incidents and casualties for the year 2018 and for the period of 1 January - 31 July 2019. The data for the security incidents from 1 January 2019 until 31 July 2019 was provided by PIPS. This report also uses the quarterly reports of CRSS and the data on the website of SATP on figures about casualties from 1 January 2019 until 31 July 2019.

To assess the geographic spread of security-related incidents (see section 2.1 Trends in regional violence), reference is made to the dashboard of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The data of ACLED are not used in this report, except for verification of incidents.

Furthermore, this report contains numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). For this, maps from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and information collected by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) were used. These IDP data are complemented with anecdotal information on IDP movements in or from the provinces and information on the causes. This information comes mainly from media sources.

In the regional description of each administrative division, a government source was used to describe the population figures in the administrative divisions. This source was used because it describes the most recent population figures in Pakistan. Some sources casted doubts about the results of the 2017 census.

Several sources mentioned that certain areas are considered ‘no-go areas’ and certain topics are taboo in Pakistan. Asad Hashim, a Pakistani journalist, stated on 28 May 2019, during a Skype interview, that the freedom of the press in the country has been on a downwards trend since 2014. Therefore, some topics, security issues, human rights issues and some areas do not get a full coverage. In this context, journalists and bloggers apply self-censorship. In the past, individual journalists were threatened and attacked. Recently, also news agencies came under attack, are being closed down and forbidden to distribute newspapers or to broadcast on certain topics.

Structure and use of this report

This report provides information on elements and indicators that may help in assessing the need for international protection. The first part gives a general description on the security situation in Pakistan. The second part explains the security situation per province in more detail. A general description of the province contains information on the geography and population, and on the background of the conflict, including the actors active in the province. A description of recent trends in the security

53 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, url, p. 4
54 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
58 Hashim, A., Skype interview, 28 May 2019. Asad Hashim is a Pakistani journalist covering Pakistan.
59 HRW, World Report 2019 - Pakistan, 17 January 2019, url
60 Hashim, A., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
situation provides quantitative (numbers) and qualitative information (examples and description of trends). A sub-chapter focuses on the nature of the violence, frequency, targets, locations, and descriptions of incidents within a timeframe 15 August 2018 until 31 July 2019. Another sub-chapter includes information about civilian casualties. Finally, conflict-induced displacements are described in a separate section.

Both the general and regional descriptions provide information from various sources on the relevant elements and indicators. Information on an indicator as such should never be taken as conclusive, but as indicative for the assessment of protection needs, and should be read in conjunction with other indicators and information on the region.

**Administrative divisions**

The description of the security situation uses the following administrative divisions:

- The four provinces: Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan, and Sindh;
- Islamabad Capital Territory;
- The two administrative regions: Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

On 28 May 2018, the former President of Pakistan Mamnoon Hussain signed the FAT A Interim Governance Regulation (2018) which will govern FATA until it merges with KP by 2020. EASO opted to follow the administrative divisions used by UNOCHA, as they produce very clear maps and use the same division systematically in all their publications. In this report, following UNOCHA’s administrative division, former FATA is described in the section of the province of KP (see Map 1). In this report, the new names of the KP tribal districts for each of the former tribal agencies in FATA are used. For a better understanding of these tribal districts and because of their impact on the security situation, the KP tribal districts are described in general terms and then in more detail in the relevant chapter (see 2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including former FATA)).

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61 Balochistan refers to the Pakistani province of Baluchistan (see Map 1)
62 Map 1: the two regions are situated in the north of Pakistan. On Map 1, they are indicated in the grey area in the north of Pakistan
63 Dawn, President signs KP-Fata merger bill into law, 31 May 2018, url; RFE/RL, Pakistani Tribal Areas Face Long Road To Stabilization, 28 May 2018, url
64 All their relevant maps can be found here: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan/infographics
65 Express Tribune (The), Tribal areas re-designated as districts, sub-divisions, 12 June 2018, url; Express Tribune (The), Notification issued for composition of new administrative divisions in Mohmand, Khyber, 20 July 2018, url
Map

Map 1: Pakistan-Overview © UNOCHA
1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan

1.1. Overview of recent conflicts in Pakistan

The security situation in Pakistan varies across the country and is influenced by different factors such as political violence, insurgent violence, ethnic conflicts and sectarian violence. The domestic security situation is also influenced by disputes with neighbouring countries India and Afghanistan that occasionally turn violent.

1.1.1. History of militant violence

Militant violence in Pakistan is mainly caused by the separatist insurgency in Balochistan and the instability in the north-west of the country resulting from the 2001 toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban settled in former FATA and in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP, currently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), having fled the invasion of an international coalition led by the United States (US) in Afghanistan. Under their influence, several Pakistani groups with a similar ideology continued working together in what developed into a federation of armed groups. This resulted in the so-called 'Talibanisation' of the region. Taliban policies included a strict application of conservative Islamic principles and resulted in violence against civilians and eventually the Pakistani authorities. As a result, Pakistan had to forsake the support for a number of Islamist groups in the country.

Since 2007, the Pakistani security forces have carried out several military operations in the tribal districts aimed at breaking the power of the Pakistani Taliban and their affiliated organisations. From 2009 onwards, operations against the Pakistani Taliban have been one of the main sources of insecurity, causing a large-scale displacement in the north-west of Pakistan.

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to negotiate a peace agreement in February 2014 with the Taliban were unsuccessful. Soon after, militants attacked an international airport in Karachi on 8 June 2014. The Pakistani government launched a military offensive on 15 June 2014 against militant strongholds in North Waziristan. This military operation was codenamed Zarb-e-Azb (see 1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes). The militants responded with several attacks. On 2 November 2014, a suicide bombing claimed 60 lives at the Wagah border crossing near Lahore, a

67 Droogan, J., The perennial problem of terrorism and political violence in Pakistan, 5 June 2018, url
68 USIP, The Current Situation in Pakistan A USIP Fact Sheet, 1 April 2019, url
69 DW, What is Pakistan’s militancy issue all about?, 1 December 2017, url
70 Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 265-270; Al, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, url, pp. 10-11
71 DW, What is Pakistan’s militancy issue all about?, 1 December 2017, url
72 AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, url, pp. 10-11
73 ECHO, Pakistan-Factsheet, last updated: 1 February 2019, url
74 BBC News, Pakistan enters peace talks with Taliban, 6 February 2014, url
75 Al Jazeera, Pakistan military warns Pashtun rights group its 'time is up', 30 April 2019, url
76 Al Jazeera, Pakistan military warns Pashtun rights group its 'time is up', 30 April 2019, url
77 Dawn, TTP claims attack on Karachi airport, 8 June 2014, url
78 Dawn, Zarb-e-Azb operation: 120 suspected militants killed in N Waziristan, 16 June 2014, url
symbolic and sensitive area. On 16 December 2014, an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar killed nearly 150 people, mostly children of army personnel.

On 25 December 2014, after consultation with different political parties, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced a 20-point comprehensive plan of action, the National Action Plan (NAP), in order to confront the insurgent threat. The plan encompassed the establishment of special courts for the speedy trial of ‘terrorist suspects’ and a moratorium on capital punishment was revoked, after being instated earlier in December 2014. The plan furthermore stipulated the deployment of a 5,000 men strong counter-terrorism force across the country. Under the plan, no armed militias would be allowed to function in the country and the funding of terrorist organisations would be ‘choked’. The plan also envisaged combatting hate speech. The Pakistani army confirmed that military operations in the tribal areas ‘would continue’.

In 2015 and 2016, Operation Zarb-e-Azb continued. The Pakistani army was targeting a wide array of militant groups in the tribal areas. Besides military operations, the Pakistani army was called upon to provide security backup to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In February 2017, an upscale of ‘terrorist attacks’ occurred in the country. In response to these attacks, on 22 February 2017, the government of Pakistan announced a countrywide military operation codenamed Radd-ul-Fasaad (see 1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes). In the run-up to the general elections of 25 July 2018, the country witnessed a surge in violent attacks. On 13 July 2018, a suicide bomber targeted a rally of the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) in Mastung district of Balochistan province, killing 149 people and wounding 189. This was the third deadliest attack in Pakistan’s history.

Mohammad Amir Rana, security and political analyst and director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) stated in a Skype interview on 17 July 2019 that the security situation in the first half of 2019 was ‘better’ than in 2018. According to him, the situation is much more ‘stable’ than in previous years. The security forces carried out many counter-terrorism operations in the first half of 2019 and apprehended some major commanders from different militant groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Although attacks have decreased in recent years, militant groups continue to target security forces and civilians.

1.1.2. Ethnic and sectarian violence

According to Maryam Azam and Umbreen Javaid, militant groups have exploited the religious and ethnic narrative in Pakistan to seek support among the public for their own agenda. Examples of ethnic militancy include the case of Karachi (multicultural environment mixed with militant wings of political parties) and the case of Balochistan (Quetta), where the Shia Hazara community has been specifically targeted. From the mid-1980s onwards, also urban Sindh has often been in the grip of

79 Dawn, TTP splinter groups claim Wagah attack: 60 dead, 3 November 2014, url
81 Express Tribune (The), Fight against terrorism: Defining moment, 25 December 2014, url
82 Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality, 27 June 2016, url
83 Nation (The), Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two years of success, 6 September 2016, url
84 Express Tribune (The), Pakistan Army leaving no stone unturned to protect Chinese investment, 8 February 2016, url
85 Dawn, Pakistan Army launches ‘Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad’ across the country, 22 February 2017, url
87 Al Jazeera, Pakistan: Death toll rises to 149 in Mastung attack, 15 July 2018, url
88 Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 17 July 2019. Mohammad Amir Rana is a security and political analyst and director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) (https://www.pakpips.com/).
89 Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 17 July 2019
90 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, pp. 17-32; Express Tribune (The), Captain among 10 soldiers martyred in two terrorist attacks, 27 July 2019, url
ethnic violence. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement, established around the same time, has played a central role in these conflicts.\(^{94}\) Militant groups have continuously targeted religious minorities in Pakistan throughout the years. Shiias, Hindus, Sunni groups, Christians and Ahmadiyya communities were the victims of sectarian violence.\(^{95}\) Religious minorities in Pakistan are also the victims of legal, institutional and social discrimination, according to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF).\(^{96}\) Several sources stated that sectarian violence has been declining in the last two years.\(^{97}\)

The efforts of the Pakistani state to combat militancy in Pakistan have been to some extend successful. However, despite the improved security situation, the government of Pakistan has done little to combat the challenge of growing extremism and religious intolerance.\(^{98}\) Blasphemy was still a topic that was brought at the forefront of the general elections in July 2018 by candidates of several militant groups, including Jamaat-ud Dawa of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed.\(^{99}\) In April 2019, the government announced a reform plan for bringing more than 30,000 madrasas under government control, amid accusations that these religious schools promote violent extremism and maintain ties to militant networks.\(^{100}\)

### 1.1.3. Political landscape

On 25 July 2018, general elections were held in Pakistan. The run-up to the elections was overshadowed by a series of violent incidents in different provinces, by criminal cases opened against members of the ruling party, and by the prime minister’s accusation that the military had interfered.\(^{101}\) Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI) party won most seats for the National Assembly.\(^{102}\) On 18 August 2018, Imran Khan was sworn in as Pakistan’s Prime Minister.\(^{103}\) On 9 September 2018, Arif Ali was sworn in as president of Pakistan.\(^{104}\)

The Pakistani military is a prominent player in Pakistan’s politics, particularly with regard to domestic security, foreign policy and economic affairs.\(^{105}\) In the first months of 2019, the economic problems in the country (increased taxes and rising inflation) have put the government under pressure.\(^{106}\)

Early 2018, Pakistan witnessed the emergence of the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement (PTM), a civil rights movement advocating for rights for the country’s Pashtun minority.\(^{107}\)

The PTM has the following main demands: the clearance of land mines from the tribal districts; accountability for targeted killings, for extrajudicial killings, for missing persons, and people who have been held without charge or crime by the government.\(^{108}\) Manzoor Pashteen leads the PTM and the movement holds rallies and sit-ins. The media barely covers these rallies.\(^{109}\) Two other leaders of the


\(^{96}\) USCIRF, Annual report on religious freedom (covering 2018), April 2019, [url](https://example.com), pp. 72-79


\(^{98}\) Diplomat (The), Taking Stock of Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Efforts, 4 Years After the Army Public School Attack, 21 December 2018, [url](https://example.com); USIP, The Current Situation in Pakistan A USIP Fact Sheet, 1 April 2019, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{99}\) BBC News, Pakistan election raises fears of ‘creeping coup’, 23 July 2018, [url](https://example.com); Guardian (The), Imran Khan criticised for defence of Pakistan blasphemy laws, 9 July 2018, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{100}\) Reuters, Pakistan plans to bring 30,000 madrasas under government control, 29 April 2019, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{101}\) BBC News, Pakistan election: Who’s who and why it matters, 22 July 2018, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{102}\) RFE/RL, Pakistani Opposition Leader Khan Ahead In Early Results, Media Report, 27 July 2018, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{103}\) Guardian (The), Imran Khan sworn in as prime minister of Pakistan, 18 August 2018, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{104}\) Dawn, Arif Ali sworn in as 13th President of Pakistan, 9 September 2018, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{105}\) New York Times (The), Imran Khan’s ‘New Pakistan’ Is as Good as the Old, 17 July 2019, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{106}\) DW, Pakistani PM Imran Khan draws ire over taxes, rising inflation, 14 July 2019, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{107}\) BBC News, Manzoor Pashteen: The young tribesman rattling Pakistan’s army, 23 April 2018, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{108}\) Al Jazeera, Pakistan military warns Pashtun rights group its ‘time is up’, 30 April 2019, [url](https://example.com)

\(^{109}\) Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Pashtun Rights Movement Suffers First Casualty, 5 February 2019, [url](https://example.com)
PTM, Mohsin Dawar and Ali Wazir, ran in the general elections in 2018 as independent candidates and each won a seat in the National Assembly.110

According to Daud Khattak, a Pakistani journalist, the military is disturbed by the narrative and the slogans of the PTM as those are mostly related to the security forces.111 During 2018, the PTM and its leadership were labelled as ‘traitors, disloyal, and anti-state’ by their opponents, according to a 2019 article in the Diplomat. The police and security agencies arrested members and activists.112 The Pakistani military accused the PTM of being funded by India's Research and Analysis Wing (the Indian Intelligence Service) and the Afghan intelligence agency.113 Ali Wazir and eight others were arrested114 after the military killed three protesters at a check post in North Waziristan on 26 May 2019, according to the PTM. The military, however, said that it responded after the protesters opened fire first.115 Mohsin Dawar was arrested a couple of days later.116 On 22 July 2019, the Pakistani newspaper the News reported that Dawar and Wazir remain in custody.117

According to Asad Hashim, the PTM as a movement finds itself in a difficult position, as they have no idea in which direction the movement should evolve beyond holding protest and sit-ins. They did not expect the movement to grow so big and it remains a question what PTM will become in the future.118

1.1.4. International context

The security situation in neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan, India and Iran pose also a challenge for the security situation in Pakistan.119 China has military and economic interests in Pakistan.120 In addition, the bilateral relationship with the United States influences Pakistan’s domestic security policy and has an impact on the stability of the security situation in neighbouring countries.121

In 2018, Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan was tense and remained tenuous during the first half of 2019. Both countries have been blaming each other for sheltering terrorists.122 In 2017, escalating border tensions resulted in Pakistan building a fence on the border to prevent the movement of militants.123 Following Imran Khan’s inauguration as Prime Minister of Pakistan in August 2018, the two countries continued efforts to improve their relations.124 However, in January 2019, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani suggested that Pakistan was ‘a safe haven’ for militants and their cross-border activities by saying that the ‘keys to war are in Islamabad, Quetta, [and] Rawalpindi’.125 At the end of June 2019, President Ashraf Ghani visited Pakistan to discuss different topics such as strengthening bilateral cooperation and the role of Pakistan in achieving peace in Afghanistan.126

Pakistan and India share a turbulent history.127 Tensions between the two countries escalated in February 2019 after Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) claimed responsibility for killing 40 Indian soldiers in a

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110 International News (The), Two PTM leaders make it to NA, 29 July 2018, url
111 Khattak, D., telephone interview, 6 May 2019. Daud Khattak is a Pakistani journalist and Senior Editor of Radio Mashaal for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RF) in Prague.
112 Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Pashtun Rights Movement Suffers First Casualty, 5 February 2019, url
113 DW Is Pakistan’s war-ravaged northwestern region turning against the military?, 7 May 2019, url
114 Al Jazeera, Pakistani legislator Dawar surrenders to authorities, 30 May 2019, url
115 Al Jazeera, Three killed by military gunfire at Pakistan rights protest, 26 May 2019, url
116 RFE/RL, Pakistan Arrests Second Pashtun Lawmaker Over ‘Attack’ On Troops, 30 May 2019, url
117 International News (The), Opposition decides to requisition House bodies’ sessions, 22 July 2019, url
118 Hashim, A., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
119 Gandhara, Tensions With Neighbors Pose Challenges For Pakistani Foreign Policy, 9 May 2017, url
120 Council on Foreign Relationschips (Afridi, J., Bajoria, J.), China-Pakistan Relations, 6 July 2010, url
122 Diplomat (The), Afghan-Pakistani Cross-Border Terrorism Cuts Both Ways, 9 April 2018, url
123 Dawn, Pakistan holds ‘keys to war’, says Afghan president, 31 January 2019, url
124 VoA, Pakistan, Afghanistan Vow to Improve Strained Ties, 27 June 2019, url
125 Dawn, Pakistan holds ‘keys to war’, says Afghan president, 31 January 2019, url
126 Al Jazeera, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani arrives in Pakistan for key talks, 27 June 2019, url
127 DW, India and Pakistan’s troubled history, 27 February 2019, url
suicide attack in Pulwama in Indian-administered Kashmir.\textsuperscript{128} Days after this attack, India carried out airstrikes on an alleged camp of JeM in Balakot in Pakistan in the province of KP.\textsuperscript{129} Pakistan responded with airstrikes on targets in Indian-administered Kashmir and claimed that it had shot down two Indian fighter jets inside Pakistani airspace and captured two Indian pilots, but India only acknowledged one captured pilot.\textsuperscript{130}

Tensions de-escalated after Prime Minister Imran Khan decided to release the Indian pilot as a peace gesture and diplomatic efforts by countries including the United States, China and the United Arab Emirates.\textsuperscript{131} In July 2019, Pakistan lifted airspace restrictions for civilian flights and reopened a key transit air corridor five months after the military standoff with India.\textsuperscript{132} Heavy cross-border shelling along the Line of Control (LoC) continued during July 2019.\textsuperscript{133}

At the beginning of August 2019, tensions between India and Pakistan at the LoC intensified. Pakistan accused India of having used illegal cluster bombs on 30 and 31 July 2019, which killed and wounded multiple civilians. India denied this accusation.\textsuperscript{134} On 5 August 2019, India removed Kashmir’s special autonomous status (Indian-administered Kashmir) from its constitution with a presidential decree.\textsuperscript{135} Pakistan reacted by stating that it will expel India’s high commissioner in Islamabad and suspend all trade with India.\textsuperscript{136}

As for the relationship between Iran and Pakistan, both countries regularly blame each other for harbouring militants at the border.\textsuperscript{137} Pakistan plans to fence its border with Iran, according to an article in the Diplomat.\textsuperscript{138} In April 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan went on a two-day visit to Tehran.\textsuperscript{139} Pakistan and Iran agreed to set up a joint security force to police the border and to increase bilateral security co-operation.\textsuperscript{140}

China has military, security and economic interests in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{141} The involvement of China in Gwadar (Balochistan) and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has an impact on the situation in Balochistan. According to The Jamestown Foundation, Baloch insurgent groups believe that China is militarily supporting Pakistan’s government in its efforts to crush the Baloch insurgency.\textsuperscript{142} It is also perceived by the Baloch insurgent groups as an effort by the Pakistani state to exploit Balochistan’s resources while receiving little in return.\textsuperscript{143} As a result, during 2018 and in the beginning of 2019, Baloch insurgent groups conducted a series of attacks against Chinese interests (see 2.2.3. Balochistan).\textsuperscript{144}

During 2018 and the first half of 2019, the United States continued to urge Pakistan to take decisive action against militant groups and terrorism financing in the country.\textsuperscript{145} On 21 July 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan, together with the army chief and the head of the intelligence service, went on a

\textsuperscript{128} DW, India and Pakistan’s troubled history, 27 February 2019, \texttt{url}; BBC News, Kashmir attack: Tracing the path that led to Pulwama, 1 May 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{129} BBC News, Balakot: Indian air strikes target militants in Pakistan, 26 February 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{130} Al Jazeera, Pakistan shoots down two Indian fighter jets: Military, 27 February 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{131} Daily Times, Five soldiers martyred in explosion near LoC, 4 July 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{132} Al Jazeera, Pakistan reopens airspace months after India standoff, 16 July 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{133} Dawn, Soldier martyred, 4 civilians injured in ‘unprovoked shelling’ by Indian forces along LoC, 21 July 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{134} Reuters, India denies Pakistan’s claims of illegal bombs amid renewed tensions over Kashmir, 3 August 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{135} DW, India abolishes Kashmir’s autonomous status, 5 August 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{136} BBC News, Kashmir dispute: Pakistan downgrades ties with India, 7 August 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{137} TRT World (Stone, R.), Don’t underestimate Pakistan’s relationship with Iran, 29 April 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{138} Diplomat (The), Pakistan-Iran Relations Under Imran Khan, 30 April 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{139} RFE/RL, Pakistani Prime Minister Begins First Official Visit To Iran, 21 April 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{140} DW, Iran, Pakistan agree to joint border ‘reaction force’, 22 April 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{141} Council on Foreign Relationships (Afridi, J., Bajoria, J.), China-Pakistan Relations, 6 July 2010, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{142} Aamir, A., The Balochistan Insurgency and the Threat to Chinese Interests in Pakistan, 15 February 2019, in: China Brief, volume: 19, issue: 4, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{143} Council on Foreign Relationships, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks, 29 June 2018, \texttt{url}; Dawn, How Gwadar’s CPEC development might leave its people behind, 28 June 2018, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{144} Aamir, A., The Balochistan Insurgency and the Threat to Chinese Interests in Pakistan, 15 February 2019, \texttt{url}
\textsuperscript{145} New York Times (The), Pakistan Brings Terrorism Financing Charges Against Hafiz Saeed, 4 July 2019, \texttt{url}
visit to Washington to try to improve bilateral relationships between the two nations.\textsuperscript{146} According to an analyst quoted by Al Jazeera, there was goodwill between both nations. Imran Khan stated that Pakistan was seeking a ‘reset’ of its relationship with the United States in order to be seen as an equal partner.\textsuperscript{147}

1.2. Actors in the conflict

1.2.1. State forces

For a detailed description of the state’s ability to secure law and order, see \textit{1.5. State ability to secure law and order}. Below a description of the different branches of state armed forces is given.

\textbf{Pakistan Armed Forces}

According to an article in the National Interest, the Pakistan Armed Forces have around 650 000 active personnel, with a reserve personnel of 500 000, a total strength of 1.15 million as of February 2019.\textsuperscript{148} Operational control rests with the National Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a threat from India. Since 2008, a priority for the army has been counter-insurgency operations, mainly against Islamist groups, for which forces were redeployed from the Indian border.\textsuperscript{149}

Since November 2016, the Pakistan army is led by General Qamar Jawed Bajwa.\textsuperscript{150} His tenure will end in November 2019, although there was some debate whether he should get a new term.\textsuperscript{151} In August 2019, his tenure was prolonged with three years.\textsuperscript{152}

The Pakistani army consists of 26 combat divisions falling under the control of nine army corps. Most divisions are infantry divisions. Pakistan has 425 combat aircraft and has seven airborne early warning and control aircraft.\textsuperscript{153} The navy consists of nine frigates, eight submarines, seventeen patrol and coastal vessels, and eight combat capable aircraft according to an article of Reuters.\textsuperscript{154} Several sources consider the Pakistan army to be the most powerful institution in Pakistan. Sources believe that its views ‘on national security, foreign policy, and politics are given considerable weight’.\textsuperscript{155} Imran Khan appointed General Bajwa to be a part of the economic council in June 2019.\textsuperscript{156}

\textbf{Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)}

The ISI is one of several intelligence services in Pakistan. The ISI’s task is coordinating intelligence between the branches of the military, collecting foreign and domestic intelligence and conducting covert offensive operations.\textsuperscript{157} In October 2018, Lieutenant-General Asim Munir replaced Naveed Mukhtar as the head of the ISI.\textsuperscript{158} In June 2019, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed replaced Asim Munir as the new head of the ISI.\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{146} Dawn, PM in Washington, 22 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{147} Al Jazeera, Q&A: Was Pakistan PM Imran Khan’s visit to the US a success?, 25 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{148} National Interest (The), India vs. Pakistan: Who Wins in a War (And How Many Millions Could Die)?, 15 February 2019, url
\textsuperscript{149} IISS, The Military Balance 2018, 14 February 2018, url, p. 291
\textsuperscript{150} New York Times (The), Pakistan Army ‘Has Greatly Increased Its Clout’ Under New Chief, 28 January 2018, url
\textsuperscript{151} Gandhara, Pakistanis Weigh Another Term For Powerful Army Chief, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{152} Dawn, Army chief Gen Bajwa’s tenure extended for another 3 years, 19 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{155} RFE/RL, Reading The Pakistani Debate Over Military Chief’s Doctrine, 3 April 2018, url
\textsuperscript{156} New York Times (The), Imran Khan’s ‘New Pakistan’ Is as Good as the Old, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{157} Global Security, ISI Organization, 15 December 2016, url
\textsuperscript{158} Al Jazeera, Pakistan appoints new head of powerful intelligence agency, 10 October 2018, url
\textsuperscript{159} Dawn, Faiz made ISI chief in military shake-up, 17 June 2019, url
\end{flushright}
According to Hein Kiessling, a political scientist and historian, the ISI reportedly has close ties with a number of extremist Islamist groups.\textsuperscript{160} In the 1990s, the ISI established close relationships with groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and JeM to put pressure on India.\textsuperscript{161} The US has accused the ISI of supporting groups such as the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Pakistani jihadist groups allied with al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{162} The Diplomat stated in October 2018 that former ISI chief Amrullah Salah mentioned that the ISI supports the Taliban.\textsuperscript{163}

**The Frontier Corps (FC)**

The Frontier Corps (FC) is an auxiliary paramilitary force, formally under the authority of the Interior Ministry.\textsuperscript{164} According to the US Department of State (USDoS), the Frontier Corps reports to the Interior Ministry in peacetime and to the Pakistan army in times of conflict.\textsuperscript{165} Their strength is around 70,000.\textsuperscript{166} There are two major subdivisions, one stationed in KP and one stationed in the province of Balochistan. The FC helps local law enforcement to maintain law and order, to provide assistance with border control and fight against organised crime.\textsuperscript{167} According to Malik Siraj Akbar, a Washington based political analyst and Baloch journalist, the FC in Balochistan is seen as an ‘outsider’. Therefore, they are also engaged in many soft power initiatives to win the hearts and minds of the local community and discredit the army’s political opponents. The FC takes up ‘a lot of resources’ from the provincial government and also ends up playing the role of a major political power centre in the province of Balochistan.\textsuperscript{168}

**Levies and Khassadars**

Following the integration of FATA into KP, ‘the police began to operate alongside paramilitary forces in the former FATA. Paramilitary forces present in the former FATA include the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary, Khassadars (hereditary tribal police), and the FATA Levies Force, which reported to deputy commissioners (the appointed administrative heads of each tribal agency)’.\textsuperscript{169} In April 2019, the provincial government of KP announced the merger of former FATA Levies and Khassadar forces into KP police.\textsuperscript{170} No further information was found within the reporting period of this report.

**The Rangers**

The Rangers are a paramilitary force under the authority of the Interior Ministry. There are two major subdivisions: the Punjabi Rangers headquartered in Lahore and the Sindh Rangers headquartered in Karachi. The Rangers help local law enforcement, provide border security and fight smuggling. According to a March 2016 publication of the Government of Pakistan, their total strength is about 23,515 personnel in Punjab and 27,778 in Sindh.\textsuperscript{171} No recent figures could be found in the reporting period of this report. In July 2019, the Sindh Government decided to prolong ‘the special policing powers’ of the Rangers in Sindh, extending by three months their deployment and mandate in Karachi.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{160} Kiessling, H., Faith, Unity, Discipline The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, October 2016, pp. 1-11
\textsuperscript{161} Kiessling, H., Faith, Unity, Discipline The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, October 2016, pp. 1-11
\textsuperscript{162} Reuters, Mattis says will try to work with Pakistan 'one more time', 3 October 2017, url: Al Jazeera, Pakistan appoints new head of powerful intelligence agency, 10 October 2018, url
\textsuperscript{163} IISS, The Military Balance 2018, 14 February 2018, p. 294
\textsuperscript{164} IISS, The Military Balance 2018, 14 February 2018, p. 294
\textsuperscript{166} IISS, The Military Balance 2018, 14 February 2018, url, p. 294
\textsuperscript{168} Akbar Siraj M., Skype interview, 23 May 2019. Washington based journalist and Baloch journalist.
\textsuperscript{170} Nation (The), Khassadar, Levies forces merged into KP police, 9 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{171} National Commission for Government Reform’s Prime Minister’s office Government of Pakistan, A functional and legal classification of Corporations, autonomous bodies and attached departments under the federal government, March 2016, url, p. 65
\textsuperscript{172} News (The), Sindh Home Department extends stay of Rangers in Karachi, 9 July 2019, url
The Pakistani police

The Pakistani police, as a primary domestic security force, is responsible for most parts of the country. USDoS reported that the local police are under the jurisdiction of provincial governments. Policing is a provincial subject: each of the federating units has its own police force. According to USIP, the Pakistani police is underfunded, and has shortfalls in facilities and equipment. They are facing the difficult task of fighting rising crime. The police is perceived as ‘inefficient, corrupt, brutal, unprofessional and politicised’. Dawn stated that instead of structural reforms such as capacity building and financing, the focus has been on increasing the force’s numerical strength.

Pro-government militia

Tribal militias (so called Lashkars) emerged in 2008 in the tribal belt. The Pakistani military counted on the tribal militias ‘to work as a localized force’ and to help fight the Taliban in the tribal area in 2008. According to Dawn in 2016, they were often called ‘Government Taliban’. They have reportedly used indiscriminate and punitive force, engaging in the destruction of houses belonging to suspected Taliban and their families, arbitrary arrest and unlawful killings. In May 2016, according to Dawn, the provincial government of KP decided to discontinue their financing.

1.2.2. Armed Groups

Cyril Almeida, former assistant editor and journalist of Dawn newspaper stated in his presentation during a workshop organised by EASO in October 2017, that armed groups in Pakistan can broadly be divided into five major groups:

- Anti-Pakistan militants: groups that have taken up arms against the state and carry out attacks inside Pakistan. The main group is the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP);
- India-centric militants: main examples are LeT and JeM;
- Afghan-centric militants: mostly Pashtun militants with bases on Pakistani territory such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network;
- Sectarian groups: examples are the Punjabi Taliban, Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), ISKP and Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ);
- Foreign groups: al-Qaeda, the Arab militants, the Uzbeks and the Chechens are examples of foreign groups. According to Cyril Almeida, the numbers of foreign groups are rather small.

A report by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in January 2019 stated that ‘one of the key characteristics of Pakistan’s terrorist landscape is that it is not static and evolves in the short-term – with shifting allegiances, emergence of decentralised networks and cells.’ Further, this report stated that the militant groups are ‘continuously evolving and reviving in a changing security environment’. They try ‘to consolidate their operational strengths, as they compete with each other, and face counter-terrorism operations’.

The main armed groups in Pakistan are described in detail below.

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174 Daily Times, Police service-challenges and reforms, 6 October 2018, url
175 USIP, A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Stations, 18 August 2014, url, pp. 3-4
176 Dawn, Sisyphean task, 21 July 2019, url; International News (The), Inefficiency, corruption smears police department, 12 March 2018, url; International News (The), Inefficiency and corruption blotch police, 17 June 2019, url
177 Dawn, Sisyphean task, 21 July 2019, url
179 Dawn, Death by lashkar: The forgotten protectors of Adezai village, 9 May 2016, url
181 RSIS, Annual Threat Assessment-South Asia, January 2019, url, p. 52
182 RSIS, Annual Threat Assessment-South Asia, January 2019, url, pp. 52-53
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The TTP (also called Pakistani Taliban) was founded in 2007 by Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in 2009 by a US drone strike. The initial objectives of the organisation were the implementation of Sharia law and the ousting of coalition forces from Afghanistan.\(^\text{183}\) The group was banned in August 2008 by the Government of Pakistan.\(^\text{184}\) The term Pakistani Taliban was also used to describe various groups.\(^\text{185}\) The TTP is an umbrella organisation that was formed out of 13 distinct Pakistani Taliban factions – approximately half of all Pakistani Taliban factions.\(^\text{186}\)

The nomination of hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as successor for B. Mehsud was considered a rejection of possible peace talks with the Pakistani authorities.\(^\text{187}\)

Military operations during 2011-2015 eliminated the strongholds of the TTP in the former FATA and under the strain of military operations in North Waziristan in 2014, the rise of ISKP and tensions within the group over the leadership of Fazlullah, the TTP split into different factions.\(^\text{188}\) The TTP has been largely driven out of Pakistan and now operates from Afghanistan.\(^\text{189}\)

In June 2018, the TTP confirmed that TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah was killed by a US drone strike in the province of Kunar in Afghanistan.\(^\text{190}\) The TTP appointed Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud as the new ‘emir’ or TTP leader. According to analyst and managing editor of the Long War Journal Bill Roggio, the leadership of the TTP hereby returned to the Mehsud tribe in its home base of North and South Waziristan.\(^\text{191}\) Mufti Hazratullah was named deputy emir.\(^\text{192}\) In September 2018, the TTP released a redefined code of conduct to outline internal procedures, tactics and efforts to seek unification of the different factions.\(^\text{193}\) An expert on terrorism in Pakistan, Farhan Zahid, stated in April 2019 that the challenges for Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud are to reunite various TTP factions and to establish his authority over them while re-establishing TTP’s organisational infrastructure in Pakistan.\(^\text{194}\) Different sources indicated that the TTP was going through a resurgence and becoming operationally active again.\(^\text{195}\) In the first half of 2018 and especially in the run-up to the general elections, the TTP claimed responsibility for two attacks in July 2018. According to the source, this indicated the operational strength of the TTP.\(^\text{196}\) A breakaway group of the TTP was also active in South Waziristan where they were organised in one of the peace committees.\(^\text{197}\) In 2018, according to PIPS, the TTP was involved in 79 ‘terrorist attacks’, compared to 70 in 2017.\(^\text{198}\) These attacks were concentrated in the former FATA,

\(^{183}\) Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations. "TTP.", last updated: July 2018, [url]

\(^{184}\) Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations. "TTP.", last updated: July 2018, [url]

\(^{185}\) IPCS, Pakistan’s Militant Groups in 2015, January 2015, [url], p. 4

\(^{186}\) Jeffery, F., Documenting: Jihadist groups operating in Afghanistan, Aurora Intel, 2 June 2019, [url]

\(^{187}\) Guardian (The), Pakistani Taliban select hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as new leader, 8 November 2013, [url]

\(^{188}\) Jaffreyot, C., The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, April 2015, p. 212; Jeffery, F., Documenting: Jihadist groups operating in Afghanistan, Aurora Intel, 2 June 2019, [url]


\(^{190}\) Dawn, TTP chief targeted in Afghan drone strike: US, 15 June 2018, [url]; LWJ, Pakistani Taliban appoints new emir after confirming death of Mullah Fazlullah, 23 June 2018, [url]

\(^{191}\) LWJ, Pakistani Taliban appoints new emir after confirming death of Mullah Fazlullah, 23 June 2018, [url]

\(^{192}\) Jamestown Foundation (The), Pakistani Taliban: Mullah Fazlullah’s Death Revives Mehsud Clan Fortunes, 13 July 2018, [url]

\(^{193}\) Ur Rehman, Z., Pakistani Taliban: Between infighting, government crackdowns and Daesh, TRT World, 18 April 2019, [url]; RSIS, Annual Threat Assessment-South Asia, January 2019, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, [url], p. 53; Refslund Hamming, T., Jihadists’ Code of Conduct in the Era of ISIS, The Middle East Institute, 29 April 2019, [url]

\(^{194}\) Zahid, F., Profile of New TTP Chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud: Challenges and Implications, 15 April 2019, PIPS, [url]

\(^{195}\) RSIS, Annual Threat Assessment-South Asia, January 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, [url], p. 53; Baloch, H., TTP’s Ambush on Pakistan Army, The Beginning of a Resurgence?, ITCT, 28 September 2018, [url]

\(^{196}\) RSIS, Annual Threat Assessment-South Asia, January 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, [url], p. 53

\(^{197}\) Kanwal Sheikh, M., New conflict lines in Pakistan’s tribal areas, 6 July 2018, [url]

KP and Balochistan in 2018.\textsuperscript{199} The Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) reported that the TTP was attributed eleven suicide attacks in 2018.\textsuperscript{200} According to a report by Jeffrey L., a security analyst from Aurora Intel, which refers to a 2019 DoD report, the TTP consists of an estimated number of 3 000 to 5 000 active militants in Afghanistan. While holding sanctuaries across the border in eastern Afghanistan, the TTP has ‘some sleeper cells and sympathizers left in Pakistan’.\textsuperscript{201} Afghanistan is the base of operations but the group is generally not conducting attacks in Afghanistan. The TTP focuses on fighting the Pakistani government.\textsuperscript{202} In the first seven months of 2019, the TTP carried out three attacks in the Pashtun areas of the province of Balochistan targeting security officials, police officers and security forces.\textsuperscript{203} The TTP and Hizbul Ahrar (HuA), claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on police personnel at a shrine in Lahore on 8 May 2019.\textsuperscript{204}

**Jamaat-ul Ahrar (JuA)**

The JuA is a faction of the TTP but operates with a degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{205} In the summer of 2014, the JuA split from the TTP.\textsuperscript{206} In March 2015, the group re-joined the TTP but released its own statements on attacks.\textsuperscript{207} The Diplomat reported in March 2017 that the group is operating from Lalpur in Nangarhar province in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{208} The US government estimated that approximately 200 JuA militants were present in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{209} The leadership of JuA reportedly had ties to al-Qaeda and its emir, Ayman al Zawahiri.\textsuperscript{210} In 2017, JuA was led by Omar Khalid al Khurasani, a Taliban commander from Mohmand Agency. A spokesperson for the group revealed that Khurasani was killed in October 2017 in a US drone strike in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{211} However, Khurasani reportedly released a statement, just days after his presumed death. The United States also did not confirm his death.\textsuperscript{212} In August 2016, the US Department of State added the JuA to its list of global terrorists organisations.\textsuperscript{213} In July 2017, JuA was listed as a terrorist group by the United Nations Security Council.\textsuperscript{214} In February 2017, JuA announced its strategy for 2017 and named their action plan ‘Operation Ghazi’.\textsuperscript{215} The group encountered internal rivalry and a faction led by former spokesperson Mukarram formed a separate group called ‘HuA’ in November 2017.\textsuperscript{216} Different sources stated that since then the JuA is losing operational strength and human resources.\textsuperscript{217} The main targets of the group

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{199}] PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 74
\item[\textsuperscript{200}] Jeffrey, F., Documenting: Jihadist groups operating in Afghanistan, Aurora Intel, 2 June 2019, url
\item[\textsuperscript{202}] Al Jazeera, Pakistan: Blast near major Sufi shrine in Lahore kills 10, 8 May 2019, url; Dawn, ‘Facilitator’ of Data Darbar suicide blast captured, 21 May 2019, url
\item[\textsuperscript{203}] LWJ, Mehsud faction rejoins the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 4 February 2017, url
\item[\textsuperscript{204}] LWJ, Taliban splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar forms in northwestern Pakistan, 26 August 2014, url; Nation (The), Ex-TTP spokesman surrenders major a breakthrough, 18 April 2017, url
\item[\textsuperscript{205}] Roggio, B. and Weiss, C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017, url
\item[\textsuperscript{206}] Diplomat (The), Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the ‘Good Taliban’, 10 March 2017, url
\item[\textsuperscript{207}] Jeffrey, F., Documenting: Jihadist groups operating in Afghanistan, Aurora Intel, 2 June 2019, url
\item[\textsuperscript{208}] Roggio, B. and Weiss, C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017, url
\item[\textsuperscript{209}] Diplomat (The), Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the ‘Good Taliban’, 10 March 2017, url
\item[\textsuperscript{210}] FRC, Strategic Code of Conduct for “Operation Ghazi”, 16 February 2017, url
\item[\textsuperscript{211}] Dawn, Taliban splinter group splits further, 13 November 2017, url
\end{itemize}
were military and law enforcement personnel, government buildings, politicians, minority groups and lawyers.\(^{218}\)

PIPS documented that in 2018, the JuA was involved in 15 ‘terrorist attacks’ compared to 37 in 2017.\(^{219}\) All these attacks in 2018 by JuA were reported from KP province.\(^{220}\) Conversely, PICSS reported that JuA did not claim responsibility for any suicide attack or any major attack in 2018.\(^{221}\) In a Skype interview on 17 July 2019, Mohammad Amir Rana stated during 2019 that the JuA has disappeared completely in Pakistan due to a lack of leadership.\(^{222}\)

### Hizbul Ahrar (HuA)

Hizbul Ahrar is a breakaway faction of the JuA. In November 2017, Mukkaram Khan announced the formation of HuA in a video message.\(^{223}\) Mukkaram Khan is a commander originating from Mohmand tribal district. This group is orientated against the United States and its allies.\(^ {224}\) In April 2018, HuA announced ‘Operation Ibne Qasim or Bin Aim’,\(^ {225}\) directed against the Pakistani security forces while promising not to harm civilians, according to Farhan Jeffery on Twitter in April 2018.\(^ {226}\) In September 2018, the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) claimed that it had neutralised a network of HuA.\(^ {227}\) In February 2019, HuA announced a new operation against the Pakistani security forces named ‘Operation Shamzai’.\(^ {228}\)

According to PIPS, the group was found involved in six ‘terrorist attacks’ (few major ones) and claimed responsibility of two attacks each from Balochistan and Karachi and one attack each in Punjab and KP provinces.\(^ {229}\) PICSS reported that HuA was responsible for three suicide attacks in 2018.\(^ {230}\)

### The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

The IMU has been active in the Pakistani tribal region since late 2001, where it regrouped after sustaining heavy losses fighting alongside the Taliban during the US invasion of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Toher Yuldashev the group targeted the Pakistani security forces from its bases in North and South Waziristan. From 2007, the IMU formed an alliance with the TTP and fought alongside them. In 2009, Yuldashev was killed in a drone attack. Pakistan’s military operations forced the IMU to flee to North Waziristan where it started to cooperate with the Haqqani Network. Osman Odil became the new leader of the organisation in 2010. In 2015, a radical splinter group of IMU - the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) - tried to export terrorism from its Pakistan base.\(^ {231}\) On 8 June 2014, IMU militants staged a major attack on Karachi Airport.\(^ {232}\) The Pakistani army subsequently made it a priority to eradicate the group. Most of its militants fled to Afghanistan.\(^ {233}\) At the end of March 2015, the IMU reportedly pledged allegiance to ISKP.\(^ {234}\) However, some elements within IMU retained the name of the group along with its alliance with al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. Remnants of IMU continue to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan.\(^ {235}\) In September 2018, USDoS estimated IMU’s strength at

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\(^{218}\) Dawn, Pakistan welcomes UNSC sanctions on Jamaatul Ahrar, 7 July 2017, url
\(^{220}\) PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 74
\(^{221}\) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, url, p. 24
\(^{222}\) Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 17 July 2019
\(^{223}\) Dawn, Talib splinter group splits further, 13 November 2017, url
\(^{224}\) PICSS reported that in 2018, the JuA was involved in 15 ‘terrorist attacks’ compared to 37 in 2017.
\(^{225}\) Dawn, CTD Punjab ‘breaks’ TTP, Hizbul Ahrar network, 18 September 2018, url
\(^{226}\) Jeffery, F., Documenting: Jihadist groups operating in Afghanistan, Aurora Intel, 2 June 2019, url
\(^{227}\) PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 74
\(^{228}\) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, url, p. 24
\(^{229}\) RFE/RL, What Next For The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan?, 23 August 2015, url
\(^{230}\) BBC News, Karachi airport: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claims attack, 11 June 2014, url
\(^{231}\) FJ [Twitter], posted on: 24 April 2018, url
\(^{232}\) RFE/RL, What Next For The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan?, 23 August 2015, url
\(^{233}\) PICSS reported that HuA was responsible for three suicide attacks in 2018.
\(^{234}\) Dawn, Pakistan welcomes UNSC sanctions on Jamaatul Ahrar, 7 July 2017, url
\(^{235}\) BBC News, Karachi airport: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claims attack, 11 June 2014, url

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200-300 members.\textsuperscript{236} No further information could be found about the IMU in Pakistan during the reporting period of this report in the consulted sources.

**Al-Qaeda**

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda operatives withdrew to the Pakistani tribal regions. By 2008, they were so deeply entrenched in Waziristan that, according to American intelligence officials, the area had become al-Qaeda’s ‘international operations hub’.\textsuperscript{237} Among their ranks were also Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and Chinese Muslims.\textsuperscript{238}

In the former FATA, al-Qaeda had aligned itself with several militant groups, offering support with manpower, training and propaganda. It also attacked the government of Pakistan, which was viewed as apostate for allying itself with the US-led war on terrorism. Al-Qaeda in Waziristan developed privileged relations with the IJU.\textsuperscript{239} According to Farhan Zahid, since 2014, al-Qaeda has suffered losses and setbacks. In August 2017, al-Qaeda was attempting to resurrect itself in Pakistan, possibly with the help of the Jamaat-ul Ansar al-Sharia.\textsuperscript{240} According to an article published by Combating Terrorism Center in September 2017, the presence of al-Qaeda in Karachi had been growing.\textsuperscript{241} As of January 2019, according to RSIS, Al-Qaeda was largely absent and inactive in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{242} However, according to PIPS, Pakistani officials consider al-Qaeda as a potential threat as it has allies in many militant organisations.\textsuperscript{243} USDos stated in September 2018 that:

‘although al-Qa’ida (AQ) in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been seriously degraded, remnants of AQ’s global leadership, as well as its regional affiliate al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), continued to operate from remote locations in the region that historically have been exploited as safe havens. Afghan and Pakistani forces continued to contest AQ’s presence in the region and Pakistan’s military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) further degraded the group’s freedom to operate.’\textsuperscript{244}

According to PIPS, al-Qaeda was not attributed any ‘terrorist attack’ in 2018 in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{245}

**Jamaat-ul Ansar Al-Sharia**

Jamaat-ul Ansar Al-Sharia is an umbrella organisation of Islamist terrorist organisations endeavouring to converge into a platform to reintroduce al-Qaeda and restart armed activities under its banner.\textsuperscript{246} It emerged in Pakistan in April 2017. The mastermind of the group is allegedly Abdul Karim Saroush Siddiqi and militants are educated with sound technical knowledge of the media.\textsuperscript{247} A security official, cited in Dawn, stated that the exact date of the formation of this group was still not known though it was initially believed that ‘the genesis of the group could be traced to Pakistanis fighting in Syria’. This group is believed to operate in urban centres, particularly Karachi. The same article mentioned that the group had basically been neutralised in a wave of arrests in September 2017.\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{236} USDos, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 - Chapter 5 - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 19 September 2018, \textit{url}, p. 302
\textsuperscript{237} Guardian (The), Waziristan: the hub of al-Qaida operations, 7 January 2008, \textit{url}; Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 268-269
\textsuperscript{238} Reuters Alertnet, Analysis - The ties that kill: Pakistan militant groups uniting, 30 May 2010, \textit{url}
\textsuperscript{239} CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 29 June 2012, \textit{url}, pp. 67-68
\textsuperscript{240} Zahid, F., The Return of Al-Qaeda to Pakistan, Middle East Institute, 24 August 2017, \textit{url}
\textsuperscript{241} Combating Terrorism Center, Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan: A Metric Problem?, September 2017, \textit{url}
\textsuperscript{242} RSIS, Annual Threat Assessment-South Asia, January 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, \textit{url}, p. 55
\textsuperscript{243} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \textit{url}, p. 77
\textsuperscript{244} PIPS, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 - Chapter 5 - Al-Qa’ida (AQ), 19 September 2018, \textit{url}, p. 165
\textsuperscript{245} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \textit{url}, p. 77
\textsuperscript{247} Dawn, The rise and ‘fall’ of Ansarul Sharia Pakistan, 9 September 2017, \textit{url}
\textsuperscript{248} Dawn, The rise and ‘fall’ of Ansarul Sharia Pakistan, 9 September 2017, \textit{url}
PIPS did not attribute any attack to this group in the 2018 annual security report.\textsuperscript{249} No further information could be found about the Jamaat-ul Ansar Al-Sharia in Pakistan during the reporting period.

**The Punjabi Taliban**

‘The Punjabi Taliban network is a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin’, mostly sectarian and previously Kashmir insurgency focused, who have developed strong links with the TTP. The major factions of this network include operatives from Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and JeM and their splinter groups (for details on these groups, see their separate sections in this chapter).\textsuperscript{250} In 2014, the TTP Punjab chapter was led by Maulana Asmatullah Muawiya.\textsuperscript{251} In September 2014, Muawiya first intended to shift his militant activities from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and then some days later announced he would give up armed struggle in Pakistan entirely and use peaceful means instead.\textsuperscript{252} In April 2016, it was reported that the Punjabi Taliban was considered weakened and scattered.\textsuperscript{253} No further information could be found about the Punjabi Taliban in Pakistan during the reporting period.

**Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)**

The first reports about ISKP (also called ISIS, ISIL, IS, or Daesh) appearing in Pakistan date back to the beginning of 2015.\textsuperscript{254} IS envisaged global expansion of the caliphate and designated the region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian republics Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP – Islamic State Khorasan Province).\textsuperscript{255} In May 2019, Islamic State announced Wilayat Pakistan (Islamic State Pakistan Province, ISPP)\textsuperscript{256} after claiming multiple attacks in the province of Balochistan.\textsuperscript{257} Antonio Giustozzi, an independent researcher and a visiting professor at King’s College London, stated in February 2016 that ISKP had an estimated 2 000 to 3 000 members in Pakistan, including ‘fighters and support elements’.\textsuperscript{258} Different militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Khilaafat Pakistan, the Shahidullah Shahid Group of TTP, Jundullah and IMU pledged allegiance to the leader of IS, al-Baghdadi.\textsuperscript{259}

Farhan Zahid stated that ISKP had managed to increase its influence by forming ‘tactical alliances’ with similar local militant groups. ISKP asserted its dominance through local affiliates in urban centres of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{260} Different sources reported that ISKP in 2016–2017 had recruitment networks in several major urban regions such as Peshawar and Karachi.\textsuperscript{261} In a report of May 2019 of Huzaifa Baloch, a writer on security issues, ISKP has ex-TTP commanders in it ranks and this makes it easy for this group to carry out attacks in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{262}

ISKP is involved in sectarian attacks both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. According to PIPS, the group has relatively greater presence and activities in Balochistan and northern Sindh, where a ‘new

\textsuperscript{249} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{250} Abbas, H., Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, 15 April 2009, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{251} Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, The Punjabi Taliban, February 2014, \url{url}, pp. 28-31
\textsuperscript{252} Dawn, Punjabi Taliban call off armed struggle in Pakistan, 13 September 2014, \url{url}; Dawn, Punjabi Taliban give up ‘armed struggle’, 14 September 2014, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{253} International News (The), Who are Punjabi Taliban?, 24 April 2016, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{254} Henry Jackson Society (The), ISIS Khorasan: Presence and potential in the Afghanistan Pakistan region, October 2017, \url{url}, pp. 4-7; USIP, The Islamic State in Pakistan, 21 September 2016, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{255} Jamestown Foundation, Islamic State in Afghanistan Ready to Capitalize on Mullah Omar’s Death, 3 September 2015, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{256} Throughout this report reference is made to ISKP
\textsuperscript{257} Jeffery, F., What Does Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Hind & Wilayat Pakistan Mean?, ITCT, 20 May 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{258} Giustozzi, A., The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: A Nuanced View, RUSSI commentary, 5 February 2016, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{259} Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan’, 4 February 2016, \url{url}; Diplomat (The), The Islamic State Threat Is Real in Pakistan, 18 February 2016, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{261} Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan’, 4 February 2016, \url{url}; IRIN, Islamic State ramps up recruitment in Pakistan, 11 January 2017, \url{url}; Wall Street Journal (The), Pakistan Frets Over Potential Appeal of Islamic State, 23 February 2016, \url{url}; VoA, Islamic State Takes Root, Grows Along Afghan-Pakistan Border, 1 March 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{262} Baloch, H., Peace Talks, ISKP and TTP—The Future in Question, ITCT, 6 May 2019, \url{url}
emerging sectarian fault-line lies.\textsuperscript{263} PICCSS adds that ISKP also has an operational presence in parts of Punjab province.\textsuperscript{264} Daud Khattak noted during a telephone interview on 6 May 2019 that ISKP is existing in an ‘organizational shape’ across the border in Afghanistan, but that is not the case in Pakistan. There are individual cases of ISKP supporters in some cities, but the Pakistani security forces took quick action and made some arrests. Daud Khattak explained that their supporters may exist in Pakistan, particularly among the educated class, but they are not organised and they do not have a base. Khattak mentioned that they have some individual supporters in the cities, with some groups on social media.\textsuperscript{265} In June 2019, the CTD of Punjab killed two ISKP militants and closed ‘a big chapter’ of ISKP in the province.\textsuperscript{266}

PIPS documented that ISKP was responsible for five ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2018, compared to six in 2017. Four attacks took place in Balochistan and one in KP in 2018.\textsuperscript{267} ISKP claimed some of the deadliest attacks in Pakistan,\textsuperscript{268} including the attack on the Mastung election rally which killed more than 130 people and injured 300 in July 2018.\textsuperscript{269} ISKP continued to claim a series of deadly attacks in Balochistan in May 2019.\textsuperscript{270}

**Haqqani Network**

The Haqqani network is an insurgent network with origins in the 1970s mujahideen groups. Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani founded the Haqqani Network.\textsuperscript{271} In September 2018, Jalaluddin Haqqani reportedly died aged 71.\textsuperscript{272} In July 2015, Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed as a deputy leader of the Afghan Taliban.\textsuperscript{273} The group’s leadership historically maintained a power base around Pakistan’s tribal areas.\textsuperscript{274} According to a USDoS report of September 2018:

> ‘The Haqqani Network is active along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and across much of southeastern Afghanistan, particularly in Loya Paktia (which consists of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces, and includes parts of Logar and Ghazni) and has repeatedly targeted Kabul in its attacks’.\textsuperscript{275}

It was reported in 2017 that the the Haqqani Network also had a long-standing relationship with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which led to frictions between Pakistan and the US.\textsuperscript{276} The Haqqani network was also believed to have ties with al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{277} A United States general stated in November 2014 that ongoing Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan have ‘disrupted’ the military capabilities of the Haqqani Network.\textsuperscript{278} The Haqqani Network relocated in 2014 from North Waziristan to Kurram under pressure of these military operations.\textsuperscript{279} No information could be found during the reporting period of attacks carried out by the Haqqani Network in Pakistan.

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\textsuperscript{263} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{264} PICCSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{265} Khattak, D., telephone interview, 6 May 2019
\textsuperscript{266} VoA, Pakistan Says it Struck a Blow Against Islamic State-Khorasan, 21 June 2019, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{268} PICCSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url](#), p. 25
\textsuperscript{269} Baloch, H., Peace Talks, ISKP and TTP—The Future in Question, ITCT, 6 May 2019, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{270} Jeffery, F., What Does Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Hind & Wilayat Pakistan Mean?, ITCT, 20 May 2019, [url](#); Express Tribune (The), Blast hits Hazara community’s shoe market in Quetta, 6 August 2019, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{272} AP News (Gannon, K.), Death of Afghan group’s founder unlikely to weaken militants, 4 September 2018, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{273} Ruttig, T., The New Taleban Deputy Leaders: Is there an obvious successor to Akhtar Mansur?, 10 February 2016, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{274} VoA, What is the Haqqani Network?, 1 June 2017, [url](#); Economic Times (The), US asks Pakistan to act against Haqqani network, other terror groups, 27 February 2018, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{276} VoA, Haqqani Network Remains Primary Source of Pakistan-US Tensions, 29 November 2017, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{277} CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, [url](#), p. 63
\textsuperscript{278} Dawn, Operation Zarb-e-Azb disrupted Haqqani network; US general, 6 November 2014, [url](#)
\textsuperscript{279} LWJ, US drones target jihadist ‘hideouts’ in Pakistan’s tribal areas, 22 February 2016, [url](#)
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

SSP is a former Deobandi political party founded in the early 1980s by Sunni cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in Jhang, Punjab.\(^{280}\) Its principal aim is to fight Shia influence in Pakistan.\(^{281}\) Jhangvi was assassinated in 1991 and replaced by Maulana Azam Tariq. Tariq was killed in 2003 and was succeeded by Maulana Ali Sher Hyderi. It was reported that the organisation had close ties with the Jihadi organisation JeM and the TTP, and was a part of the Punjabi Taliban network. Several reports labelled SSP as a violent group. At the beginning of the century, it was responsible for the murder of Shia militants, ordinary Shia citizens and attacks on Shia mosques. Although the group denied involvement in violence, former President Musharraf banned it in 2002, and in 2005, the US listed SSP as a ‘terrorist organisation’.\(^{282}\) A part of SSP rebranded itself as Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama’at, which under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi became a political party.\(^{283}\)

Other members left SSP to form Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which observers said was even more radical than the SSP.\(^{284}\) Other extremist splinter groups of SSP include the Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Tanzeem-ul Haq, Al-Farooq and the Al-Badr Foundation.\(^{285}\) The core of SSP supporters was made up of Sunni peasantry in the rural Jhang and merchant and trader classes in the urban centres. The madrassas were a major recruiting ground for SSP. SSP cadres received *jihadi* training in Afghanistan. To fund its organisation and activities, SSP relied on contributions from its supporters in the form of *zakat*. Sunni business people contributed as well. Observers believed that SSP received considerable financial and logistic backing from Saudi donors who wanted to curb Iran’s influence over the Shia population in Pakistan.\(^{286}\) SSP reportedly had a political party; it also had a student wing, an insurance company, many offices in all districts of the Punjab and a nationwide network.\(^{287}\)

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

LeJ is a Deobandi militant group founded in 1996, when a number of militants led by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq broke away from SSP Pakistan. LeJ is not a political party but a purely paramilitary organisation. Some claim that its creation was prompted by the 1994 establishment of Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP), a Shia militant group that targeted leaders of SSP.\(^{288}\) USDoS noted in September 2018 that LeJ was formed as the militant wing of SSP to attack the Shia community and that it became independent when it gained more proficiency.\(^{289}\) USDoS stated that LeJ ‘works closely’ together with the TTP.\(^{290}\) LeJ was openly supported by the ISI, who used the group as a proxy in Afghanistan and India as well to counter Shia militant groups in 2000 and 2001.\(^{291}\) LeJ was banned by the Pakistan Government in 2001 and was placed on the US terrorist list in 2003.\(^{292}\) Its underground

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\(^{281}\) Nelson, M., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#).


\(^{283}\) Nelson, M., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan; 16-17 October 2017, Rome, February 2018, [url](#).

\(^{284}\) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, [url](#).

\(^{285}\) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, [url](#).

\(^{286}\) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, [url](#).


\(^{289}\) Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations. “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.”, last updated: August 2018, [url](#).


\(^{291}\) Reuters, Special Report: Pakistan’s threat within - the Sunni-Shia divide, 24 October 2012, [url](#); National (The), Pakistan arrests 97 Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants, 12 February 2016, [url](#); Guardian (The), Pakistan military intelligence under fire for failing to prevent Quetta bombing, 18 February 2013, [url](#).

violent activities continued, especially against Shias and members of the Hazara community in Quetta. 293

Although most of the violence used by LeJ targets Shias, the organisation also cultivated a radical stance against Christians, Ahmadi and Sufi Muslims. 294 A substantial number of the leadership of LeJ have either been killed, including Malik Ishaq in 2015295, or captured in 2017, like Naeem Bukhari. 296 On 19 January 2017, LeJ’s commander Asif Chuto was killed in an encounter with law enforcement agencies. 297 In May 2018, security forces killed the commander of LeJ’s Balochistan chapter Salman Badeni. 298 According to PIPS, in 2018, LeJ had further lost it operational strength. 299

According to PIPS, LeJ was responsible for seven ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2018 in Pakistan, compared to ten of such attacks in 2017. 300 Six of these attacks took place in Balochistan and one in KP. 301 Its main areas of operation are the province of Punjab, former FATA, Karachi and the province of Balochistan. 302

Lashkar-e Jhangvi Al-Alami (LJA)

Over the past decade, LeJ broke up in different factions as a result of the military operations of the Pakistan State. 303 One of those emerging factions is LeJ Al-Alami (LJA) 304, designated by Pakistan as a ‘terrorist organisation’ in November 2016. 305 The main difference between LeJ and LJA is that LeJ only targets minority groups whilst LJA also carries out attacks on law enforcement agencies and government installations. 306 The Jamestown Foundation reported in January 2017 that the group was led by Yousaf Mansoor Khurasani and a shura (council) composed of six members. 307

In 2018, PIPS did not mention any attack claimed by LJA. 308

Lashkar-e Islam (LI)

LI is a militant group that is active in Khyber tribal district. 309 An article of 2016 of Afghanistan Analyst Network estimated the size ‘at no fewer than 500 in the past three years’. 310 The government of Pakistan banned LI in June 2008. 311 Pakistani military operations in 2014 reportedly crippled the group’s operational capabilities in Khyber district. As a result, members of LI relocated to Afghanistan. 312 It has been reported that LI works together with ISKP in Afghanistan and both are...
‘important allies’. In 2015, LI announced its merger with the TTP. The leader of LI, Mangal Bagh, was reportedly killed in a drone attack in Afghanistan in the summer of 2016. This was not confirmed by the Pakistani government or by experts. A regional expert declared to Voice of America (VoA) in February 2018 that Mangal Bagh was still alive and active in eastern Afghanistan.

LI was involved in 10 ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2018 compared to 21 in 2017 according to PIPS. All of these attacks took place in KP. PIPS reported that LI is losing its operational capabilities.

Sipah-e Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)

SMP is a Shia militant group whose aim is to protect the Shia community and target hostile Sunni Deobandi organisations such as SSP and LeJ. SMP is an armed offshoot of a mainstream Shia political party, the Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ). The origins are unclear but it was probably founded around 1993 by Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani. SMP was banned in Pakistan in August 2001.

In 2018, SMP carried out one ‘terrorist attack’ in the province of KP, according to PIPS.

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)

JeM was founded late 2000 by former Harakat ul-Mujahideen leader Masood Azhar. USDoS stated in September 2018 that ‘the group aims to annex the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and expel international forces from Afghanistan. JeM has openly declared war against the United States’. JeM and the Pakistani army have been accused of having an alliance. According to Pakistani security analyst, Azaz Syed, cited by Farhan Zahid in an article of 2019, JeM has an estimated strength of 40 000 militants. JeM has relations with multiple militant groups operating in Pakistan such as the TTP and LeJ. The structure of the organisation can be categorised as cell-based and operated in Pakistan Punjab’s southern districts.

JeM was also active in Indian Kashmir since the Pathankot airbase attack in 2016. Since then, it steadily increased its presence and activities in Kashmir according to security analysts. On 14 February 2019, JeM carried out an attack on a convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel in Pulwama in Indian-administrated Kashmir. In this attack, 46 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed and 80 others wounded. India blamed Pakistan for this attack, which triggered an escalation of tensions

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314 LWJ, 3 jihadist groups merge with Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 6 May 2015, url
315 Nation (The), Mangal Bagh ‘is dead’, 25 July 2016, url
316 VoA, IS, Lashkar-e-Islam Clash in Eastern Afghanistan, 11 February 2018, url
318 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, p. 75
320 Express Tribune (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, url
322 Zahid, F., Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar, April 2019, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, url, pp. 1-5
324 Lowy Institute, Pakistan and Jaish-e-Mohammad: An unholy alliance, 7 July 2017, url; Diplomat (The), Jaish-e-Mohammed: Under the Hood, 13 March 2019, url
325 Zahid, F., Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar, April 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, p. 5
326 Zahid, F., Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar, April 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, p. 5
327 Basit, A., Mahmood, S., Implications of Possible United States Withdrawal on the South Asian Militant Landscape, April 2019, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, p. 21
328 BBC News, Pulwama attack: India will 'completely isolate' Pakistan, 15 February 2019, url; Zahid, F., Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar, April 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, p. 1
between India and Pakistan. The leader of JeM, Masood Azhar was placed on the list of ‘global terrorists’ by the United Nations on 1 May 2019.

Nationalist movements in Balochistan

Malik Siraj Akbar, a Washington based political analyst and Baloch journalist, stated in a Skype interview on 23 May 2019 that the Balochistan nationalist groups have become more structured and organised in 2019. They seem to have more resources; they wear a uniform with their name on it and record their messages in English. This does not only show, according to Akbar, that they are highly educated but also that they want to get international attention and support for their movement.

They have diversified their attacks and strategies, which made them more unpredictable. Previously their modus operandi was mostly targeted killings. Now attacks are more random with every attack being different from the previous one in terms of the geographical region, the target and the attack itself. They are looking for targets that can get them international attention. The armed movements of these groups are very sophisticated compared to their political movements.

Below the most prominent Baloch nationalist groups are described.

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

The BLA is a Baloch armed nationalist movement. Its objective is an independent Balochistan, free of Pakistani and Iranian rule. Because of its violent methods, such as bomb attacks, it was banned in Pakistan in April 2006. The BLA is led by Harbiyar Marri, who lives in the United Kingdom. Security analyst Abdul Basit stated that the BLA is one of the strongest threats to China’s investments, due to its prominent physical strength (2,000 to 3,000 militants) and that the groups are capable to operate out of Afghanistan, in Iran and in Balochistan’s mountainous areas. In July 2019, the US Department of State designated the BLA as a ‘terrorist organisation’.

PIPS stated that the BLA carried out 25 ‘terrorist attacks’ in Balochistan in 2018, which is a decrease compared to 2017 when they carried out 51 attacks. In November 2018, three BLA gunmen killed at least five people in an attack targeting the Chinese consulate in Karachi in the province of Sindh. This was the second time the group carried out a suicide attack, instead of their ‘normal’ operating tactics such as mortar attacks and ambushes. According to an article of RSIS this signified a willingness to learn from other terrorist groups and to evolve. On 10 May 2019, the BLA killed at least five people in a gun and bomb attack on a coalmine in Harnai district in Balochistan. On 12 May 2019, militants of the BLA attacked the Pearl Continental hotel in Gwadar, killing at least five people.

329 Zahid, F., Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar, April 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, url, p. 1
330 Al Jazeera, UN puts Pakistani armed group chief Masood Azhar on ‘terror’ list, 1 May 2019, url
331 Akbar Siraj M., Skype interview, 23 May 2019
332 Akbar Siraj M., Skype interview, 23 May 2019
333 Akbar Siraj M., Skype interview, 23 May 2019
334 Akbar Siraj M., Skype interview, 23 May 2019
335 Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009, url; Express Tribune (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, url
336 South China Morning Post (Basit, A.), Attacks on Chinese nationals and interests in Pakistan are likely to continue. Here’s why, 27 November 2018, url
337 RFE/RL, U.S. Designates Pakistan’s Balochistan Liberation Army As Terrorist Group, 3 July 2019, url
339 Al Jazeera, Gunmen attack Chinese consulate in Karachi, 23 November 2018, url
340 RSIS, Annual Threat Assessment-South Asia, January 2019, in: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, url, p. 57
341 Al Jazeera, Pakistan: Five dead as Baloch separatist gunmen attack coal mine, 10 May 2019, url
342 Al Jazeera, Pakistan military says five killed in hotel attack in Gwadar, 12 May 2019, url
The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)
The BLF is an insurgent group, led by Allah Nazar Baloch.\textsuperscript{343} This group operated across Balochistan, but was primarily active in the Makran belt.\textsuperscript{344} BLF was banned in September 2010.\textsuperscript{345} In October 2017, the BLF accused local journalists of collaborating with the Pakistani army, threatened and boycotted the local media.\textsuperscript{346}

According to PIPS, the leadership of the BLF has moved into the neighbouring countries, which has a negative effect on its operational abilities.\textsuperscript{347} In 2018, the BLF claimed responsibility for 22 ‘terrorist attacks’ compared to 39 in 2017.\textsuperscript{348}

The Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
The banned BRA is the militant wing of the separatist Baloch Republican Party (BRP) and was at the end of 2018 reportedly headed by Brahumdagh Bugti.\textsuperscript{349} The most prominent BRA attack was in January 2015 against the electricity network of Pakistan, which caused a blackout in 80% of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{350}

The BRA carried out 12 attacks in 2018, mainly in Dera Bugti, Nasirabad and Kholu districts of Balochistan province.\textsuperscript{351}

United Baloch Army (UBA)
The UBA is a nationalist insurgent group in Balochistan and a splinter group of the BLA.\textsuperscript{352} In 2015, the UBA was led by Mehran Marri.\textsuperscript{353} The Balochistan Post reported in February 2018 that the BRA, the UBA and the Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LB) would work together for an independent Balochistan.\textsuperscript{354}

Baloch Raji Ajoji Sangar (BRAS)
The Baloch Raji Ajoji Sangar (BRAS), also known as the Baloch People Liberation Coalition, is a coalition of the BLA, the BLF and the Baloch Republican Guards after publicly disagreeing for years.\textsuperscript{355} This coalition was launched in November 2018.\textsuperscript{356} According to an article published by the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR), ‘unification and consolidation of the national strength is the only way forward to get rid of Pakistani occupation of Balochistan’. The coalition aims to direct coordinated attacks against Pakistani military, Chinese interests in Balochistan and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) sites.\textsuperscript{357} According to the Pakistani foreign minister, training and logistical camps are established in the Iranian region bordering Pakistan.\textsuperscript{358}

\textsuperscript{343} South China Morning Post (Basit, A.), Attacks on Chinese nationals and interests in Pakistan are likely to continue. Here’s why, 27 November 2018, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{344} Firstpost, Pakistan releases wife, children of Baloch Liberation Front chief Allah Nazar after detaining them for ‘illegal travelling’, 4 November 2017, \url{url}; RFE/RL, Pakistan’s Balochistan Conflict Reverberates In Europe, 7 December 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{345} Express Tribune (The), The List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{346} BBC News, Balochistan journalists caught ‘between the stick and the gun’, 26 November 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{347} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \url{url}, p. 79
\textsuperscript{348} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \url{url}, p. 79
\textsuperscript{349} South China Morning Post (Basit, A.), Attacks on Chinese nationals and interests in Pakistan are likely to continue. Here’s why, 27 November 2018, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{350} Diplomat (The), The Understanding Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency, 24 June 2015, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{351} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \url{url}, p. 79
\textsuperscript{352} RFE/RL, Pakistan’s Balochistan Conflict Reverberates In Europe, 7 December 2017, \url{url}; Dawn, Situationer: Who’s who of Baloch insurgency, 1 June 2015, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{353} Dawn, Situationer: Who’s who of Baloch insurgency, 1 June 2015, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{354} Balochistan Post (The), Baloch pro-freedom groups to work unitedly, 25 February 2018, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{355} Gandhara, Balochistan’s Separatist Insurgency On The Wane Despite Recent Attack, 18 April 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{356} CSCR (Nabeel, F.), Identity as a Pretext of Terror: Brief Backgrounder of Baloch Raaji Aajoji Sangar, 18 April 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{357} CSCR (Nabeel, F.), Identity as a Pretext of Terror: Brief Backgrounder of Baloch Raaji Aajoji Sangar, 18 April 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{358} Reuters, Pakistan asks Iran to act on militants behind Baluchistan killings, 20 April 2019, \url{url}
From November 2018 until 18 April 2019, BRAS claimed responsibility for 'at least three terror attacks'. On 18 April 2019, BRAS killed 14 bus passengers after several buses were ambushed in the remote Ormara area of Balochistan.

### 1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations

According to sources systematically collecting information on militant and anti-state violence in Pakistan, the overall security situation improved in 2018 compared to previous years. The nature of the violence in 2018 and in the first seven months of 2019 was diverse and is described in detail in the following sections.

In 2018, the Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) recorded 406 incidents of anti-state violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the Pakistani government, in which 694 people were killed (164 militants, 356 civilians, 172 security forces personnel, 2 razakars, pro-government tribal militia). A total of 985 people were injured including 695 civilians, 7 militants and 283 security forces personnel. Compared to 2017, this represents a 57% decrease in the number of incidents.

PIPS documented 497 incidents of violence, resulting in 869 deaths and 1,516 injured in 2018. More than half of the number of violent incidents (262) were labelled as 'terrorist attacks', according to PIPS (see Figure 1). Compared to 2017, the number of violent incidents decreased by approximately 30%.

Figure 1 presents a breakdown of the nature of violent incidents and the number of casualties recorded by PIPS in 2018:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of violence incidents</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>No. of killed</th>
<th>No. of injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘Terrorist attacks’</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>262</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political / election-related violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clashes &amp; encounters between security forces &amp; militants</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-tribal clashes/attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border clashes/attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational attacks by sec. forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drone attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian clashes</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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359 CSCR (Nabeel, F.), Identity as a Pretext of Terror: Brief Backgrounder of Baloch Raaji Aajo Sangar, 18 April 2019, url
360 Al Jazeera, Gunmen kill 14 bus passengers in Pakistan’s Balochistan, 18 April 2019, url
362 For a description of this source, see the introduction
365 For a description of this source, see the introduction
367 Sectarian and political (etc.) ‘terrorist attacks’ are counted as ‘terrorist attacks’ and not included in the other categories;
368 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 20
For the first seven months of 2019, PIPS documented 276 incidents of overall violence (see Figure 2). This resulted in 403 killed and 702 injured. More than half of the number of violent incidents (155) were labelled as ‘terrorist attacks’, according to PIPS (see Figure 2), killing 253 and injuring 539 people.

Figure 2 presents a breakdown of the nature of violent incidents and the number of casualties recorded by PIPS in the first seven months of 2019:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of violence incidents</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>No. of killed</th>
<th>No of injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Terrorist attacks’</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political /ethnic violence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clashes &amp; encounters between security forces &amp; militants</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border clashes/attacks</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational attacks by sec. forces</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot/foiled terror attempts</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery of dead bodies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted attacks (not by ‘terrorists’)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests/clashes w. security forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 1 January-31 July 2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>403</strong></td>
<td><strong>702</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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369 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 20
370 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
371 Sectarian and political (etc.) ‘terrorist attacks’ are counted as ‘terrorist attacks’ and not included in the other categories; PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 12
372 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
373 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes

According to PIPS, security operations and armed clashes were reported in all four provinces of Pakistan in 2018. Security forces carried out 31 operations and raids against militants in 2018, compared to 75 operations and raids against militants in 2017.374 Most of these operational strikes were carried out in Balochistan (15), Sindh (1), Punjab (2) and in KP (13).375 According to PIPS, 77 people were killed (compared to 296 in 2017), including 68 militants and 9 security forces personnel.376 Besides these operational attacks, security forces engaged in 22 armed clashes with militants in 2018. This is a decrease of 68 % compared to 2017. These clashes claimed 43 lives in 2018 (37 militants, 5 security forces personnel and one civilian). In total 16 people sustained injuries: 15 security forces personnel and one militant.377

PIPS stated that in the first seven months of 2019, the security forces carried out 23 operations against militants. Besides these operational attacks, security forces engaged in 15 armed clashes with militants in the first seven months of 2019.378

For further information on the varying numbers of civilian casualties and the various methodologies used by these research institutions, see the introduction and 1.4.1. Figures on casualties.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched on 15 June 2014 by the Pakistani armed forces in the province of KP and in the former FATA. The purpose of the operation was to target the militants in North Waziristan.379 Operation Zarb-e-Azb reduced the levels of militant violence, but at the cost of high levels of violence on behalf of security forces that affected the civilian population.380 Most areas were cleared of militants, except a few pockets and sleeper cells. Therefore, the Pakistani state has regained public trust to some extent but the operation was conducted ‘in a violent manner’. The operation also caused internal displacement.381 Critics of the operation claim it did not destroy the TTP, who were able to relocate to Afghanistan to carry out attacks from there. Also, intolerance and extremism have allegedly increased.382

Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad

Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad was launched on 22 February 2017, after a series of attacks in the country in the beginning of 2017. This operation has not been confined to one area, but carried out across the whole of Pakistan.383 The operation is aimed at eliminating the threat of terrorism and at consolidating the gains of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. It also aimed at ensuring the security of Pakistan’s borders. The operation included the involvement of Pakistan’s air force, Pakistan’s navy, Pakistan’s police and other civil armed forces.384 The Rangers were given ‘special powers’ to operate in Lahore and different parts in the province of Punjab.385 The strategy of the operation is to use Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs). IBOs used information from multiple intelligence agencies to find and eliminate militant

378 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
380 Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality, 27 June 2016, url; BBC News, Uncovering Pakistan’s secret human rights abuses, 2 June 2019, url
381 Dawn, Nearly 40pc IDPs have returned to North Waziristan, army chief told, 19 December 2015, url
382 Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality, 27 June 2016, url
383 Express Tribune (The), Army launches Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad against terrorists across the country, 22 February 2017, url
384 Dawn, Pakistan Army launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' across the country, 22 February 2017, url
385 Al, Pakistan: Wave of violence shows a horrific disregard for human life, 23 February 2017, url
hideouts across the country. Operation *Radd-ul-Fasaad* reduced the level of violence but failed to prevent militant attacks on security forces and civilians.386 This military operation led to criticism that some groups such as Pashtuns, including Afghan migrants in the country were indiscriminately targeted.387 Anti-militant operations as part of *Radd-ul-Fasaad* continued in 2018. In July 2019, the operation was ongoing.388

**Operation Khyber-IV**

In July 2017, the Pakistani army launched Operation Khyber-IV to clear Rajgal Valley in of militants in Khyber tribal district.389 The main goal of Operation Khyber-IV was to eradicate the threat of IS in Khyber tribal district, although security forces also targeted other militant groups and focused on the border security at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.390 The Pakistani army announced the completion of Operation Khyber-IV on 21 August 2017.391

1.3.2. Attacks by militant groups

Militant groups continued to conduct attacks in 2018 and the first half of 2019. Tactics used were targeted killings, different types of IEDs, suicide attacks, kidnappings, grenade blasts, rocket attacks, sabotage acts and mortar attacks.392 Figures on these attacks and a description of the most common methods used by militants is given here below.

**Numbers**

According to the PIPS 2018 annual report, 262 ‘terrorist attacks’ were carried out by militant, nationalist, insurgent and violent sectarian groups in Pakistan in 2018. This is a 29% decrease compared to 2017 (370 ‘terrorist attacks’). PIPS mentioned that in 2018 those attacks killed 595 and injured 1,030 people. The number of people killed decreased by 27% compared to 2017.393 Those killed in these attacks in Pakistan in 2018 included 371 civilians, 173 security forces personnel and 51 militants, whilst those injured included 724 civilians, 302 security forces and 4 militants.394

According to PICSS 2018 annual report, 229 militant attacks occurred in 2018 compared to 420 in 2017. PICSS mentioned that in 2018 those attacks killed 579 people and injured 960.395 According to numbers provided by PIPS, in the first seven months of 2019, 155 ‘terrorist attacks’ were documented. These attacks killed 253 and injured 539 people.396 Those killed in these attacks in Pakistan in 2019 included 117 civilians, 115 security forces personnel and 21 militants, whilst those injured included 399 civilians, 138 security forces and 2 militants.397

**Suicide attacks**

The PICSS 2018 annual report stated that militants carried out 18 suicide attacks in which 267 people were killed and 460 were injured.398 Of all insurgent tactics, suicide attacks caused the highest number of deaths.399 Geographically, Balochistan witnessed the most suicide attacks compared to other

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387 Express Tribune (The), Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad: ‘Punjab police focus on Pakhtuns and Afghans’, 4 March 2017, [url](https://example.com)
388 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url](https://example.com), p. 83; Nation (The), Forces ready to respond to any threat: COAS, 13 June 2019, [url](https://example.com)
389 Dawn, Army launches Operation Khyber-4 in Rajgal Valley, 16 July 2017, [url](https://example.com)
391 Express Tribune (The), Rajgal cleansed of terrorists as military concludes Operation Khyber-IV, 21 August 2017, [url](https://example.com)
393 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url](https://example.com), p. 17, p. 21
395 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url](https://example.com), pp. 16-17
396 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
397 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
provinces, according to PICSS.400 PIPS documented 19 suicide attacks in 2018 in which 317 were killed and 482 were injured. The majority of these suicide attacks took place in Balochistan followed by KP in 2018. Suicide attacks mainly targeted civilians.401 In the period from 1 January 2019 until 31 July 2019, PIPS recorded four suicide attacks (in Lorelai, in Dera Ismael Khan, in Lahore and in Quetta). In total 55 people were killed and 122 injured in these four attacks.402

**Bomb explosions and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**

PIPS mentioned that, in 2018, militants used various types of IEDs in 118 attacks.403 PICSS reported that, in 2018, 118 people were killed and 309 injured in 87 IED attacks. The number of IED attacks decreased by 37 % compared to 2017 (138 IED attacks).404 The highest number of IED explosions was recorded in the province of Balochistan followed by KP.405 According to Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, a researcher at the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, IEDs are ‘a particularly serious threat’ in the KP tribal districts.406

**Targeted killings**

According to PICSS, 55 targeted killings occurred in 2018. In these attacks, 81 people were killed and 29 injured.407 PICSS reported that most of the targeted killings took place in Balochistan province, followed by the provinces of KP and Sindh.408 According to PIPS, criminals in Karachi, sectarian terrorist appeared to have recently adopted targeted killings as their most important tactic.409

In 2018, militants targeted political workers, serving and former police officers, former militants, minorities, religious leaders of different sects (both Shia and Sunnis), workers of private companies as well as government officials.410 In January 2019, Dawn observed an increase in targeted killings in Karachi in the province of Sindh. Criminal gangs are the possible perpetrators. In three of five cases, the victims were apparently targeted because of their political and religious background.411 From 1 January 2019 until 31 July 2019, PIPS documented two targeted attacks with two casualties.412

**Kidnapings**

PICSS counted only one kidnapping by militants in 2018.413 Abduction was reported as a method used by the Pakistani security establishment to silence anyone who tried to question and expose their actions. Regularly there were reports of abductions of journalists or activists.414 Deutsche Welle reported in July 2019 on enforced disappearances of Shiite Muslims that were reportedly carried out by the country’s intelligence agencies. This happened in the context of Shiites who went to Iraq, Iran or Syria, though without any evidence that they took part in violent acts.415

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400 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], pp. 19-20
401 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 51
402 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
403 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 18
405 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 21
406 Mohanty Ranjan, T., Pakistan: IEDs: Continuous Haemorrhage, 22 July 2019, in: South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 18, No. 4, [url]
408 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 22
410 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 22
411 Dawn, Police see new underworld group behind recent targeted killings in Karachi, 31 January 2019, [url]
412 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
413 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 19
414 Al Jazeera, Pakistani activist abduction sparks fear of crackdown on dissent, 6 June 2018, [url]
415 DW, Why are Pakistani Shiites ‘disappearing’?, 9 July 2019, [url]
1.3.3. Sectarian-related violence

According to PIPS, 12 incidents of sectarian-related violence occurred in 2018. Compared to 2017, PIPS counted 20 incidents of sectarian-related violence.\(^{416}\) In 2018, 51 were killed and 45 were injured in those 12 incidents.\(^{417}\) Most of the sectarian attacks and clashes (11) in 2018 were incidents of targeted killing or firing while one such attack employed suicide bombing.\(^{418}\) Six of these attacks occurred in Balochistan and the other six in the province of KP or former FATA.\(^{419}\) The sectarian-related attack with most fatalities in 2018 occurred in Orakzai tribal district on 23 November 2018 (35 killed and more than 50 injured) claimed by ISKP.\(^{420}\) Most people that were killed were Shia.\(^{421}\) In contrast, CRSS documented 198 sectarian-related casualties in 2018 with 91 killed and 107 wounded.\(^{422}\) According to CRSS, main perpetrators in 2018 were Sunni militant groups such as LeJ, IS, SSP and the TTP. Most of the violence was directed against Shias.\(^{423}\) From 1 January 2019 until 31 July 2019, PIPS documented 12 incidents of sectarian violence. In these incidents, 36 people were killed and 65 injured. Fractions of LeJ, SeM and ISKP affiliates were the perpetrators.\(^{424}\)

1.3.4. Political violence

PIPS counted 22 incidents of political and election-related violence in 2018. Besides this, PIPS also counted 24 ‘terrorist attacks’ against political leaders and workers. Overall, these 46 incidents claimed the lives of 229 people and injured 449 in 2018.\(^{425}\) PIPS noticed an increase in 2018 compared to 2017 (13 ‘terrorist attacks’ and 4 incidents of political violence). PIPS stated that this increase was due to the general elections held in 2018.\(^{426}\)

For a more extensive assessment of the violence in the run-up to the general elections of 25 July 2018, please refer to the [EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation](#) of October 2018.\(^{427}\)

According to PIPS, five incidents of political/ethnic violence occurred in the first seven months of 2019 claiming the lives of five people and injuring two.\(^{428}\)

1.3.5. Border attacks

In 2018, PIPS counted in total 131 cross-border attacks at the borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran by foreign forces, Pakistani forces and militants. This is a decrease of 23 % in comparison to 2017 (171 cross-border attacks).\(^{429}\) Most of these attacks (109) took place at the border with India, followed by 16 attacks at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and 6 attacks at the Pakistan-Iran border.\(^{430}\) The main

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419 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url](#), p. 54
420 RFE/RL, IS Claims ‘Suicide’ Attack On Market In Pakistani Tribal District, 24 November 2018, [url](#)
422 The discrepancy in the numbers between PIPS and CRSS is due to a different approach and methodology of both sources. CRSS, CRSS Annual Security Report Special Edition 2013 – 2018, March 2019, [url](#), p. 5
424 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
428 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
targets were security forces, their check posts and militants. In the first seven months of 2019, PIPS registered in total 66 cross-border attacks at the borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran.

According to PIPS, 16 cross-border attacks at the border with Afghanistan killed 43 and injured 22 people in the border area in 2018, mostly militants. The TTP was responsible for most of these attacks. At the end of 2017, the Pakistani army started fencing the border and building border fortifications. These attempts to improve security at the border triggered numerous border clashes. In the first seven months of 2019, clashes at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border continued. PIPS reported two attacks in the first seven months of 2019. These attacks killed three people and injured seven. On 1 May 2019, Pakistan military officials claimed that around ‘60 to 70 terrorists’ from Afghanistan launched an attack against Pakistani soldiers who were constructing the fence along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. In this clash, three Pakistani soldiers were killed while seven others were injured.

The situation at the LoC and the de facto border between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Kashmir stayed ‘relatively more volatile’ in terms of the number of cross-border violations documented in 2018, according to PIPS. At the Pakistan-India border 109 cross-border attacks occurred, claiming the lives of 64 and injuring 264 people. The majority of these attacks (72) occurred in the period January - May 2018. PIPS stated that the reduction of these attacks in the second half of 2018 was probably due to the agreement on a cease-fire between Pakistan and India in May 2018. In total in the first seven months of 2019, 63 cross-border attacks caused the death of 42 people and injured 127.

In 2018, Iranian border security forces carried out six cross-border attacks in Chagai, Gwadar and Panjgur districts of Balochistan, resulting in four deaths and four injured. Compared to 2017, this was a decrease of 50 % (twelve attacks in 2017). PIPS documented only one cross-border attack in the first seven months of 2019. No casualties were reported. In April 2019, Iran and Pakistan announced the establishment of a joint border security force. This is to respond to an increase in violence in the first months of 2019 along the Iran-Pakistan border.

1.3.6. Drone strikes

The first US drone strike in Pakistan took place in the Waziristan region in 2004. The number of drone strikes between 2004 and 2014, and casualties, varied according to the source consulted. Most of the US drone strikes in Pakistan took place in former FATA, where the US military believed al-Qaeda, Taliban and other militant groups sought refuge. Under the Trump administration, aerial drone

432 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
434 RFE/RL, Afghanistan Returns Captured, Dead Pakistani Soldiers After Cross-Border Clash, 16 April 2018, url; Los Angeles Times, This border barrier got built — and it’s upended lives in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 26 May 2019, url
435 RFE/RL, Afghanistan Returns Captured, Dead Pakistani Soldiers After Cross-Border Clash, 16 April 2018, url
436 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
437 VOA, Pakistan says Cross-Afghan Border “Terrorist” Raid Kills 3 Troops, 1 May 2019, url
439 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, pp. 64-65
440 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
441 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 67
442 PIPS, Security Report 2017, 7 January 2018, url, p. 78
443 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
444 Al Jazeera, Pakistan and Iran to form rapid reaction force along border area, 22 April 2019, url
445 DW, Iran, Pakistan agree to joint border ‘reaction force’, 22 April 2019, url
447 Express Tribune (The), Explore the data: Drone strikes in Pakistan, 9 February 2018, url; Dawn, Thousands killed in drone strikes, terror attacks since 2004, 9 November 2018, url
strikes in Pakistan continued after a pause of nine months under the Obama administration.\textsuperscript{448} A study published in March 2019 by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) that examined the relationship between drone strikes and suicide attacks in Pakistan, stated that between January 2011 and January 2019 there were 199 confirmed drone strikes in Pakistan. This study stated that US-led drone strikes in Pakistan may be fuelling ‘terrorist attacks’ – both of which were linked to high levels of civilian harm.\textsuperscript{449}

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) compiled its own data on aerial drone strikes. In 2018, TBIJ recorded five strikes. These US drone strikes killed between 4 - 9 people. In four out of these five drone strikes, the victims were militants. In one drone attack, TBIJ stated that there was the possibility that civilians were injured.\textsuperscript{450} The last drone strike occurred on 4 July 2018, when a US drone killed a commander of the TTP near North Waziristan.\textsuperscript{451} Among the consulted sources, there were no drone attacks reported in the first seven months of 2019.\textsuperscript{452}

In September 2015, for the first time, the Pakistani army launched a Pakistani-made drone, a ‘Burraq Drone’, to strike at terrorists in Shawal Valley in former FATA.\textsuperscript{453} No further information could be found during the reporting period.

1.4. Impact of the violence on the civilian population

1.4.1. Figures on casualties in 2018

In 2018, PIPS recorded 497 violent incidents, resulting in 869 deaths and 1 516 injured (including deaths and injured from ‘terrorist attacks’).\textsuperscript{454} According to PIPS, 456 civilians, 191 militants and 222 security personnel (Police/FC/Army/Levies/Rangers/Paramilitaries) were killed in 2018.\textsuperscript{455} The number of people killed in overall incidents of violence in Pakistan decreased by 46 %, from 1 611 in 2017 to 869 in 2018. The number of people injured in overall incidents of violence decreased by 31 % from 2 212 in 2017 to 1 516 in 2018.\textsuperscript{456} A downward trend was also recorded for the number of deaths of militants: 191 militants in 2018, compared to 683 in 2017, a decrease of 72 %. The number of civilians killed (456) in these violent incidents, also decreased by about 31 % as compared to 2017.\textsuperscript{457} Fatalities among security forces personnel in 2018 (222) were 18 % less than the previous year’s fatalities among them (271).\textsuperscript{458} In addition, the PIPS data showed that ‘terrorist attacks’ (262) accounted for nearly 52 % of all violent incidents in 2018. The number of people killed in these attacks in 2018 decreased by 27 % compared to 2017. The number of people injured in 2018 decreased by 41 % compared to 2017.\textsuperscript{459}

SATP recorded 697 fatalities in ‘terrorist violence’ in 2018 (359 civilians, 163 security forces personnel, 161 terrorists/insurgents, 14 not specified). Compared to 2017 (1 269 deaths), this number was considerably lower, due to a decrease in the number of killed terrorists/insurgents (533 in 2017).\textsuperscript{460}

Data provided by CRSS showed 1 133 fatalities and 1 202 injured from violence in 2018.\textsuperscript{461} This included 598 civilians, 291 militants, and 244 security officials.\textsuperscript{462} Compared to 2017, the number of violence-

\textsuperscript{448} New America, Drone strikes: Pakistan, n.d., url
\textsuperscript{449} Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), Drone strikes and suicide attacks in Pakistan: an analysis, 29 March 2019, url
\textsuperscript{450} TBIJ, Pakistan: reported US strikes 2018, n.d., url
\textsuperscript{451} Dawn, Taliban commander killed in suspected US drone strike near Pak-Afghan border, 5 July 2018, url
\textsuperscript{452} TBIJ, Pakistan: reported US strikes 2018, n.d., url; New America, Drone strikes: Pakistan, n.d., url
\textsuperscript{453} Express Tribune (The), Why Pakistan’s first drone strike should worry Obama, 1 October 2015, url
\textsuperscript{454} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, pp. 19-20
\textsuperscript{455} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 24
\textsuperscript{456} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 20
\textsuperscript{457} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 24
\textsuperscript{458} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 24
\textsuperscript{459} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 22
\textsuperscript{460} SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2019, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{462} CRSS, Monthly data fatalities 2018, email, 28 June 2019
related casualties decreased by 45 % according to CRSS. CRSS counted 754 fatalities from ‘terror attacks’ in 2018.

CRSS is the only institute that collected data on the political or religious affiliations of the victims. They also recorded specifically victims working in media or on polio vaccination teams. It observed that, among the civilian casualties, the identifiable people were found to have a link with political/religious parties or belonging to professions such as media personnel and health professionals. According to CRSS, a slight reduction in 2018 of the number of security personnel killed in terrorist attacks was observed compared to 2017. ‘Security personnel’, according to CRSS, includes: ‘the Police, the Pakistani army, FC personnel, Pakistan Air Force, Levies, Khassadars and others’. PICSS recorded 406 incidents of violence carried out by militants and during counter-insurgency operations by the state in 2018. In total 694 people were killed: 164 militants, 356 civilians, 174 security forces personnel. Compared to 2017, a more than 50 % decline in deaths and a nearly 50 % decrease in injured people.

Figure 3 gives a comparison of the persons killed in 2017 and in 2018 between the four sources based on the definitions described in the Introduction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017 by source</th>
<th>Total killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>Militants killed</th>
<th>Security forces killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PIPS</td>
<td>1 611</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATP</td>
<td>1 260</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSS</td>
<td>2 057</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICSS</td>
<td>1 395</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2018 by source</th>
<th>Total killed</th>
<th>Civilians killed</th>
<th>Militants killed</th>
<th>Security forces killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PIPS</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATP</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSS</td>
<td>1 133</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICSS</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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471 SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2019, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
475 SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2019, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
Patterns of casualties in 2018

Data compiled by CRSS shows certain stability in the number of fatalities throughout most of the year 2018, except in July (see Figure 4). Most fatalities occurred in January, May and July 2018. December 2018 witnessed the least fatalities of the year.

The same trend is visible in monthly data recorded by SATP, although the figures differ slightly. In January 2018, SATP counted 57 fatalities, in July 2018 237 fatalities and in November 2018 56 fatalities. According to SATP, the least fatalities occurred in the months of August (15 fatalities) and December 2018 (16 fatalities).

Data compiled by PICSS shows the highest number of fatalities in July 2018. PICSS noted an increase in the numbers of fatalities in the months of September and November 2018.

1.4.2. Civilian casualties during 1 January - 31 July 2019

In the first seven months of 2019, PIPS recorded 276 violent incidents, resulting in 1,105 casualties (403 deaths and 702 injured) (including deaths from ‘terrorist attacks’).
SATP recorded 267 fatalities in the first seven months of 2019 (108 civilians, 100 security forces personnel, 61 terrorists/insurgents).\textsuperscript{486} Compared to the first seven months of 2018 (522 deaths), this number is considerably lower, due to a decrease in the number of killed civilians.\textsuperscript{487}

Data provided by CRSS counted in total 921 casualties (457 fatalities, 464 injured) in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2019.\textsuperscript{488}

\textbf{Patterns of casualties during 1 January - 31 July 2019}

The monthly data recorded by SATP shows that the most fatalities in the first seven months of 2019 were recorded in May 2019 (58 fatalities) followed by April 2019 (55 fatalities) and July 2019 (45 fatalities).\textsuperscript{489}

According to CRSS, in the second quarter of 2019 almost the same number of fatalities was recorded as in the first quarter of 2019.\textsuperscript{490} The number of injured was higher than in the first quarter of 2019.\textsuperscript{491} In the second quarter of 2019, there were more fatalities in former FATA and in Balochistan compared to the first quarter of 2019 (see Figure 5).\textsuperscript{492}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{violence-related-casualties-by-region-q1-q2-2019.png}
\caption{Violence-related casualties by region-Q1, 2019 vs. Q2, 2019 © CRSS\textsuperscript{493}}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Region & Q1, 2019 & Q2, 2019 & Notes \\
\hline
Balochistan & 32 & 32 & \\
Sindh & 32 & 32 & \\
KP & 31 & 44 & \\
Punjab & 48 & 45 & \\
FATA & 53 & 6 & \\
Islamabad & 62 & 63 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Violence-related casualties by region-Q1, 2019 vs. Q2, 2019 © CRSS\textsuperscript{493}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{486} SATP, Monthly Fatalities -2019, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{487} SATP, Monthly Fatalities -2018, last updated: 5 August 2018, url
\textsuperscript{488} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019, url; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{489} SATP, Monthly Fatalities -2019, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{490} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019, url; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{491} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019, url; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{492} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019, url; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{493} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, url
1.4.3. Children

In February 2019, Save The Children listed Pakistan as one of the countries that in ‘absolute terms’ accounted for a high number of children living in conflict-affected areas.\(^{494}\)

According to a June 2019 report of the UN Secretary-General (covering January-December 2018) on children and armed conflict there were continued reports of the recruitment and use of children in Pakistan, including the alleged use of children by armed groups for suicide attacks.\(^{495}\) The report mentioned 36 incidents, which resulted in seven children killed, and maiming (56) of 63 children. Of those incidents, 20 were attributed to armed groups. Ten of the reported incidents involved the use of IEDs disguised as toys and resulted in the maiming of 19 children mainly in KP tribal districts.\(^{496}\) Inter Press Service (IPS) reported in April 2018 that remnants of IEDs and landmines put children in danger in several areas, especially in the provinces of Balochistan and KP.\(^{497}\) In November 2018, three children were killed and two injured after a mortar shell exploded in Swat.\(^{498}\) Four children were critically injured after a landmine exploded in North Waziristan on 31 July 2019.\(^{499}\)

In 2017 and 2018, HRW reported that militant attacks had a devastating impact on education.\(^{500}\) Human Rights Watch stated that Islamist militant violence had disrupted ‘the education of hundreds of thousands of children, particularly girls’.\(^{501}\) According to Human Rights Watch, the government of Pakistan fails ‘to stop or mitigate’ attacks on educational institutes. In November 2018, Human Rights Watch stated that many girls have no access to education, mainly because of a shortage of government schools and insecurity.\(^{502}\)

Human Rights Watch reported that militant attacks had a devastating impact on education. Islamist militant violence had disrupted ‘the education of hundreds of thousands of children, particularly girls’. The government failed to protect schools from such attacks and prosecute perpetrators.\(^{503}\) Many girls had no access to education because of insecurity.\(^{504}\) During the year 2018, PIPS reported six ‘terrorist attacks’ on educational institutions in the country causing three civilians fatalities. Two of these attacks occurred in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, one in the province of Balochistan and three attacks occurred in Gilgit-Baltistan.\(^{505}\) On 3 August 2018, at least 12 schools were burned down by unknown militants in the Diamer district in Gilgit-Baltistan. There were no reports of casualties.\(^{506}\)


\(^{499}\) Dawn, Four children hurt in landmine blast, 1 August 2019, [url](https://www.dawn.com/2019/08/01/four-children-hurt-in-landmine-blast)

\(^{500}\) HRW, Dreams Turned into Nightmares: Attacks on Students, Teachers, and Schools in Pakistan, 27 March 2017, [url](https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/27/dreams-turned-nightmares/attacks-on-students-teachers-and);

\(^{501}\) HRW, Pakistan: Surge in Militant Attacks on Schools, 3 August 2018, [url](https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/03/pakistan/surge-militant-attacks-on-schools);

\(^{502}\) HRW, Pakistan: Surge in Militant Attacks on Schools, 3 August 2018, [url](https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/03/pakistan/surge-militant-attacks-on-schools);

\(^{503}\) HRW, Dreams Turned into Nightmares: Attacks on Students, Teachers, and Schools in Pakistan, 27 March 2017, [url](https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/27/dreams-turned-nightmares/attacks-on-students-teachers-and);

\(^{504}\) HRW, “Shall I Feed My Daughter, or Educate Her?” Barriers to Girls’ Education in Pakistan, 12 November 2018, [url](https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/11/12/shall-feed-daughter-or-educate-her-barriers-girls-education-pakistan)


\(^{506}\) RFE/RL, At Least 12 Schools Burned Down In Northern Pakistan, 3 August 2018, [url](https://www.rferl.org/a/government-fails-stop-or-mitigate-attacks-on-schools/26077947.html)
1.4.3. Internally Displaced Persons and refugees

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Since 2008, approximately 5.3 million people were displaced by insurgency, counter-insurgency and other related violence in Pakistan. As of 30 September 2017, 5.05 million people returned.\(^\text{507}\) Most of the internal displacements in the country were concentrated from former FATA to KP. As of December 2018, 96,384 people were registered as IDPs in the province of KP. Since 1 January 2018, 83,454 people had returned to de-notified areas according to UNHCR.\(^\text{508}\)

The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) stated that there were a total of 119,000 IDPs in Pakistan as of 31 December 2018. About 98,000 IDPs were displaced in North Waziristan and Khyber tribal district. They were initially displaced by armed conflict and military operations in former FATA and KP, since 2004 IDMC reported about 17,000 IDPs staying in camps who had been displaced to Khost province in Afghanistan before, but returned to Pakistan. IDMC also mentioned 1,800 new displacements in 2018.\(^\text{509}\)

In the second part of this report, internal displacements are explained in greater detail and by geographic division (see 2. Security situation per region).

Afghan refugees

As of February 2019, Pakistan was hosting around 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees\(^\text{510}\) and remained the world’s second largest refugee hosting country after Turkey.\(^\text{511}\) The majority of these refugees lived in the provinces KP (58%) and Balochistan (23%). Furthermore, 68% of Afghan refugees lived outside of refugee villages, while 32% resided in 54 refugee villages across Pakistan.\(^\text{512}\) Pakistan hosted also around one million undocumented Afghan refugees.\(^\text{513}\)

Proof of Registration (PoR) cards are issued by the National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) for the registered Afghan refugees, providing them temporary legal stay and freedom of movement. At the end of June 2019, the validity of the PoR cards were extended by the Government of Pakistan until 30 June 2020.\(^\text{514}\)

Between August 2017 and February 2018, the Government of Pakistan, in collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan and with the support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR, carried out a countrywide exercise to identify undocumented Afghans. Some 880,000 previously undocumented Afghan nationals were identified during the exercise and 380,000 of them have already received their Afghan Citizen Cards (ACCs).\(^\text{515}\) The purpose of the documentation exercise was to provide undocumented Afghans with identification credentials that will allow to legalise and regularise their stay in Pakistan for a limited period of time.\(^\text{516}\) At the end of June 2019, the ACC cards were extended by the Government of Pakistan until 31 October 2019.\(^\text{517}\)

Throughout 2018, there were 13,584 voluntary returns from Pakistan to Afghanistan with the assistance of UNHCR. Due to the improved protection environment for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and to the deteriorating security in Afghanistan, the return trend from Pakistan significantly decreased

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\(^{507}\) UNOCHA, Pakistan: Displacements and returns in KP and FATA 2008 - 2017 (as of 30 September 2017), 25 October 2017, [url](https://www.unocha.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/Pakistan%20Displacements%20and%20returns%20in%20KP%20and%20FATA%202008%20-%202017%20(As%20of%2030%20September%202017)%20-%2025%20October%202017.pdf)

\(^{508}\) UNHCR, ‘IDP Returns Fact Sheet’, 31 December 2018, [url](https://www.unhcr.org/5c2134f01.html), p. 5

\(^{509}\) IDMC, Pakistan Figure Analysis – Displacement Related to Conflict and Violence (GRID 2019), 2019, [url](https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/pakistan/), p. 1

\(^{510}\) UNHCR, Registered Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, 4 February 2019, [url](https://www.unhcr.org/pakistan/afghan-refugees-in-pakistan.html)

\(^{511}\) UNHCR, Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 2018-2019, October 2018, [url](https://www.unhcr.org/5b0a75785.html), p. 6

\(^{512}\) UNHCR, Pakistan: Afghan Refugee Update, 31 January 2019, [url](https://www.unhcr.org/5cc0f6c05.html), p. 1


\(^{514}\) UNHCR, UNHCR welcomes Pakistan cabinet’s decision to extend stay of Afghan refugees, 28 June 2019, [url](https://www.unhcr.org/5d5a0a206.html)

\(^{515}\) UNHCR, Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 2018-2019, October 2018, [url](https://www.unhcr.org/5b0a75785.html), p. 13

\(^{516}\) IOM, UN Migration Agency Supports Pakistan’s Documented of Undocumented Afghans, 24 May 2018, [url](https://www.iom.int/news/2018/05/un-migration-agency-supports-pakistans-documented-undocumented-afghans)

in 2018.\textsuperscript{518} As of 5 August 2019, UNHCR reported that between 1 January 2019 and 2 August 2019, 3,238 registered Afghans returned to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{519} IOM reported that 13,622 undocumented Afghan refugees had returned between 1 January 2019 and 3 August 2019.\textsuperscript{520}

1.5. State ability to secure law and order

In the Rule of Law Index, 2019 carried out by the World Justice Project, Pakistan was ranked 117 out of 126 countries in the world on overall rule-of-law scores. This index was composed based on a set of questionnaires sent to experts (on average more than 300 per country) and to the public. Pakistan scored very low in several categories: ‘right to life and security’, ‘due process of law’, ‘sanctions for official misconduct’, ‘effective investigations’ and ‘no improper government influence’ in the criminal justice system.\textsuperscript{521}

Muhammad Amir Rana stated in 2018 that Pakistan had a comprehensive constitutional framework and accompanying legal procedures but in practice the rule of law was confined to ‘conventional concepts of internal security and law enforcement’.\textsuperscript{522} The constitution of Pakistan provides that the political authority is divided between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. According to a report of Freedom House that covered 2018, the military had a substantial influence on national security, foreign policy and economic policy.\textsuperscript{523} Freedom House further stated that corruption, lack of accountability and lack of transparency were pervasive problems at all levels of government, in politics, and in the military.\textsuperscript{524} According to Sarah Belal in an interview in May 2019, minorities and women were denied protection in Pakistan, but this was also related to the socio-economic background of the victim.\textsuperscript{525} Belal also added that although the state itself did not single out a particular minority to oppress, anybody who lacked the socio-economic power to protect themselves against the police were subjected to the exigencies of the system. In terms of protection from sectarian violence, minority communities are inherently more vulnerable and require a higher degree of protection afforded to them by the state - which was lacking at the time of the interview.\textsuperscript{526}

1.5.1. Security forces

General

The security forces in Pakistan include the Pakistan Armed Forces, the police, the Pakistan Rangers, the Levies, the Frontier Corps, Khassadars and others. For a description of these forces, see 1.2.1. State armed forces.

According to Mohammad Amir Rana, the Government of Pakistan engaged, parallel to the security forces, paramilitary forces to fight terrorism and other security threats. Each province in Pakistan had such parallel security forces.\textsuperscript{527} The military and the paramilitary forces also took up the role of law enforcement. Mohammad Amir Rana stated further that such ‘temporary or situational arrangement’s’ contributed in the state’s lack of political will to reform and empower civilian law enforcement structures.\textsuperscript{528} One example was the Rangers in Karachi; another example was the FC and

\textsuperscript{518} UNHCR, Afghanistan, Voluntary Repatriation Update, January 2019, \url{url}, p. 2
\textsuperscript{519} UNHCR, Pakistan: Voluntary Repatriation Weekly Update, As of 2nd August 2019, 5 August 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{520} IOM, Return of Undocumented Afghans - Weekly Situation Report (28 July-3 August 2019), 3 August 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{521} World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2019, 28 February 2019, \url{url}, pp. 6, 119, 160
\textsuperscript{522} Amir Rana, M., The rule of law: concept and practices in Pakistan, 26 September 2018, PIPS, \url{url}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{523} Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019-Pakistan, 4 February 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{524} Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019-Pakistan, 4 February 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{525} Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019. Sarah Belal is the executive Director of Justice Project Pakistan (\url{https://www.ipp.org.pk/}).
\textsuperscript{526} Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
\textsuperscript{527} Amir Rana, M., The rule of law: concept and practices in Pakistan, 26 September 2018, PIPS, \url{url}, p. 2
\textsuperscript{528} Amir Rana, M., The rule of law: concept and practices in Pakistan, 26 September 2018, PIPS, \url{url}, pp. 1-2
army in Balochistan and tribal districts who took control of security as well as law enforcement, ‘parallel to existing, though weak, law enforcement structures’. 529

As many as 136 ‘terrorist attacks’ or 52 % of the total number of ‘terrorist attacks’ (262) reported in 2018 by PIPS, targeted security forces and law-enforcement agencies across Pakistan. 530 In 2018, 222 security force personnel were killed and 382 injured in overall violent incidents according to PIPS. 531 As stated by PIPS, in the first seven months of 2019, 153 security force personnel were killed and 267 injured in 77 ‘terrorist attacks’. 532

Capacity

According to an article by Foreign Policy in March 2019, over 20 % of the annual budget of Pakistan officially went to the military, and the ‘actual expense is even higher’. 533 The army chief declared in June 2019 that the voluntary cut in the defence budget for the coming year would not have an impact on the ‘response potential’ of the army. 534 The capacity building of law enforcement agencies, especially the police, was a long-standing problem. 535 The Pakistani police was under-resourced, and lacked equipment. 536 Efforts were made to reform the police but as of Mid-2018, effective police reforms were still not in place. 537 Paramilitary forces such as the FC, the Levies and the Khassadars in former FATA lacked training and capacity building. 538 After the merger of Khassadars and Levies forces with the KP police, personnel of both forces began training in May 2019 in order to be able to perform responsibilities in tribal districts in an efficient manner. 539

In September 2018, Mohammad Amir Rana described the effectiveness of the security forces as follows:

‘The interaction and coordination between military and civilian law enforcement agencies has also not been good, thus exposing some deeper structural issues linked to the rule of law and law enforcement in the country. Indeed, paramilitary forces have been encroaching on civilian law-and-order affairs and strengthening their institutional and moral authority. On the other hand, civilian law-enforcement agencies have become so weak that they cannot even clarify their position in certain instances where they could not act due to dominant role played by paramilitaries’. 540

USIP stated in April 2019 that the Pakistani police had been struggling with a ‘poor relationship with the public categorized by mistrust and mistreatment’. As a result, ‘effective policing’ was hindered. 541 According to Sarah Belal, there was a ‘huge disconnect’ between the police and the citizens. The police operated without independence and without accountability. They operated at the whim of politicians, bureaucrats and those with power. 542 Freedom House stated in February 2019 that the police was accused of biased or arbitrary handling of initial criminal complaints. Both the police and the prosecution service were criticised for a chronic failure to prosecute terrorism cases. 543

529 Amir Rana, M., The rule of law: concept and practices in Pakistan, 26 September 2018, PIPS, url, pp. 1-2
530 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 17
532 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/03/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
533 Foreign Policy, Poor Nation, Rich Army, 21 March 2019, url
534 Dawn, Austerity measures: ‘We are one through thick and thin,’ says army chief, 5 June 2019, url
535 Amir Rana, M., The rule of law: concept and practices in Pakistan, 26 September 2018, PIPS, url, p. 4
536 Amir Rana, M., The rule of law: concept and practices in Pakistan, 26 September 2018, PIPS, url, p. 4
538 Dawn, Policing Fata, 5 April 2018, url
539 TNN, KP police start training Khasadar, levies personnel, 16 May 2019, url
540 Amir Rana, M., The rule of law: concept and practices in Pakistan, 26 September 2018, PIPS, url, p. 4
541 USIP, The Current Situation in Pakistan A USIP Fact Sheet, 1 April 2019, url
542 Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
543 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Pakistan, 4 February 2019, url
Integrity

Sources indicated that there is corruption within the police force in Pakistan. According to Newsline Magazine, the Pakistani police has the reputation of lacking internal and external accountability, of corruption at the highest levels and for being influenced by politicians.

The Pakistani military was involved in many spheres of the economy. Besides this, the Pakistani Army played a dominant role in domestic politics. The balance between the civilian government and the military leadership was complex. The army was accused of meddling in the elections in 2018. In February 2019, the Supreme Court of Pakistan criticised the army for its role and for exceeding their mandate in the blasphemy protests of 2017. The Diplomat stated in June 2019 that sympathisers of jihadist groups like Islamic State and LeJ are present within the army.

Abuse of power, ill treatment, use of excessive force, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings

Security forces reportedly engaged in arrests without warrants, detention for long periods before seeing a judge and detaining people in secret locations. The PTM movement accused the army of using excessive force during a demonstration on 26 May 2019 when at least three people were killed as a result of violence between Pashtun activists and the army.

Unlawful and extrajudicial killings by Pakistani law enforcement agencies were also reported by Amnesty International. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) stated that from January 2018 until December 2018, 124 police encounters occurred which caused 183 victims. In January 2019, the police shot a family in their car near Sahiwal, reportedly acting upon intelligence that claimed the family was accompanied by a ‘terrorist’. According to Sarah Belal, extrajudicial killings were usually a symptom of the politics of the specific area. During martial law and during repressive regimes there were extra judicial killings ‘on mass scale’, even under democratic rule, similar patterns occurred.

BBC News reported in May 2018 on disappearances and unlawful detentions of Shia’s, Sunni jihadists, ethnic nationalist activists, and secular critics of the Pakistani military establishment. In addition, Deutsche Welle reported in July 2019 about the disappearances of Shiites apparently carried out by the country’s intelligence agencies as stated by Shiite organisations and activists. Between 2011 and end of May 2019, the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (CIED; an official commission of inquiry on enforced disappearances, led by a retired judge) registered 6 051 people as missing. At the end of May 2019, 2,258 cases were still pending with the Commission.

According to Freedom House, there was ‘no sign of the commission’s deliberations leading to any effective sanctions against the agencies undertaking the disappearances’.

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544 Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019; International News (The), Inefficiency and corruption blotch police, 17 June 2019, url
545 Newsline Magazine (Sumbul, D.), Seeds of Police Reform, 20 May 2019, url
546 Foreign Policy, Poor Nation, Rich Army, 21 March 2019, url
547 New York Times (The), Military’s Influence Casts a Shadow Over Pakistan’s Election, url; BBC Reality Check, The political influence of Pakistan’s powerful army [online video], 18 August 2018, url
548 Gandhara, Pakistan’s Top Court Tells Army To Stay Out Of Politics, Media, 6 February 2019, url
549 Diplomat (The), Islamic State Comes for South Asia, 18 June 2019, url
550 International News (The), Inefficiency and corruption blotch police, 17 June 2019, url; New York Times (The), In Pakistan, Detainees Are Vanishing in Covert Jails, 26 July 2015, url
551 HRW, Pakistan: Investigate North Waziristan Deaths Uphold Rights of Region’s Pashtun Population, 30 May 2019, url
552 AI, Sahiwal shootings: The rot goes as deep as the roots, 31 January 2019, url
553 HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2018, April 2019, url, p. 71
554 BBC News, Sahiwal shooting: How a Pakistani boy exposed police for killing his family, 23 January 2019, url
555 Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
556 BBC News, The story of Pakistan’s ‘disappeared‘ Shiias, 31 May 2018, url
557 DW, Why are Pakistani Shiites ‘disappearing‘?, 9 July 2019, url
558 GEO TV (Omar, R.), A review of Pakistan’s commission on missing persons, 27 May 2019, url
559 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Pakistan, 4 February 2019, url
Torture and ill-treatment in detention to obtain confessions or during investigations continued to remain a serious issue according to sources.\textsuperscript{560} As noted by Sarah Belal, the primary method of investigation used by the police was torture and abuse of detainees, without accountability.\textsuperscript{561} On 2 June 2019, BBC published a report that looked into Pakistan’s long battle with militants in the past. The report stated that ‘tens of thousands of people’ had been killed during Pakistan’s long battle with militants as part of the post-9/11 war on terror and that many of them were tortured and murdered by soldiers (and insurgents) in Waziristan.\textsuperscript{562} Pakistan has not yet enacted a law to criminalise custodial torture, however Pakistan is a signatory to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT).\textsuperscript{563}

1.5.2. Judiciary and legal system

Structure of the judiciary

The formal court system, as established by the Constitution, consists of the Supreme Court, High Courts in the four provinces and Islamabad, session courts in each district and a Federal Shariat Court.\textsuperscript{564}

Capacity

Syed Junaid Arshad, a police officer with more than sixteen years of experience working in law enforcement, stated in 2017 that the judiciary in Pakistan is understaffed. There was also a serious backlog in cases according to Arshad.\textsuperscript{565} As of January 2019, 40,000 cases were pending with the Supreme Court, about 300,000 with the high courts and about two million with the subordinate judiciary of the four provinces and the federal capital, according to an opinion piece in the Express Tribune.\textsuperscript{566} The lack of capacity in the judiciary to deal with cases was also rooted in vast numbers of detainees, detentions without documentation, slow legal processing times, lack of use of bail provisions, and lack of information sharing.\textsuperscript{567}

Pakistanis in some rural areas avoided Pakistani civil and criminal courts and instead relied on tribal dispute settlement of private issues, especially in rural areas. This was largely due to lack of access to justice, lack of trust in the judiciary or because of lack of social status and financial resources for some parts of the population.\textsuperscript{568}

Integrity

The Pakistan judiciary is susceptible to corruption, bribery, political interference, and pressure from political groups and the army.\textsuperscript{569} Appointments and court decisions were influenced by political influence and favouritism.\textsuperscript{570} The Pakistani judiciary was described as having restricted independence and impartiality with a weak and dependent nature.\textsuperscript{571} Judicial officials and lawyers faced ‘significant

\textsuperscript{560} Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019; BBC News, Uncovering Pakistan’s secret human rights abuses, 2 June 2019, \url{url}; Dawn, View from the courtroom: No legislation yet to criminalise custodial torture accessed, 1 July 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{561} Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
\textsuperscript{562} BBC News, Uncovering Pakistan’s secret human rights abuses, 2 June 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{563} Dawn, View from the courtroom: No legislation yet to criminalise custodial torture accessed, 1 July 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{564} Courting the Law, Criminal Justice System In Pakistan: A Critical Analysis, 15 February 2017, \url{url}; Government of Pakistan, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 13 February 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{565} Courting the Law, Criminal Justice System In Pakistan: A Critical Analysis, 15 February 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{566} Express Tribune (The), Judicial reforms for a competitive Pakistan, 16 January 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{567} UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, 23 August 2017, \url{url}, par. 31; Express Tribune (The), Judicial reforms for a competitive Pakistan, 16 January 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{568} NPR, Tribal Council Orders ‘Revenge Rape’ In Pakistan, 27 June 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{569} RFE/RL, Pakistani Lawyers Protest Gov’t Case Against Top Judge, 3 June 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{570} Pakistan Today, Political influence, favouritism behind elevation of high court judges, suggest lawyers, 29 April 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{571} Nation (The), Pakistan’s flawed justice system, 19 June 2018, \url{url}; Daily Times, Reforming the judicial system, 8 March 2019, \url{url}; Daily Times, Modern justice system and Pakistan, 21 February 2019, \url{url}; Dawn, Crisis of the judiciary, 17 July 2019, \url{url}
pressure’, intimidation, and violence, particularly for cases of organised crime, corruption or related to blasphemy.  

1.5.3. Anti-Terrorism Acts and military courts

Anti-Terrorism Acts

On 24 February 2014, the Government announced an internal security policy for a five-year period. This policy focused mainly on securing urban centres, while it often did not mention the situation in former FATA and Balochistan. It referred to dialogue with all stakeholders for madrassa reforms, militants’ rehabilitation and deradicalisation. A primary target of the security policy was isolating terrorists. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was supposed to carry out tasks ranging from counterterrorism to political and operational interventions. In February 2014, the Government was still engaged in peace talks with the Taliban, and the security policy proved insufficient once the military operation in North Waziristan started and the country fell victim to retaliatory attacks by the militants.

The December 2014 militant attack on the Peshawar Army Public School served as a catalyst for political consensus when former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif convened an all parties’ conference the day after the attack. This led, in the same month, to consultation with all political parties, to the establishment of a National Action Plan (NAP) to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan. Later in December 2014, Nawaz Sharif announced the formation of a federal counterterrorism force with immediate effect. The political and security establishment set up temporary military courts to try terrorism-related offences instead of pursuing the cases via an independent judiciary. The implementation of the NAP was not as effective as expected, according to Ihsan Ghani who served as National Coordinator of NACTA. PIPS evaluated that it had only met its goals in some areas. In November 2018, the Government of Pakistan announced the formation of ‘a new version’ of the NAP and to restructure the NACTA to effectively tackle internal threats to security.

Military courts

In January 2015, the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill and the Pakistani Army Amendment Act 2015 were signed. Those amendments gave military courts the jurisdiction for two years to convict civilians for terrorism-related offences. In August 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the parliamentary bill. The military courts were disbanded on 7 January 2017 after the legal provision expired. In March 2017, the Parliament, the Senate and the President passed legislation to reinstate the military courts for a two-year period. On 30 March 2019, the military courts’ jurisdiction over civilians for terrorism-related offences ceased.

The Government failed to get support from opposition parties for a
constitutional amendment to extend the jurisdiction of military courts again.\textsuperscript{585} No information was found on new legislation on this matter. According to a report by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) of January 2019, military courts had since January 2015 convicted 641 people for terrorism-related offences, out of which 345 people were sentenced to death and 296 people were given prison sentences. At least 56 people were hanged while only five people were acquitted.\textsuperscript{586} Sources criticised the establishment of the military courts in the past and warned that those courts could be used as a mechanism against political dissidents or groups that had disturbed the military.\textsuperscript{587}

1.5.4. Detention and death penalty

Detention

According to Sarah Belal in May 2019, there was a conversation in the public sphere about reforming the prison system. There was widespread recognition that there was a need to seek prison reforms and to improve the prison rules in the country. Pakistan had a massive overcrowding problem in prisons. Moreover, the majority of the people in prisons were under trial prisoners.\textsuperscript{588} In its April 2019 publication, HRCP, based on information by the Federal Ombudsman from 2018, reported that Pakistan had a prison population of 78,160 against a sanctioned capacity of 63,532 prisoners.\textsuperscript{589} According to statistics provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the total prison population of Pakistan in 2018, including pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners was 83,718.\textsuperscript{590}

Several sources reported that security, overcrowding, and health and hygiene conditions continued to be a challenge in prisons.\textsuperscript{591} Torture remained a widespread practice in police detention, interrogation cells and in prisons.\textsuperscript{592}

Death penalty

In December 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on a school in Peshawar, the Pakistan authorities partially lifted a moratorium on the death penalty that had been in place since 2008. On 10 March 2015, the Pakistani Government declared that executions would resume for all capital crimes.\textsuperscript{593}

According to Justice Project Pakistan, a non-profit human rights law firm based in Pakistan, Pakistan had the largest reported death row population in the world. In 2018, Pakistan’s official death row population stood at 4,688.\textsuperscript{594} The average death row prisoner spended ten years under threat of execution before the case reached the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{595}

\textsuperscript{585} Dawn, Military courts cease to function today, 31 March 2019, url
\textsuperscript{586} ICJ, Military Injustice in Pakistan-Briefing Paper, January 2019, url, p. 5
\textsuperscript{587} Dawn, Govt, opposition discussing military courts’ extension, 14 March 2019, url; HRCP, Military courts are anti-democratic, 12 January 2019, url
\textsuperscript{588} Belal, S., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
\textsuperscript{589} HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2018, April 2019, url, p. 82
\textsuperscript{590} World Prison Brief, World Prison Brief data, Pakistan, last updated: 2018, url
\textsuperscript{592} Dawn, Speakers call for legislation on torture, 27 June 2019, url
\textsuperscript{593} Diplomat (The), Pakistan and the Death Penalty, 21 April 2016, url; Economist (The), The man with the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre, 24 January 2015, url; Justice Project Pakistan, Counting Executions, 6 July 2017, url, p. 1
\textsuperscript{594} Justice Project Pakistan, Death row population in Pakistan, n.d., url
\textsuperscript{595} AI, Death penalty in 2018: Facts and figures, 10 April 2019, url, p. 19
Pakistan was among the top three countries in the Asia-Pacific that imposed and carried out state executions according to Amnesty International’s 2019 report on death sentences and executions (covering 2018).  

According to data compiled by Justice Project Pakistan, Pakistan executed 512 prisoners since December 2014 until July 2019. Amnesty International recorded in 2018 in the country ‘at least’ 14 executions. This is a lower number compared to 2017 when Amnesty International recorded ‘at least’ 60 executions.

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596 Foundation for Fundamental Rights (The) and Reprieve, The Pakistan Capital Punishment Study A Study of the Capital Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, April 2019, url, p. 2
597 Justice Project Pakistan, Death Penalty Database (Executions), n.d., url
598 AI, Death penalty in 2018: Facts and figures, 10 April 2019, url, p. 9
2. Security situation per region

2.1. Geographical overview of the violence 2018 – 31 July 2019

2.1.1. Trends in regional violence

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) provides a publicly available dashboard to assess the geographical spread of violent incidents. The maps in this section are based on the ACLED dataset, which contains data about security-related incidents in Pakistan. Map 2 and Map 3 show an overview of the violence in Pakistan by type of event for 2018 and the first seven months of 2019: battles, remote violence and violence against civilians.

Map 2: Battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence in Pakistan, 2018 ©ACLED

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599 The figures of ACLED were not used in other sections because this source uses a different methodology to describe 'violence' that is more different than the other sources- for an explanation on the methodology of ACLED see: ACLED, ACLED Codebook, 10 April 2019, url

600 Battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence; protests and strategic developments were not included.

601 ACLED, South & Southeast Asia dataset-Pakistan, last updated: 27 July 2019, url

602 ACLED, Dashboard, last accessed 1 August 2019, url (applied filters: timeframe 1 January 2018-31 December 2018- event types: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence)
According to Map 2 in 2018, in the provinces of Punjab, KP and Sindh, fewer armed, organised instances of violence occurred in general as compared to 2017. Balochistan saw a relatively large number of battles, incidents of remote violence and violence against civilians. Also in the former FATA battles, remote violence and violence against civilians were documented (see Map 2).

**Map 3** shows the violence by type of event for the first seven months of 2019. In the province of Balochistan the following types of events occurred: battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. In the province of Punjab no explosions of remote violence were recorded by ACLED.

ACLED recorded in 2018 in the province of KP explosions/remote violence, battles and violence against civilians. In Sindh, ACLED recorded violence against civilians, battles and violence against civilians.

603 ACLED, Dashboard, last accessed 1 August 2019, [url](applied filters: 1. timeframes 1 January 2018-31 December 2018 vs. 1 January 2017-31 December 2017; 2. event types: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence; 2. Different provinces)

604 ACLED, Dashboard, last accessed 1 August 2019, [url](applied filters: timeframe 1 January 2019-July 2019- event types: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence)

605 ACLED, Dashboard, last accessed 1 August 2019, [url](applied filters: timeframe 1 January 2019-July 2019- event types: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence)
2.1.2. Regional comparison of violence-related casualties

Regional comparison of violence-related casualties in 2018

This section provides figures of fatalities and attacks at regional level, according to the four sources as described in the introduction. It is impossible to present the figures in one comparative table, as the four main sources about the security situation use different parameters and definitions.

PIPS only gave regional details for ‘terrorist attacks’ in its year report of 2018, which made up about 53% of all violent incidents. PIPS focused on the number of terrorist attacks (and consequent fatalities per province, and indicated percentage changes in 2018 compared to 2017, see Figure 6). Compared to 2017, PIPS observed a decrease in ‘terrorist incidents’ (29% overall). The number of deaths and injured also decreased. Balochistan and KP (including former FATA) were most affected by these attacks in 2018 (see Figure 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No of terrorist incidents 2018</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>No of killed 2018</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>No of injured 2018</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP (including former FATA)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh (excl. Karachi)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgit-Baltistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No %</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No %</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1 030</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: ‘Terrorist attacks’ by region - 2018 vs. 2017 (PIPS)

SATP provided data for fatalities per province in 2018, subdivided into civilians, security forces and terrorists/militants. The total number of fatalities in 2018, according to SATP, was 697. Balochistan was the most affected region, with 388 fatalities. KP and former FATA occupied the second and third position with 167 and 50 fatalities in 2018.

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606 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 21
608 SATP, Data Sheet-Pakistan-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
609 SATP, Data Sheet-Balochistan-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
610 SATP, Data Sheet-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
611 For 2018 SATP counted the numbers for former FATA and KP separate, for 2019 SATP counted the numbers together; SATP, Data Sheet-FATA-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
CRSS recorded most of the fatalities in Balochistan, followed by former FATA and KP in 2018.\textsuperscript{612} Overall, the decrease in fatalities could be largely attributed to a sharp decrease in violence-related fatalities in former FATA, Sindh and Punjab.\textsuperscript{613}

Figure 7 presents a comparative regional analysis by CRSS of violence–related casualties in Pakistan in 2018.\textsuperscript{614}

![Violence-related casualties by province/region - 2018](image)

Figure 7: Comparative Regional Analysis 2018 © CRSS\textsuperscript{615}

PICSS gives only data for overall incidents. In 2018, 406 overall incidents were observed. 694 people were killed, and 985 others injured. PICSS documented most of the fatalities due to overall incidents (terrorist and other violent incidents) in Balochistan, followed by former FATA and the province of KP.\textsuperscript{616}

**Regional comparison of violence-related casualties 1 January – 31 July 2019**

1,105 casualties were recorded by PIPS in 276 incidents of overall violence during the first seven months of 2019. Data from PIPS indicated that most casualties of overall incidents in the first half of 2019 took place in Balochistan (547 casualties), followed by KP (304 casualties) and Azad Kashmir (166 casualties) (see Figure 8).\textsuperscript{617}

\textsuperscript{613} CRSS, CRSS Annual Security Report Special Edition 2013 – 2018, March 2019, \url{url}, p. 6
\textsuperscript{616} PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, \url{url}, p. 15
\textsuperscript{617} Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
SATP recorded from 1 January 2019 until 31 July 2019 most fatalities of terrorist violence in Balochistan (148 fatalities). KP occupied the second position with 67 fatalities. In total for the whole of Pakistan in the first seven months of 2019, SATP recorded 267 fatalities.

According to the first and the second quarterly report of CRSS, most casualties in the first half of 2019 occurred in Balochistan (400), followed by Punjab (218) and former FATA (142).

### 2.2. Security trends per geographic subdivision

In the following sections, security trends are explained in greater detail, per geographic subdivision. In each provincial section, a general description of the province contains information on the geography and population, on the background of the conflict, including the actors of the conflict in the province. The subsections describe recent trends in the security situation, including the nature of violence, frequency, targets, locations, and victims within a timeframe from 15 August 2018 until 31 July 2019. A separate part is dedicated to displacements. Under the subsections several incidents are described. These should be read as illustrations of trends in the security situation and not as an exhaustive list of incidents.

#### 2.2.1. Punjab

**General description of the province**

Punjab province (see Map 1) is located in the east of Pakistan. It borders the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north-east, the Indian States of Punjab and Rajasthan in the east, the province of Sindh in the south, Balochistan and KP provinces in the west, Islamabad Federal Capital area and Azad

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618 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
619 SATP, Data Sheet-Balochistan-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, [url](#)
620 These numbers include Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and former FATA; SATP, Data Sheet-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, [url](#)
621 SATP, Monthly Fatalities -2019, last updated: 5 August 2019, [url](#)
Kashmir in the north. Punjab can be distinguished in three zones: Central, North and South Punjab. The military headquarters are located in Northern Punjab and it maintains most of its forces in the province. The Southern parts of Punjab are among the poorest areas in the country. The provincial capital of Punjab is Lahore. Lahore is the second biggest city of Pakistan, after Karachi (Sindh province). The province of Punjab is seen as the ‘heart of political and economic activity’ in Pakistan. It is a province with strong development capacities and a good infrastructure. According to the latest population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics in 2017, the population of the province was approximately 110 million.

Background of the violence and actors in the Punjab

International Crisis Group mentioned in 2016 that Southern Punjab was considered as the region where militant networks and extremists were present in the province of Punjab. Anti-India groups such as Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) and JeM had their headquarters and religious facilities in Southern Punjab. In March 2019, in response to the Pulwama attack in Indian-administrated Kashmir, the Pakistani authorities made arrests and seized assets linked to militants to this attack in the province of Punjab. Mohammad Amir Rana stated the following in a Skype interview on 17 July 2019 about these developments:

‘A dangerous development can be that there is a growing frustration along members of JeM. Some among these frustrated members of JeM can now also join the militant Islamic State group and al Qaeda or form their own small terrorist cells. The JeM cadre is more critical because hundreds of its militants have a background of having worked along with the TTP Pakistan, al Qaeda and sectarian terrorist organisations.’

The newspaper the Nation stated in April 2018 that the TTP, al-Qaeda and ISKP were posing ‘a serious threat’ to the province. According to PIPS, arrests of ISKP militants confirmed the group’s presence in Punjab province during 2018.

The Punjab Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) continued with operations against militants in Punjab province during 2018. Media agencies reported about arrests made or killings of suspicious militants of the TTP, HuA, LeJ, and ISKP by the Punjab CTD.

Description of recent security trends

In 2018, PIPS counted four ‘terrorist attacks’, compared to 14 in 2017. Two attacks were carried out by the TTP, one by HuA and one by unknown militants. These attacks occurred in Lahore, Attock, Rahim

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623 Diplomat (The), How Land Reform Can Help Reduce Terrorism in Pakistan, 21 June 2018, [url]; UNOCHA, Pakistan-Overview map [map], 3 December 2018, [url]
624 The McGill International Review, South Punjab – Neglected and Politicized, 4 April 2019, [url]
625 Dawn, 20pc of Pakistanis live in 10 cities, census reveals, 29 August 2017, [url]
626 South Asian Voices, What the case of Punjab says about Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy, 29 June 2018, [url]
627 The McGill International Review, South Punjab – Neglected and Politicized, 4 April 2019, [url]
629 International Crisis Group, Pakistan’s Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab, 30 May 2016, [url]
630 Jamestown Foundation (The), Pakistan’s Jamaat-ud-Dawa Positions Itself for Politics, 12 October 2017, [url]
631 Defence, Explainer: Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Pakistan-based militants, at heart of tension with India, 15 February 2019, [url]; Guardian (The), Pakistan launches major crackdown on extremist groups, 8 March 2019, [url]
632 Guardian (The), Pakistan launches major crackdown on extremist groups, 8 March 2019, [url]; AP News (Gannon, K.), Popular support for militants complicates Pakistan crackdown, 8 March 2019, [url]
633 Rana Amir, M., Skype interview, 17 July 2019
634 Nation (The), Qaeda, TTP, Daesh posing serious threat to Punjab: CTD head, 5 April 2018, [url]
635 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 112
636 PIPS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 43; ACLED, Regional Overview-29 January 2019, 29 January 2019, [url]
Yar Khan and Rawalpindi.\textsuperscript{637} PICSS observed also a decline in militant attacks in 2018, compared to 2017 (from 15 militant attacks in 2017 to five in 2018).\textsuperscript{638}

Militant attacks in the province of Punjab took place in the second half of 2018.\textsuperscript{639} In December 2018, HuA claimed responsibility for a firing incident at a military checkpoint in Rawalpindi.\textsuperscript{640} Other types of violence mentioned by PIPS in 2018 were suicide attacks, incidents of political and election-related violence, communal and mob violence.\textsuperscript{641}

From 1 January - 31 July 2019, PIPS counted three ‘terrorist attacks’ in Punjab.\textsuperscript{642} On 8 May 2019, HuA carried out a suicide attack near a Sufi Shrine in the provincial capital Lahore with at least nine fatalities reported. Police officers were the prime target.\textsuperscript{643} At the end of July 2019, security measures in Rawalpindi increased after reports that militants would possible target police stations and sensitive installations.\textsuperscript{644}

**Impact of the violence on the civilian population**

CRSS counted 288 casualties (148 fatalities and 140 injured) in Punjab in 2018, a considerable decrease compared to 2017 (738 casualties).\textsuperscript{645} According to different sources, most casualties were militants and civilians, followed by security forces and others.\textsuperscript{646} SATP recorded in 2018 in total 36 fatalities (12 civilians, 6 security force personnel, 14 militants and 4 not specified).\textsuperscript{647}

CRSS counted in total 136 casualties (75 fatalities, 61 injured) in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2019. In the second quarter of 2019, fatalities decreased in the province with 31 % (from 44 to 31 fatalities) compared to the first quarter of 2019. The number of injured increased during the second quarter of 2019.\textsuperscript{648}

From 1 January until 31 July 2019, SATP counted 24 fatalities. Among those killed, SATP observed 10 civilians, 7 security forces personnel, and 7 militants.\textsuperscript{649}

**Displacement**

The IDMC stated that the majority of ‘new displacements in 2018’ were caused by inter-religious violence in Lahore but did not specify the number of displacements.\textsuperscript{650} Among the consulted sources there was no further information found about any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Punjab. UNOCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Punjab in 2018 or in the first seven months of 2019.\textsuperscript{651}

\textsuperscript{637} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 49
\textsuperscript{638} PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, url, p. 43
\textsuperscript{639} PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, url, p. 43
\textsuperscript{640} Dawn, Police official shot dead at checkpoint in Rawalpindi, 3 December 2018, url; PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 49
\textsuperscript{641} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 52, p. 58, p. 60
\textsuperscript{642} Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
\textsuperscript{643} BBC News, Pakistan Data Darbar: Bomber kills nine outside Sufi shrine in Lahore, 8 May 2019, url
\textsuperscript{644} Express Tribune (The), High alert issued for Rawalpindi, 29 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{647} SATP, Data Sheet-Punjab-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{648} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019, url; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{649} SATP, Data Sheet-Punjab-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{650} IDMC, Pakistan Figure Analysis – Displacement Related to Conflict and Violence (GRID 2019), 2019, url, p. 1
\textsuperscript{651} Websites consulted: http://www.unocha.org/pakistan; https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan; http://reliefweb.int/country/pak
2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including former FATA)

General description of the province

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (see Map 1) is situated in the north of Pakistan and borders Afghanistan in the west, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan in the east and north-east and Punjab province in the south-east. The provincial capital and the largest city in the province is Peshawar. The province is well known for its natural resources. The majority of the population speaks Pashtu, followed by the local language Hindko and Urdu. The population of the province (including former FATA) is around 35.5 million.

The FATA was a semi-autonomous tribal region in north-western Pakistan, consisting of seven tribal agencies (districts) and six frontier regions, until being merged with KP on 31 May 2018. The region of former FATA is referred to as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa tribal districts. The tribal agencies and frontier regions in former FATA have been re-designated as districts and sub-divisions of KP.

The KP tribal districts are described separately and in detail below because of their impact on the security situation in Pakistan.

Background of the conflict and actors in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including former FATA)

In 2009, the Pakistani army engaged in a series of military operations against the TTP in KP. This offensive was marked by human rights violations and arbitrary arrests. The army’s counter-insurgency operations such as Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad in KP (including former FATA) contributed to a higher level of security in the province in the long-run. The Pakistani state is exercising control in Malakand division and peace returned to the Swat valley in 2019. According to Daud Khattak in a telephone interview on 6 May 2019, some parts in KP are still vulnerable to attacks. Cities like Mardan and Dera Ismael Khan are surrounded by the tribal districts and they have their border with Afghanistan. Therefore, from a security point of view they are vulnerable according to Daud Khattak.

At the end of May 2018, the FATA merged with KP. The newly merged tribal districts are governed under provincial laws of KP. According to a report of International Crisis Group in August 2018, years of military operations in former FATA broke the TTP’s hold over most of the tribal belt but also displaced millions of residents, destroyed homes and ruined livelihoods. Security in those areas has ‘improved but remains fragile’ according to International Crisis Group. The networks of the TTP are still active either in Afghanistan or in districts of KP such as Tank, Dera Ismael Khan, North and South Waziristan. The government announced provincial elections in the tribal districts of the province. The provincial elections were foreseen for 2 July 2019 but postponed until 20 July 2019 due to security

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652 Government of Pakistan, Provincial Disaster Management Authority, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Monsoon Contingency Plan 2019, 6 July 2019, url, pp. 4-7
653 Alhasan Systems, Pakistan Development Perspective - City district Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 31 December 2015, url, p. 17
654 International News (The), KP has abundant natural resources, 25 June 2017, url
655 Daily Sabah, Pakistan: A land of many languages, 9 March 2018, url
656 Government of Pakistan, Provincial Disaster Management Authority, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Monsoon Contingency Plan 2019, 6 July 2019, url, p. 7
657 Asia Foundation (The), Dismantling Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, 24 October 2018, url
658 Express Tribune (The), Tribal areas re-designated as districts, sub-divisions, 12 June 2018, url; Express Tribune (The), Notification issued for composition of new administrative divisions in Mohmand, Khyber, 20 July 2018, url
659 Dawn, Swat: an unquiet calm, 21 September 2014, url
660 Almeida, C., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Pakistan, 16-17 October 2017; Rome, February 2018, url, p. 21, p. 46
661 Anadolu Agency, Swat city center: From bloody square to business hub, 23 May 2019, url
662 Khattak, D., telephone conversation, 6 May 2019
663 Khattak, D., telephone conversation, 6 May 2019
664 International Crisis Group, Shaping a New Peace in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, 20 August 2018, url, p. 2
665 International Crisis Group, Shaping a New Peace in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, 20 August 2018, url, p. 3; New York Times (The), Pakistan’s Tribal Areas Are Still Waiting for Justice as Army Tightens Grip, 11 June 2019, url
reasons. On 20 July 2019, provincial elections were held amid heightened security measures, including the deployment of police officers and soldiers in the region. The election process was peaceful with no major security incidents.

**Description of recent security trends**

PIPS documented a total of 183 incidents of violence in the province in 2018. This included ‘terrorist attacks’, anti-militant operational strikes by security forces, armed clashes/encounters between security/law enforcement personnel and militants, inter-militant clashes, cross-border attacks and drone strikes. PIPS counted 125 ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2018.

PIPS observed that militants in 2018 used tactics such as suicide bombings, firearms, IEDs, and hand grenades and rockets. The trend of militants attacking civilians, government officials and institutions, tribal elders and police officers continued during 2018. According to PICSS, the security situation in the province improved in the second half of 2018 after an increase of militant attacks during the election period in 2018. The KP districts where 10 or more ‘terrorist attacks’ happened in 2018 includes North Waziristan (33 attacks), Dera Ismael Khan (18 attacks), Peshawar (12 attacks), Khyber and Bannu (11 attacks each), Bajaur and South Waziristan (10 attacks each).

From 1 January 2019 to 31 July 2019, PIPS observed 78 ‘terrorist attacks’ in the province. In the first seven months of 2019 the KP districts where most ‘terrorist attacks’ took place are: North Waziristan (37 attacks), Dera Ismael Khan (9 attacks), Bajaur (5 attacks) and South Waziristan (4 attacks).

On 21 July 2019 ten people including three civilians, six police officers and one militant died in two back-to-back attacks in Dera Ismail Khan. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack. In Dera Ismail Khan, multiple security operations were carried out in the past but the area still continues to serve as ‘a fertile ground for extremists to breed and thrive’.

**Impact of the violence on the civilian population**

According to PIPS, in 183 incidents of violence of various types 297 people were killed (129 civilians, 94 security personnel, and 74 militants) and 504 people wounded in the province in 2018. CRSS documented 810 casualties in the province of KP (369 fatalities, 441 injured) in 2018.

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666 Dawn, KP govt seeks delay in tribal district elections for provincial assembly, 9 June 2019, [url]
667 RFE/RL, Pakistan’s Restive Tribal Region Holds First Local Elections, 20 July 2019, [url]
668 Dawn, Win for ex-Fata, 23 July 2019, [url]
669 This number includes former FATA agencies; PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 36
670 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 36
671 This number includes former FATA agencies; PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 35
672 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 35
673 This number includes former FATA agencies; PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 35
675 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 40
676 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 35
677 This number includes former FATA agencies; PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 35
678 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
679 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
680 Dawn, 6 policemen martyred in gun, bomb attack in DI Khan, 21 July 2019, [url]
681 Mohanty Ranjan, T., Pakistan: Dera Ismail Khan: Tenuous Control, 29 July 2019, in: South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 18, No. 5, [url]
682 These numbers includes former FATA agencies; PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 36
According to data provided by CRSS in their first and second quarter analysis report of 2019, 264 casualties (145 fatalities, 119 injured) were counted for the province.685 The casualties in former FATA increased in the second quarter of 2019. In the first quarter of 2019, CRSS counted 20 fatalities and in the second quarter of 2019 45 fatalities. On the opposite side in what CRSS describes as KP the casualties decreased from 48 fatalities to 32 fatalities in the second quarter of 2019.686

In the first seven months of 2019, 72 fatalities were counted by SATP. SATP counted 14 civilian fatalities, 40 security forces fatalities and 14 militant fatalities.687

Displacement

In May 2018, UNOCHA identified some areas in KP as an IDP-hosting area.688 During the period of 1 March 2018 to 31 July 2018, 207 families returned to North Waziristan tribal district and Khyber tribal district. Although IDP returns are not ‘officially open’ as of August 2018, a small number of families have chosen to return. According to UNOCHA, 29 452 families remain displaced as of August 2018 and the government has not announced further returns in 2018.689

PICSS describes in its 2018 report that ‘post operation, rehabilitation of temporary displaced persons (TDPs) in [former] FATA region is in its final stage as 322 915 families have returned to their homes by 19 December 2018 while 16 136 families are yet to return. Out of these 16 136 families, 15 017 belong to North Waziristan and 1 119 belong to Khyber tribal district.’690 No further information could be found about displacement in the province of KP during the reporting period.

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa tribal districts

For a better understanding of the security situation the KP tribal districts are first described in general terms and below in more detail.

General

According to PICSS, the security situation in the tribal districts improved in 2018 compared to 2017. The number of militant attacks (66 militant attacks in 2018) and the number of casualties (109 killed, 151 injured in 2018) decreased in 2018 compared to 2017.691 FRC states in its annual report of 2018 that compared to 2017 there was a decrease of 17 % in ‘terrorist incidents’ and a decrease of 20 % in counter terrorism incidents in 2018. In total FRC counted 264 violent incidents (127 terrorism and 137 counter-terrorism incidents) in 2018.692

Figure 9 (see below) gives an overview of the nature of violence in the tribal districts in 2017 and 2018, showing that the nature of the incidents is diverse: from search operations by the military to attacks on civilians and security force personnel by militants and drone attacks. In 2018, the number of attacks on civilians and security forces decreased compared to 2017.693

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685 These numbers include Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and former FATA; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019, [url]. CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, [url].
687 These numbers include Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and former FATA; SATP, Data Sheet-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, [url].
688 UNOCHA, Pakistan: KP and FATA - Areas of Displacement, Hosting and Returns as of 31 May 2018, 13 June 2018, [url].
689 UNOCHA, Pakistan: KP Tribal Districts Returns Update (from 01 March to 31 July 2018) - Humanitarian Snapshot, 21 August 2018, [url].
690 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 37
691 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 34
692 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, [url], p. 1
693 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, [url], p. 1
### Nature of violent incidents in the tribal districts in 2017 and 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of incidents</th>
<th>No. of incidents 2017</th>
<th>No. of incidents 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on civilians</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on security forces</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on peace forces</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clashes between militants groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search operations</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial strikes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drone attacks</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Nature of violent incidents in the FATA in 2017 and 2018 (FRC)

Figure 10 (see below) gives an overview of the nature of the casualties in the tribal districts in 2017 and 2018. In 2018, FRC counted a total of 366 casualties (152 killed and 214 injured) in all the KP tribal districts, marking a significant decrease of 70% in overall casualties compared to 2017. According to Figure 10, civilians remained the most affected target during the year 2018.

### Nature of casualties in the tribal districts 2017 and 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of casualties in the tribal districts 2017 and 2018</th>
<th>No of casualties 2017</th>
<th>No of casualties 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militants</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security forces</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace forces/Aman Lashkar</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Nature of casualties in the tribal districts in 2017 and 2018 (FRC)

Methods used by militants included IEDs, suicide attacks, cross-border attacks, clashes between militant groups and militant ambushes on security personnel (see also Figure 11). Just as in 2017, the

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695 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, [url](#), p. 2

use of IED remained the most used tactic by militants in 2018. These are observed in all tribal districts. Pakistani security forces reacted with air strikes, ground operations and search operations in 2018.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militant tactics in the tribal districts 2017 and 2018</th>
<th>No of incidents 2017</th>
<th>No of incidents 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted killings</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide attacks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross border attacks</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Militant tactics in the tribal districts in 2017 and 2018 (FRC)  

Below a description is given of the recent security trends in the tribal districts in KP in 2018 and the first half of 2019.  

**Bajaur tribal district**

Bajaur is located in the north of the province of KP and shares a border with Afghanistan’s eastern Kunar Province to the north-west, and Mohmand tribal district in the west. The population of Bajaur tribal district is 1,093,684. In Bajaur, the first district courts were set up in the merged tribal districts at the end of June 2019.

FRC documented 21 violent incidents in Bajaur. This is a decrease of 61% in terms of incidents compared to 2017 (52 violent incidents). According to FRC 38 casualties were counted in 2018 (24 killed and 14 injured). PIPS counted 10 ‘terrorist attacks’ in Bajaur killing 8 and injuring 7 in 2018. FRC stated that the TTP is mainly involved in militant attacks in Bajaur. Militants mainly used IEDs to target security forces, civilians and tribal elders in Mamond and Nawagai tehsil (an administrative division) of the district.

From 1 January 2019 to 31 July 2019, PIPS counted five ‘terrorist attacks’ in Bajaur tribal district. Three people were killed and eight injured. In April 2019, a soldier got injured during an IED blast in Ghakhi area of Bajaur. On 5 May 2019, unknown militants killed a polio worker in Bajaur. A roadside blast injured a senior political leader of Awami National Party (ANP), amongst two others on 18 June 2019.  

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697 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 15  
698 FRC, FATA Annual Security Report, 13 January 2018, url, p. 28; FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 15  
701 TNN, District court starts functioning in Bajaur, 29 June 2019, url  
702 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 4  
703 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 35  
704 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, pp. 5-6  
705 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS  
706 TNN, Army man martyred in check post firing, soldier injured while defusing IED in Bajaur, 29 April 2019, url  
707 Express Tribune (The), Polio official shot dead in Bajaur district, 5 May 2019, url  
708 TNN, Senior ANP leader injured in Bajaur bomb blast, 18 June 2019, url
Khyber tribal district

Khyber borders Afghanistan to the west, Orakzai tribal district to the south, Kurram tribal district to the south-west and Peshawar in the east. This district is divided into three sub-administrative units: Bara, Jamrud and Landi Kotal.709 Khyber tribal district has a population of 986,973.710

In recent years, the Pakistani army carried out four military operations in Khyber.711 The last military operation occurred in July 2017. The Pakistani army announced in July 2017 that it had launched a new military operation in Khyber Agency’s Rajgal Valley, the operation Khyber-IV. Hideouts and training camps of militants were destroyed in this offensive.712

In 2018, FRC stated that 17 violent incidents occurred in Khyber tribal district. This is a significant decline of 85% compared to 2017 when 115 violent incidents were reported by FRC.713 According to FRC 24 casualties were counted in 2018 (11 killed and 13 injured).714 PIPS counted 11 ‘terrorist attacks’ in Khyber killing 7 and injuring 20 in 2018.715 In December 2018, tribal leaders of Khyber tribal district complained of raids carried out by the security forces in search for weapons.716

From 1 January until 31 July 2019, PIPS counted two ‘terrorist attacks’ in Khyber tribal district. Two casualties were counted (one killed and one injured).717

Kurram tribal district

Kurram shares its border largely with Afghanistan (Nangarhar and Paktia province). In the east this agency borders Orakzai, Khyber and North Waziristan in the south. It is divided into three administrative units: Lower Kurram, Upper Kurram and Central Kurram. Parachinar is the main capital of Kurram Agency. Kurram has a significant Shia population. Kurram Agency has a history of sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia population.718 Kurram tribal district has a population of 619,553.719

In 2018, a ‘significant’ decrease in violent incidents was observed by FRC in this tribal district compared to 2017. In total, FRC counted three violent incidents in 2018 compared to 52 in 2017.720 The same downwards trend was noted in the number of casualties in 2018. FRC counted 21 casualties (8 killed, 13 injured) in 2018 compared to 664 casualties (197 killed, 467 injured) in 2017.721 PIPS counted one ‘terrorist attack’ in 2018 in Kurram killing seven and injuring one person.722 It is not known if this is the same incident as the one reported in January 2018, when an IED exploded and hit a vehicle of a family of eight persons in Upper Kurram.723

From 1 January until 31 July 2019, PIPS counted no ‘terrorist attacks’ in Kurram tribal district.724 On 12 June 2019, two Frontier Corps (FC) and police personnel were injured in a clash with militants in Marghan Ali Sherzai area of Kurram.725

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712 Dawn, Operation Khyber-IV: army clears terrorist strongholds in Rajgal valley, 23 July 2017, url
713 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 8
714 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 8
716 Gandhara, In Khyber Pass, Pashtun Tribes Protest Raids, 20 December 2018, url
717 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
718 CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, url, pp. 16-17
719 CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, url, p. 16
720 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 9
721 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 9
723 Nation (The), Eight family members killed in Kurram Agency IED blast, 30 January 2018, url
724 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
725 TNN, 2 security personnel injured in Kurram clash, 12 June 2019, url
Mohmand tribal district

Mohmand borders Bajaur in the north and Khyber in the south. In the east it borders Malakand and Charsadda districts and Peshawar District in the south-east.\(^{726}\) Mohmand tribal district has a population of 466,984.\(^{727}\)

FRC counted seven violent incidents during 2018, killing seven people and injuring four. Compared to 2017, the situation in this agency improved in 2018.\(^{728}\) According to PIPS, seven ‘terrorist attacks’ have taken place in Mohmand tribal district in 2018 killing five and injuring five people.\(^{729}\) According to FRC and PIPS militants targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies in this district.\(^{730}\) Militants used tactics such as ambushes and IED attacks.\(^{731}\) PIPS documented also two attacks on civilians and two cross border attacks from Afghanistan in 2018.\(^{732}\)

From 1 January 2019 to 31 July 2019, PIPS counted two ‘terrorist attacks’ in Mohmand tribal district in which one person died.\(^{733}\) In 2019, multiple IED attacks occurred in Mohmand. In January 2019, a police officer was killed and another one injured due to a landmine blast.\(^{734}\) A former member of a pro-government ‘peace militia’ (Aman Committee) was killed in an IED blast on 30 April 2019.\(^{735}\)

Orakzai tribal district

Orakzai shares its borders with Khyber tribal district in the north, Kohat in the east, the districts of Kohat and Hangu in the south, and Kurram tribal district in the west. Administratively, it is divided into Upper and Lower Orakzai.\(^{736}\) The population is 245,356.\(^{737}\)

Three incidents of violence were counted by FRC during 2018 compared to thirteen in 2017. FRC reported 75 casualties (37 killed, 38 injured) in 2018.\(^{738}\) According to PIPS, three ‘terrorist attacks’ have taken place in Orakzai tribal district in 2018, killing 36 and injuring 44 people. Most casualties in Orakzai occurred due to a ‘high profile attack’ on 23 November 2018.\(^{739}\) A suicide blast targeted a busy market in Kalaya.\(^{740}\) ISKP claimed the attack and stated that the suicide bomber had targeted the Shia community.\(^{741}\) After this incident, the government closed all bazaars and markets in Orakzai until the shopkeepers would install security cameras.\(^{742}\)

From 1 January until 31 July 2019, PIPS counted no ‘terrorist attacks’ in Orakzai tribal district.\(^{743}\)

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\(^{726}\) CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](url)

\(^{727}\) CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](url)

\(^{728}\) FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{729}\) PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{730}\) FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{731}\) PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{732}\) FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{733}\) PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{734}\) Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS

\(^{735}\) TNN, One soldier martyred, another injured in Mohmand blast, 23 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{736}\) TNN, Former Aman Committee member shot dead in Mohmand, 30 April 2019, [url](url)

\(^{737}\) CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](url)

\(^{738}\) CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, [url](url)

\(^{739}\) FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, [url](url)

\(^{740}\) Al Jazeera, Pakistan: Deadly blast hits market in Orakzai district, 23 November 2018, [url](url)

\(^{741}\) Reuters, Islamic state claims responsibility for Pakistan market suicide bombing, 24 November 2018, [url](url)

\(^{742}\) TNN, All bazaars in Orakzai closed after shopkeepers’ failure to install security cameras, 19 December 2018, [url](url)

\(^{743}\) Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
North Waziristan tribal district

North Waziristan borders Kurram tribal district and Hangu in the north and Karak and Bannu districts in the east, South Waziristan tribal district in the south and Afghanistan in the west. North Waziristan has a population of 543,254. Before 2014, North Waziristan was considered as a home base of al-Qaeda, Pakistani and the Haqqani-network. In June 2014, Operation Zarb-e-Azb was initiated in North Waziristan. The area was cleared of militants according to the Pakistani military. Asad Hashim stated in a Skype interview on 28 May 2019 that there is a mix of the TTP and criminal groups present. The power of local militias is growing and they are enforcing control over certain areas of North Waziristan. In the last three to four months prior to the interview in May 2019, analysts have seen a large scale of incidents in North Waziristan in particular. Incidents like targeting of security forces, targeting of civilians in targeted killings, extortion, kidnapping have spiked in the last two months prior to the interview in May 2019. In Miranshah, a pamphlet issued by the TTP in July 2019 warns citizens not to play music in public, allow women freedom of movement or vaccinate their children against polio, or ‘face the consequences’.

FRC describes the security situation in North Waziristan as ‘turbulent’ in 2018. FRC noted an increase in violent incidents and in casualties in 2018 compared to 2017. In 2018, FRC counted 57 violent incidents compared to 27 violent incidents in 2017. FRC counted 152 casualties (55 killed, 97 injured) in 2018 compared to 72 casualties (48 killed, 24 injured) in 2017. According to PIPS, 33 ‘terrorist attacks’ have taken place in North Waziristan tribal district in 2018, killing 44 and injuring 98 people. In North Waziristan the main tactic used by militants are targeted killings. Main targets of these militant attacks in 2018 are security force personnel and civilians according to FRC.

Attacks on security force personnel in the first half of 2019 continued. In the beginning of June 2019, security force personnel were targeted in multiple attacks in Datta Khel in North Waziristan. Militants used IEDs and remote-controlled bombs. Ten security force personnel were killed and 35 others injured according to an article of the Pakistani newspaper Daily Times of 9 June 2019. On 26 May 2019, three people were killed and at least 10 others injured in clashes between Pakistani security forces and protesters of the PTM.

In the wake of these incidents and to prevent any ‘untoward situation’, section 144 was imposed for thirty days. Ahead of the provincial elections, section 144 was lifted on 8 July 2019. On 27 July 2019 six soldiers were killed when their patrol came under attack in the Shawal tehsil of North

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744 CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, p. 20
745 CRSS, FATA Tribes: Finally Out of Colonial Clutches? Past, Present and Future, 12 July 2018, p. 20
746 BBC News, North Waziristan: What happened after militants lost the battle?, 8 March 2017, url
748 Nation (The), Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two years of success, 6 September 2016, url; Dawn, After Army’s clean-up of North Waziristan, locals want civilian govt to get in action, 18 May 2017, url
749 Hashim, A., Skype interview, 28 May 2019
750 Dawn, TTP warns against playing music, women going out alone in Miramshah, 1 August 2019, url
751 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 11
752 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 12
753 Daily Times, Terrorism strikes again, 9 June 2019, url
754 Daily Times, Terrorism strikes again, 9 June 2019, url
756 FRC, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Tribal Districts annual security situation 2018, 15 January 2019, url, pp. 15-16
757 Daily Times, Terrorism strikes again, 9 June 2019, url
758 Daily Times, Terrorism strikes again, 9 June 2019, url
759 Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers district administrations to issue orders in public interest that may place a ban on an activity for a specific period of time. Government of Pakistan, Code of Criminal Procedure [Pakistan], Act No. V, 1 July 1898, url
760 TNN, Section 144 lifted in North Waziristan ahead of elections, 8 July 2019, url
Waziristan. Abubakar Siddique, a Pakistani journalist, quoted a tribal leader in an article of April 2019:

‘The tribal leader said most of the 40 people killed over the past year in what appears to be an assassination campaign in North Waziristan were former Taliban members or sympathizers who had surrendered to the authorities or had helped the military take on their former comrades.’

In the first seven months of 2019, PIPS counted 37 ‘terrorist attacks’ in North Waziristan tribal district. In total PIPS counted 104 casualties (33 killed and 71 injured). According to PIPS in North Waziristan most ‘terrorist attacks were counted in the province of KP in the first seven months of 2019’. 

**South Waziristan tribal district**

South Waziristan shares its border in the north with North Waziristan, and borders Bannu and Lakki Marwat districts in the north-east, the tribal area adjoining Tank district and Dera Ismail Khan district in the east, Zhob District of Balochistan Province and Dera Ismail Khan district in the south, and Afghanistan in the west. South Waziristan Agency has a population of 543 356. RFE/RL reported in July 2018 that there is a ‘renewed Taliban influence in Waziristan’ noticeable. Locals call this armed group the Aman (Peace) Committee, which operates as a government-backed militia. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, expert on militant movements in Pakistan stated about the presence of the Taliban in South Waziristan:

‘One ‘lump’ of the Pakistani Taliban is, however, still active in South Waziristan. They are organized in one of the peace committees in the district and are also called the “good Taliban”, the ones who the military is not targeting. They are no longer part of the larger umbrella of TTP, and they have been granted the right to control an area in South Waziristan.’

According to Kanwal Sheikh, the ‘Taliban’ in Wana, in South Waziristan, is organised under four different commanders and with ‘their own police and public morality “corps” and their own justice system’. They also collect taxes from local businesses. In April 2019, the Taliban in Wana warned the police through pamphlets to leave South Waziristan. At the end of May 2019, section 144 was imposed for a month in South Waziristan due to the clash between PTM and the army on 26 May 2019 in North Waziristan.

FRC stated that the situation in South Waziristan remained ‘disturbed’ but that the frequency of attacks decreased in 2018. FRC recorded 16 violent incidents in 2018, compared to 2017 (30 violent incidents), which is a decrease of almost 50 %. FRC counted 45 casualties (32 killed, 13 injured) in 2018. This is a slight decrease compared to 2017 when FRC counted 47 casualties in 2017 (34 killed, 13 injured). According to PIPS, 10 ‘terrorist attacks’ have taken place in North Waziristan tribal district in 2018, killing 9 and injuring 17 people.
From 1 January until 31 July 2019, PIPS counted four ‘terrorist attacks’ in South Waziristan tribal district. Five people were killed and seven injured.775 In February 2019, the security forces carried out a security operation in Gul Kach area of South Waziristan. Three militants of the TTP were killed.776 In different incidents in July 2019, three people, including two security personnel, were injured.777

2.2.3. Balochistan

General description of the province

Balochistan (see Map 1) is located in the west of Pakistan. It borders Iran in the west, Afghanistan in the north-west, KP province in the north-east, Punjab province in the east, Sindh province in the south-east, and the Arabian Sea in the south.778 Balochistan is the least economically developed province of Pakistan.779 The province is rich in natural resources such as gas, coal and other minerals.780 The province of Balochistan is prone to environmental hazards including earthquakes, floods, and drought.781 The province is of strategic importance to the government of Pakistan because of the CPEC project.782 The CPEC project includes a 3 000 km network of roads, railway and pipelines running from Balochistan’s Gwadar Port to the Xinjiang region in China.783

The majority of the people are Baloch, but the second largest group are Pashtun who dominate the northern areas.784 The provincial capital Quetta is also the home of a large part of the Hazara community in Pakistan.785 Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan but the least populated.786 According to the latest population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, the population of the province is around 12.3 million.787

Background of the conflict and actors in Balochistan

The province of Balochistan struggles with multiple problems such as sectarian violence, Islamist militant attacks and a separatist insurgency.788 These conflicts are further complicated by the involvement of several foreign states, such as China, India and Iran, with an economic or political stake in the province.789

The separatist insurgency has been going on in Balochistan for decades. Different nationalist groups complained about the unfair distribution of royalties from the exploitation of natural minerals in the province.790 The conflict intensified in 2005 and escalated further in August 2006 with the death of Nationalist Leader and Tribal Head Nawab Akbar Bugti. The government of Pakistan reacted with a military operation. The building of military cantonments in Balochistan and the development of

775 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
776 TNN, Three terrorists killed in South Waziristan operation, 5 February 2019, url
777 TNN, Two soldiers among three injured in South Waziristan incidents, 20 July 2019, url
778 Diplomat (The), A Brief History of Balochistan, 12 February 2016, url
780 UNDP Pakistan, Balochistan: Challenges & Opportunities, 17 April 2019, url, p. 2, p. 14
782 UNDP Pakistan, Balochistan: Challenges & Opportunities, 17 April 2019, url, p. 2
783 Nation (The), Gwadar: Economic prosperity of Pakistan, 6 July 2019, url
784 Diplomat (The), Fear and Loathing in Balochistan, 25 April 2019, url
785 Reuters, ‘Under siege’: Fear and defiance mark life for Pakistan’s minority Hazaras, 5 July 2019, url
788 Reuters, Pakistan asks Iran to act on militants behind Baluchistan killings, 20 April 2019, url
789 Reuters, Pakistan asks Iran to act on militants behind Baluchistan killings, 20 April 2019, url; Diplomat (The), Trouble at the Pakistan-Iran Border, 30 October 2018, url
790 DW, China consulate attack: Why Pakistan’s Baloch separatists are against Beijing, 23 November 2018, url
Gwadar port by China also became reasons for conflict.\textsuperscript{791} A series of attacks on government targets and on Punjabi settlers spiked during the insurgency after 2006.\textsuperscript{792}

Independent observers and Baloch nationalists state in an interview with Gandhara in April 2019 that an extensive crackdown by Pakistani security forces relying on anti-nationalist militias, enforced disappearances, and other harsh tactics has weakened the insurgency, especially in the Makran area.\textsuperscript{793} According to Kiyya Baloch, a journalist from Balochistan’s Makran region most of the attacks occur in the remote regions of the province.\textsuperscript{794} Still, the Baloch armed groups were able to carry out a series of violent attacks on Chinese interests in the region in the last two years. This is largely due to a transformation of the Baloch armed groups caused by a change in traditional leadership and urbanisation of their operations from small towns to cities outside the province.\textsuperscript{795} An issue that has continuously fuelled the insurgency in Balochistan are the enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.\textsuperscript{796}

Different Islamist militant groups are active in the province. Balochistan continues to be a safe haven for ISKP.\textsuperscript{797} Militant groups claimed responsibility for multiple attacks during 2018 and in the first months of 2019.\textsuperscript{797} There is a resurgence of the TTP in the areas of Balochistan close to the border with Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{798} Security sources believe that Zhob district is emerging as the new hub of TTP activity where the group is establishing hideouts and safe havens.\textsuperscript{799} According to PIPS, groups such as HuA, LeJ and unknown militants are also active in the province.\textsuperscript{800}

Besides these groups, the Afghan Taliban also have a presence in Balochistan. The Quetta Shura is based in the capital of the province and the Quetta Shura has, according to Malik Siraj Akbar the support of the Pakistani military. The military assures that they are not being arrested and that they can use the Quetta Shura in negotiations with the United States according to Malik Siraj Akbar.\textsuperscript{801} Sectarian violence is still present in Balochistan. Members of the local Shia community, mostly members of the Hazara community in Quetta have fallen victim of violent attacks, targeted killings and suicide attacks.\textsuperscript{802} In addition, members of the Christian community and the Hindu community were targeted.\textsuperscript{803}

Another factor contributing to the conflict in Balochistan in recent years is the international involvement in Pakistan’s efforts to build the Gwadar Port in collaboration with China.\textsuperscript{804} The Baloch insurgent groups have condemned the CPEC project. They interpret the project as an attempt by the state to exploit Balochistan’s resources while receiving little in return. To protect the CPEC project, Pakistan increased its security personnel in the region.\textsuperscript{805}

Malik Siraj Akbar stated that multiple security forces are intertwined in Balochistan and there is an institutional breakdown. The police is responsible for the city centres in Balochistan and the Levies for

\textsuperscript{791} Aamir, A., The Balochistan Insurgency and the Threat to Chinese Interests in Pakistan, 15 February 2019, in: China Brief, volume: 19, issue: 4, url
\textsuperscript{793} Gandhara, Balochistan’s Separatist Insurgency On The Wane Despite Recent Attack, 18 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{794} Gandhara, Balochistan’s Separatist Insurgency On The Wane Despite Recent Attack, 18 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{795} Gandhara, Balochistan’s Separatist Insurgency On The Wane Despite Recent Attack, 18 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{796} Prism, Eight months in, how is Balochistan faring?, 5 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{797} Al, Pakistan: Enduring Enforced Disappearances, 27 March 2019, url
\textsuperscript{798} International News (The), TTP expands footprint in Balochistan as Quetta Safe City project remains in limbo, 10 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{799} TRT World, Pakistani Taliban: Between infighting, government crackdowns and Daesh, 18 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{800} International News (The), TTP expands footprint in Balochistan as Quetta Safe City project remains in limbo, 10 April 2019, url; TRT World, Pakistani Taliban: Between infighting, government crackdowns and Daesh, 18 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{801} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, pp. 41-46
\textsuperscript{802} Akbar Siraj M., Skype interview, 23 May 2019
\textsuperscript{803} Diplomat (The), Hazaras Gripped by Religious Extremism in Balochistan, 16 April 2019, url
\textsuperscript{804} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, p. 42
\textsuperscript{805} Dawn, The geoconomics of CPEC, 7 April 2019, url
the outskirts of the province. There is no cooperation between these two forces. When attacks occur, the provincial government relies upon the Frontier Corps. The problem is that there is no follow up according to Malik Siraj Akbar and this leads up to a break up in law and order.806

Description of recent security trends

PIPS documented 149 incidents of various types of violence in the province in 2018: 115 ‘terrorist attacks’, 15 anti-militant operational attacks by security forces, 8 armed clashes and encounters between security forces and militants, and 7 cross-border attacks.807 Compared to 2017, the number of terrorist attacks dropped by 30 % (165 ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017).808 PIPS differentiated the terrorist attacks between attacks carried out by religious inspired groups (41 attacks) and Baloch insurgents groups (74 attacks).809 PICSS mentioned that militants in 2018 used suicide bombings, firearms, IEDs, hand grenades and rockets. Targeted killings and kidnappings were also observed.810

Examples of major security incidents in 2018 in the province include attacks in the run up to the general election of 25 July 2018 and on the Election Day itself.811 On 11 August 2018, a suicide bomber of the BLA targeted a bus with Chinese engineers in Dalbandin left at least five injured.812 On 21 November 2018, nine people were injured in an explosion inside a mosque in Chaman area in Qila Abdullah District.813

From 1 January 2019 to 31 July 2019, PIPS observed in total 61 ‘terrorist attacks’. In total PIPS observed 496 casualties (144 killed and 352 injured).814

The Diplomat stated in April 2019 that the situation in Balochistan had worsened. There have been sporadic assaults on the security forces in Balochistan’s northern belt. There are reports of banned religious outfits regrouping and gaining momentum according to the Diplomat.815 In the first half of 2019, Baloch national insurgent groups carried out multiple attacks. On 16 February 2019, armed men killed two Frontier Corps in Loralai.816 On 17 February 2019, four security personnel of the Frontier Corps were killed in the Gardab area of Panjgur district.817 BRAS claimed responsibility for an attack on buses that were traveling between Karachi and Gwadar on 18 April 2019.818 On 11 May 2019, militants of the BLA carried out an attack on a Pearl Continental hotel in Gwadar.819

In addition, Islamist militant groups carried out some major attacks in the first half of 2019. On 29 January 2019, nine people including eight police officers and a civilian were killed while 22 others were injured when gunmen and suicide bombers attacked a Deputy Inspector General’s (DIG) office in Lorelai. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.820 LeJ and ISKP claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a market in Quetta, killing at least 20 people on 12 April 2019. Both groups claimed that the Hazara community was the target.821 On 24 May 2019, at least three people were killed and 19

806 Akbar Siraj M., Skype interview, 23 May 2019
810 PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, url, pp. 30-31
811 Express Tribune (The), Seven martyred in blast near Balochistan Assembly, 9 January 2018, url; Al Jazeera, Quetta: Death toll jumps to 31 in election day blast, 25 July 2018, url
812 Dawn, Three Chinese engineers among five injured in Dalbandin suicide attack, 12 August 2018, url
813 Dawn, 9 injured in IED blast at mosque in Balochistan's Chaman, 21 November 2018, url
814 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
815 Diplomat (The), Fear and Loathing in Balochistan, 25 April 2019, url
816 Express Tribune (The), Four more FC troops martyred near Panjigur, 18 February 2019, url
817 Express Tribune (The), Four more FC troops martyred near Panjigur, 18 February 2019, url
818 Al Jazeera, Gunmen kill 14 bus passengers in Pakistan's Balochistan, 18 April 2019, url
819 Guardian (The), Pakistan: Gunmen target luxury hotel in China-funded port city, 11 May 2019, url
820 Express Tribune (The), Nine martyred in gun-and-suicide attack on DIG office in Loralai, 29 January 2019, url
821 Al Jazeera, Pakistan: Deadly explosion rips through Quetta market, 13 April 2019, url
wounded after a bomb exploded at a mosque in Quetta.\textsuperscript{822} On 30 July 2019, five people were killed and at least 32 injured when a bomb exploded in Quetta, apparently targeting a police patrol.\textsuperscript{823}

**Impact of the violence on the civilian population**

PIPS reported that 420 people were killed and 624 injured in 2018 in 149 incidents.\textsuperscript{824} Both PICSS and PIPS observed that while there was a decline in attacks, the number of casualties in 2018 increased compared to 2017. This suggests that the attacks in 2018 were more lethal.\textsuperscript{825} CRSS counted 937 casualties (407 fatalities and 530 injured) in the province of Balochistan in 2018, a higher number compared to 2017 (834 casualties).\textsuperscript{826} SATP recorded in 2018 in total 388 fatalities (234 civilians, 80 security force personnel and 65 terrorists and 9 not specified).\textsuperscript{827} Most casualties of the security incidents in Balochistan were civilians, according to PICSS and SATP.\textsuperscript{828}

PIPS documented that in 2018 the capital, Quetta, lost the highest number of lives due to violence. Other districts that suffered high casualties from violence were Kech, Qilla Abdullah, and Mastung.\textsuperscript{829} In the first seven months of 2019, PIPS observed that the following districts suffered the most casualties: Quetta, Lorelai, Nasirabad and Qilla Abdullah.\textsuperscript{830}

Multiple sources stated that the Hazara community in Quetta is vulnerable to attacks by sectarian militant groups. Due to the violence, they are confined to Hazara Town and Mariab and lack educational opportunities.\textsuperscript{831} After the attack on 12 April 2019, protests by the Hazara broke out.\textsuperscript{832}

According to data in the first and second quarter analysis report by CRSS of 2019, 400 casualties (145 fatalities, 255 injured) were counted. In the second quarter of 2019, fatalities increased in the province compared to the first quarter of 2019.\textsuperscript{833} In the first seven months of 2019, 148 fatalities (mostly security force personnel (48) and civilians (70)) were counted by SATP.\textsuperscript{834}

**Displacement**

The IDMC stated in a report of 2019 that it is probable a significant number of people’ remain displaced from Balochistan in 2005 and 2006 when military operations occurred. According to IDMC, there is a lack of data on these IDPs, but the situation of these IDPs has been recognised, with appeals for economic support to fund their return.\textsuperscript{835}

According to Balochistan National Party (BNP) chief Sardar Akhtar Mengal citing data provided by the concerned deputy Commissioners ‘lawlessness’ displaced people from the districts of Kech, Panjgur and Bolan to ‘safer places’.\textsuperscript{836} Dawn reported in July 2018 that ‘thousands of Baloch people are internally displaced due to target killings or forced disappearances of political workers’.\textsuperscript{837} According

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\textsuperscript{822} Dawn, 3 killed, 19 wounded in blast inside Quetta mosque ahead of Friday prayers: DIG, 24 May 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{823} Express Tribune (The), Five dead as bomb rips through police van in Quetta, 30 July 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{824} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \url{url}, p. 41
\textsuperscript{827} SATP, Data Sheet-Balochistan-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{828} PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, \url{url}, p. 30; SATP, Data Sheet-Balochistan-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 July 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{829} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, \url{url}, p. 41
\textsuperscript{830} Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
\textsuperscript{831} Diplomat (The), Fear and Loathing in Balochistan, 25 April 2019; Al, Pakistan: Hazara community must be protected, 12 April 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{832} RFE/RL, ‘Down With Terrorism’: Pakistan’s Minority Hazara Protest For Third Day After Attack, 14 April 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{833} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 19 July 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{834} SATP, Data Sheet-Balochistan-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{835} IDMC, Pakistan Figure Analysis – Displacement Related to Conflict and Violence (GRID 2019), 2019, \url{url}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{836} Express Tribune (The), Displacement In Balochistan: Mengal renews plea for census delay, 19 February 2017, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{837} Dawn, BNP-Mengal vows to ensure people’s rights in CPEC, 2 July 2018, \url{url}
to Malik Siraj Akbar, ‘lawlessness’ caused external displacement of educated people to foreign countries and internal displacement. At times of frequent attacks people from Dera Bugti, Kholu and Awaran move to Karachi in Sindh. The provincial government has a policy of resettlement but only offers short time solutions.\textsuperscript{838}

In March 2019, 8 000 to 10 000 people have been displaced by floods caused by drought conditions. The provincial government declared a state of emergency in Qilla Abdullah district.\textsuperscript{839}

No further information could be found about displacement in the province of Balochistan during the reporting period of this report in the consulted sources.

\subsection*{2.2.4. Sindh}

\textbf{General description of the province}

The province of Sindh (see Map 1) is situated in the south-east of Pakistan. It borders the province of Balochistan in the north and in the west, the province of Punjab in the north-east and the Arabian Sea in the south.\textsuperscript{840} The provincial capital, Karachi is the largest city in Pakistan with approximately 15 to 20 million people.\textsuperscript{841} The province is divided in six administrative divisions and six cantonment areas.\textsuperscript{842} Karachi is the part of Sindh where significant sectarian, ethnic and political violence occurs. However, the security situation in the city improved gradually during the last years.\textsuperscript{843} Karachi attracts migration from every major ethnic and linguistic group in Pakistan owing to the city’s economic potential.\textsuperscript{844} The population consists of Muhajir and Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi and Baloch people.\textsuperscript{845} According to the last population census figures of 2017 published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, the population of Sindh is 47.9 million.\textsuperscript{846}

\textbf{Background of the conflict and actors in Sindh}

Since 5 September 2013, a security operation is ongoing in Sindh, mainly focusing on the capital Karachi. According to PIPS, the purpose of this operation is to tackle four categories of violent groups involved in violence in the city: the Pakistani Taliban, sectarian armed groups, armed wings of ethno-political parties and criminal gangs.\textsuperscript{847} In the period of 2013-2018 the Rangers carried out 14 327 security operations. These operations by the Rangers helped reducing the violence in Sindh.\textsuperscript{848} The Rangers have been given ‘special powers’ to tackle the variety of violence, not just ethno-political, but also sectarian violence and extortion.\textsuperscript{849} In July 2019, these ‘special powers’ were renewed for another 90 days.\textsuperscript{850} There are concerns about human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and torture and also about the growing role of the Rangers in the political affairs of Karachi and in corruption.\textsuperscript{851}

In the last two months of 2018, Karachi witnessed a surge in ‘terrorist attacks’. According to Zia Ur Rehman, a senior journalist based in Karachi, law enforcement officials believed that separatist groups

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from Balochistan and Sindh had made alliances to increase attacks in the city.\footnote{852 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url, pp. 126-127} In the first half of 2019 multiple security agencies in Sindh warned for attacks on foreign consulates, foreign engineers working for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), security forces, sensitive areas such as airports, political and religious leaders and places of worship of minorities. Multiple attacks were planned by the TTP, ISKP and AQIS according to the Sindhi police.\footnote{853 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url} In the last years, rural Sindh especially has emerged as ‘a new hotbed of militancy’, where several militant groups, particularly the TTP and the LeJ, have become active through their support and use of a local militant group led by Hafeez Brohi.\footnote{854 Express Tribune (The), Police foil 105 terrorist attacks, 7 July 2019, url} According to PIPS, most attacks in the province in 2018 were carried out by factions of the TTP, HuA and a Sindhi nationalist group Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SDLA) and the BLA.\footnote{855 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url}

Besides militancy, the province and especially the city of Karachi witnessed a lot of political, ethnic and gang-related violence.\footnote{856 Dawn, ‘Hitmen’ allegedly involved in attacks on MOM-P, PSP arrested: Sindh Rangers, 25 February 2019, url} The power struggle remains between the political parties of the main ethnic groups, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM, Mohajir), the Awami National Party (ANP, Pashtun) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP, Sindh).\footnote{857 Dawn, Karachi crime’s changing face, 27 November 2018, url} Apart, from this political violence, Karachi is still the base of heavily armed criminal gangs.\footnote{858 Dawn, ‘Hitmen’ allegedly involved in attacks on MOM-P, PSP arrested: Sindh Rangers, 25 February 2019, url}

**Description of recent trend**

In 2018, PIPS recorded 12 ‘terrorist attacks’ across the province, 9 of these attacks took place in Karachi and 3 in interior Sindh. This is a decline by more than half compared to 2017 when 31 ‘terrorist attacks’ occurred (24 attacks in Karachi and 7 in interior Sindh).\footnote{859 PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, url} Among those attacks, there were both sectarian-related and nationalist-inspired attacks.\footnote{860 PICSS observed in 2018, 15 militant attacks including five incidents of targeted killings, four IED based attacks, two cracker attacks, three physical assaults and one suicide attack.} \footnote{861} PIPS observed in 2018, 15 militant attacks including five incidents of targeted killings, four IED based attacks, two cracker attacks, three physical assaults and one suicide attack.\footnote{862}

As stated earlier, in the last quarter of 2018 there was a rise in attacks in the province.\footnote{863 Dawn, ‘Hitmen’ allegedly involved in attacks on MOM-P, PSP arrested: Sindh Rangers, 25 February 2019, url} On 23 November 2018, militants of the BLA attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi. Two police officers were killed.\footnote{864 Dawn, Karachi crime’s changing face, 27 November 2018, url} In October 2018, HuA, a splinter group of the TTP, claimed two attacks in Karachi.\footnote{865 Dawn, ‘Hitmen’ allegedly involved in attacks on MOM-P, PSP arrested: Sindh Rangers, 25 February 2019, url}

In February 2019, the International News reported about a ‘wave of sectarian killings’ in Karachi over the previous months.\footnote{866 Al Jazeera, Gunmen attack Chinese consulate in Karachi, 23 November 2018, url} In the first two months of 2019 four incidents of killings mainly on sectarian grounds have occurred in various parts of the city. According to the police it seemed that militants who were either released from jail or those militants of sleeper cells were behind the killings.\footnote{867 Dawn, ‘Hitmen’ allegedly involved in attacks on MOM-P, PSP arrested: Sindh Rangers, 25 February 2019, url} From 1 January 2019 to 31 July 2019, PIPS observed 13 ‘terrorist attacks’ in the province of Sindh. In total PIPS counted 19 casualties (17 killed and 2 injured).\footnote{868 Dawn, ‘Hitmen’ allegedly involved in attacks on MOM-P, PSP arrested: Sindh Rangers, 25 February 2019, url}
Impact of the violence on the civilian population

CRSS counted 278 casualties (192 fatalities and 86 injured) in the province of Sindh in 2018, a serious decline compared to 2017 (834 casualties).\textsuperscript{868} SATP recorded in 2018 in total 48 fatalities (12 civilians, 7 security force personnel and 29 ‘terrorists/insurgents/extremists’).\textsuperscript{869}

CRSS counted 111 casualties (85 fatalities, 26 injured) in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2019. In the second quarter of 2019, casualties (43) decreased in the province when compared to the first quarter of 2019 (67).\textsuperscript{870}

In the first seven months of 2019, SATP 22 counted fatalities. Among those killed, SATP observed 12 civilians, 5 security forces personnel, 5 ‘terrorists/insurgents/extremists’.\textsuperscript{871}

Displacement

UNOCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from the province of Sindh in 2018 or in the first seven months of 2019.\textsuperscript{872}

2.2.5. Islamabad Capital Territory

General description of the territory

Islamabad Capital Territory (see Map 1) is situated in the north of Pakistan between the provinces of KP and Punjab and includes the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. The administrative status of Islamabad Capital Territory is not very clear. The territory of the Islamabad Capital Territory is not demarcated and separated from adjoining areas.\textsuperscript{873} Islamabad has a population of different ethnic backgrounds including Punjabi, Pashtun, Sindhi and Urdu-speaking people. Islamabad has a relatively big proportion of religious minorities compared to other parts of the country, with 10% of the inhabitants being non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{874}

According to the last population census figures published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics the population of Islamabad Capital Territory is 2 million.\textsuperscript{875} Half of the population is living in urban areas.\textsuperscript{876}

Background of the conflict and actors in Islamabad Capital Territory

According to a report by Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) published on 21 May 2018, the level of security in Islamabad is higher than in other regions. The capital remains an attractive target due to the prevalence of government institutions, foreign missions, and administration officials.\textsuperscript{877} In the wake of the tensions with India in the beginning of 2019, the security forces were placed on ‘high alert’ in the capital.\textsuperscript{878}

\textsuperscript{869} SATP, Data Sheet-Sindh-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{870} CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 1st Quarter, 2019, 16 April 2019, url; CRSS, Quarterly Security Report 2019 2nd Quarter, 2019, 17 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{871} SATP, Data Sheet-Sindh-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
\textsuperscript{872} Websites consulted: http://www.unocha.org/pakistan; https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan; http://reliefweb.int/country/pak
\textsuperscript{873} International News (The), Islamabad: the deprived capital, 30 June 2019, url
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\textsuperscript{876} International News (The), Islamabad: the deprived capital, 30 June 2019, url
\textsuperscript{877} OSAC, Pakistan 2019 Crime & Safety Report: Islamabad, 7 March 2019, url
\textsuperscript{878} Business Recorder, Security put on high alert in Islamabad, 28 February 2019, url
Description of recent security trends

In 2018, PIPS recorded not a single ‘terrorist attack’ in Islamabad Capital Territory. In comparison, PIPS counted three ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017.\(^{879}\)

For the first seven months of 2019, PIPS recorded not a single terrorist attack in Islamabad Capital Territory.\(^{880}\) On 16 June 2019 unknown individuals killed journalist Muhammad Bilal Khan in Islamabad.\(^{881}\) The motive of the killing and whether it was related to his profession as a journalist was not identified.\(^{882}\)

Impact of the violence on the civilian population

In 2018, the CRSS annual security report reported 14 casualties (10 fatalities, 4 injured) from violence in Islamabad Capital Territory.\(^{883}\) This is a significant decline compared to 2017 when CRSS counted 123 casualties (16 fatalities, 107 injured).\(^{884}\)

According to CRSS data in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2019, 10 casualties (7 fatalities, 3 injured) were counted.\(^{885}\) Between January-July 2019, SATP observed one civilian fatality from violence in this region.\(^{886}\)

Displacement

UNOCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from Islamabad in 2018 or in the first seven months of 2019.\(^{887}\)

2.2.6. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

General description of the region

The Pakistan-controlled territory of Kashmir consists of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (commonly called Azad Kashmir, or AK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) (see Map 1), previously named the Northern Territories.\(^{888}\) Both regions have a partially autonomous administration.\(^{889}\) However, the influence of the government of Pakistan is far-reaching.\(^{890}\) AK has a population of about 3-4.5 million.\(^{891}\) The majority in AK is Muslim.\(^{892}\) GB has approximately 1.5 million inhabitants.\(^{893}\) GB has three

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880 Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
881 Dawn, Blogger killed in Islamabad’s G-9/4 area, police register FIR, 17 June 2019, url
882 Committee to Protect Journalists, Pakistani journalist Muhammad Bilal Khan stabbed to death in Islamabad, 19 June 2019, url
886 SATP, Data Sheet-Islamabad Capital Territory-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, url
888 OHCHR, Update of the Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019, 8July 2019, url, p. 34; Reuters, Kashmiris oppose Pakistan’s Northern Areas package, 31 August 2019, url
889 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Pakistani Kashmir, 4 February 2019, url
890 OHCHR, Update of the Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019, 8July 2019, url, p. 34
891 Reuters, Explainer: Scenic Kashmir at the heart of India-Pakistani animosity, 15 February 2019, url; Nation (The), Census 2017: AJK population rises to over 4m, 27 August 2017, url
892 Reuters, Explainer: Scenic Kashmir at the heart of India-Pakistani animosity, 15 February 2019, url
893 Nation (The), The importance of Gilgit Baltistan, 14 November 2018, url
administrative divisions: Chilas, Gilgit and Baltistan and is further divided into ten districts.\textsuperscript{894} The population of GB are mostly Shia.\textsuperscript{895}

**Background of the conflict and actors in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan**

The territory of Kashmir is a disputed area divided between India, Pakistan and China but claimed in its entirety by Pakistan and India. The Pakistan-India relationship has been historically tense for decades.\textsuperscript{896} India accuses Pakistan of supporting militant groups\textsuperscript{897} like JeM, LeT and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and having their operational bases in the Azad Kashmir region.\textsuperscript{898} Militant groups in the region of Indian-administered Kashmir address their discontent about the status of the area and recruiting young people to use violence in their quest for whether to be a part of Pakistan or be independent.\textsuperscript{899} A month after the Pulwama attack in February 2019, Pakistan started in ‘a crackdown’ on groups it claims are linked to banned organisations.\textsuperscript{900}

According to the Jamestown Foundation the wave of attacks in August 2018 in Gilgit-Baltistan showed that the area is vulnerable to militant attacks. The article suggested further the resurgence of the TTP in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. The wave of attacks in August 2018 demonstrated the group’s possibility to recruit people as well as its ability and willingness to conduct a variety of attacks.\textsuperscript{901}

**Description of recent security trends**

According to PIPS, one ‘terrorist attack’ occurred in Azad Kashmir in 2018 compared to three ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017.\textsuperscript{902} PICSS reported not a single militant attack in 2018 and described the security situation in Azad Kashmir as ‘stable’.\textsuperscript{903} However, the situation at the LoC remained volatile in 2018, according to PIPS. PIPS counted 109 cross-border attacks from the border with India.\textsuperscript{904}

In the first seven months of 2019, PIPS recorded not a single ‘terrorist attack’ in Azad Kashmir.\textsuperscript{905} In the same period PIPS recorded 63 incidents of violence at the Pakistan-India border.\textsuperscript{906} Following a suicide attack claimed by JeM on an Indian paramilitary convoy on 14 February 2019, which killed 42 soldiers in Pulwama (Indian-administered Kashmir), tensions rose between Pakistan and India. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that on 30 July 2019 along the LoC at the side of Azad Kashmir Indian troops resorted to what officials described as ‘carpet bombing’.\textsuperscript{907} Two civilians and at least 19 others were wounded in upper and lower belts of Neelum valley.\textsuperscript{908} The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan observed and reported an increase in military activity at the LoC in the beginning of August 2019.\textsuperscript{909} On 5 August 2019, India revoked Indian occupied Kashmir’s special autonomy

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\textsuperscript{894} Nation (The), The importance of Gilgit Baltistan, 14 November 2018, [url]
\textsuperscript{895} Binodkumar Singh, S., Pakistan: Gilgit Baltistan: Deception, 13 August 2018, in: South Asia Intelligence Review, volume 17, number 7, [url]
\textsuperscript{896} RFE/RL, India Blames Pakistan, Demands Action After Kashmir Attack, 15 February 2019, [url]; DW, Kashmir: The world’s most dangerous conflict, 7 August 2019, [url]
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\textsuperscript{899} Diplomat (The), Kashmir’s Teenage Militants, 27 December 2018, [url]
\textsuperscript{900} Al Jazeera, India-Pakistan tensions: All the latest updates, 10 March 2019, [url]
\textsuperscript{901} Zahid, F., Recent Wave of Terrorism in Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan Region, 2 November 2018, in Terrorism Monitor, Volume 16, Issue 21, [url]
\textsuperscript{903} PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2018, 19 April 2019, [url], p. 47
\textsuperscript{904} PIPS, Pakistan Security Report 2018, 6 January 2019, [url], p. 62
\textsuperscript{905} Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
\textsuperscript{906} Rana Amir, M., email, 2 August 2019 - data (01/01/2019-31/07/2019) courtesy of PIPS
\textsuperscript{907} Heavy shelling with mortar guns and rocket launchers; Dawn, 2 killed, at least 19 injured due to ‘carpet bombing’ by Indian troops along LoC, 30 July 2019, [url]
\textsuperscript{908} Dawn, 2 killed, at least 19 injured due to ‘carpet bombing’ by Indian troops along LoC, 30 July 2019, [url]
\textsuperscript{909} GEO News TV, UN appeals to India, Pakistan to exercise restraint as tensions mount in Kashmir, 5 August 2019, [url]
through a presidential decree.\(^{910}\) Pakistan reacted by stating that it would ‘exercise all possible options to counter the illegal steps’ taken by India regarding Indian-administered Kashmir.\(^{911}\)

According to PICSS, four militant attacks were reported in 2018 in Gilgit-Baltistan.\(^{912}\) PIPS recorded five ‘terrorist attacks’ in the area and two encounters between security forces and militants.\(^{913}\) All these attacks occurred in August 2018 and started on 3 August 2018, when at least twelve schools have been burnt down in Diamer district.\(^{914}\) In reaction to these arson attacks, the police began conducting raids in various parts of Diamer to find the perpetrators.\(^{915}\)

PIPS recorded not a single ‘terrorist attack’ in Gilgit-Baltistan in the first seven months of 2019.\(^{916}\)

**Impact of the violence on the civilian population**

In 2018, CRSS documented no fatalities of violence in Azad Kashmir.\(^{917}\) PIPS mentioned that one ‘terrorist attack’ in 2018 resulted in one person killed and two injured.\(^{918}\) In 2018, in Pakistan, cross-border attacks with India claimed the lives of 64 people while 264 were injured.\(^{919}\) Most cross-border attacks occurred in Bhimber, Kotli and Poonch alongside the LoC and in Sialkot.\(^{920}\) The cross-border shelling had an impact on the civilians living near the LoC. The civilian government remains absent in these areas.\(^{921}\) According to Pakistan-administered Kashmir leader Masood Khan, among the people there is anger at provocative statements coming from India.\(^{922}\) The report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 8 July 2019 stated that people living in Azad as well as in Gilgit-Baltistan are deprived of fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of expression and opinion.\(^{923}\) Ceasefire infringements in 2018 and 2019 resulted in the killing of civilians, destruction of civilian property and displacement of people according to OHCHR.\(^{924}\)

According to data in the first and second quarter analysis report of 2019 conducted by CRSS, no fatalities were counted in AK.\(^{925}\) According to SATP, five fatalities among security force personnel were documented from terrorist violence in AK in the first seven months of 2019.\(^{926}\) Shelling at the LoC caused in the first seven months of 2019, the death of 24 civilians and wounded 133 civilians. Eleven army personnel were killed also.\(^{927}\) Dawn stated that most victims fell in Kotli district in Haveli district, Bhimber district, in Jhelum Valley district, in Neelum Valley and in Poonch.\(^{928}\)
CRSS documented eight casualties of violence in Gilgit-Baltistan in 2018.\textsuperscript{929} In the first and second quarter of 2019 CRSS counted no casualties.\textsuperscript{930} Similarly, SATP did not document any fatalities among civilians from insurgent violence in GB in the first seven months of 2019.\textsuperscript{931}

**Displacement**

The IDMC stated that it is likely that frequent cross-border shelling and other military activities in Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir are generating displacements, although numbers are rarely reported.\textsuperscript{932} No further information about IDPs could be found among the consulted sources during the reporting period.\textsuperscript{933}

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\textsuperscript{931} SATP, Data Sheet-Gilgit-Baltistan-Yearly Fatalities, last updated: 5 August 2019, \url{https://satp.org/data-sheet-gilgit-baltistan-years/}

\textsuperscript{932} IDMC, Pakistan Figure Analysis – Displacement Related to Conflict and Violence (GRID 2019), 2019, \url{https://www.idmc.net/figures/2019/figure-alleviaterelatedconflictandviolence}, p. 1

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Annex II: Terms of Reference

The goal of this report is to provide security-related information relevant for international protection status determination. An important goal of this report is to provide details on a regional, provincial or even district level. The reporting period for incidents and events illustrating the general trends of the conflict, is 15 August 2018 until 31 July 2019. The terms of reference were drafted by Cedoca in consultation with EASO and the COI Specialist Network on Pakistan.

The content of the report should contain information on the following topics:

General description of the security situation:
- Background of the conflict
  - Overview of recent conflicts
- Actors in/Parties to the conflict
- Recent security trends and security trends
- Impact of the violence
  - Civilian population: casualties, IDPs, refugees
  - State ability to secure Law and Order: security forces, justice, detention
  - Geographical overview of the security situation

Regional description of the security situation:
- Punjab
  - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including former FATA and a description of the KP tribal districts in detail)
  - Sindh
  - Balochistan
  - Islamabad
  - Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

For each region, a short description of the region (terrain, urban areas, population) should be included, followed by information on:
- General description of the region
- Background of insecurity in the region: actors, type of violence
- Recent security trends (focus on 2018 and first seven months of 2019) according to the four main sources (number of incidents, example of the kind of violence, effects of the violence)
- Displacement/return